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Articles 
The Strange Career of Jane Crow: 
Sex Segregation and the Transformation 
of Anti-Discrimination Discourse 
Serena Mayeri* 
In September 1977, hundreds of African American parents and students 
picketed the Amite County courthouse in Liberty, I\/lississippi. Holding 
banners that read "End Sex Discrimination," they launched a month-long 
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School of Law; and the New York Lau; and Humanities Workshop. This project has benefited 
tren~endously from feedback offered at various stages by Kerry Abrams. Adrienne Davis? Rebecca 
Davis, William Eskridge. Katherine Franke, Glenda G~lmol-e, Risa Goluboff, Robert Gordon, Ariela 
Gross, Jill Hasday, Taja-Nia Henderson. Mlchael Jo, Laura Kallnan. Deborah Malamud, Harriet 
Mayeri, Bethany Moreton, Maribel Morey. Julia Ott. Robert Post, Richard Prirnus. Rebecca Rix, Jed 
Rubenfeld, Jed Handelsman Shupem~an. Reca Siegel, Anders Walker. Kenji Yoshino, and Philipp 
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Archives at M1ashingtoil 8: Lee University School of Law: and to Susan Tucker and the staff of the 
Newcomb College Center for Research on Women at Tulane U11ive1-sity. who provided heroic 
assistance under trying conditions. 
boycott of area p ~ ~ b l i c  s hools.' Thc African Arnerican comm~lnity of 
Alnitc Ceunty was protesting a rcglme of sex segregation conceived in the 
immediate aftermath s f  BI$Y.o~I'P~ V. B O U ~  of fiI1lc~ltii)tl and implemented 
fifteen years later, when the Supreme Cout-t established school districts' 
"affim~ative duty" to abolish dual school systems for black and white 
children.When whites in many parts of the South threatened to shut 
down public schools rather than desegregate, sex segregation had offered a 
promising antidote to fears of racial "amalgamation." NOW, it was African 
American families fed up with sex separation who kept their children 
home. Their story, and the legal battles fought in their name, are the focus 
of this article. 
"Jane C r ~ w , " ~  the term I will use to refer to the use of sex segregation in 
racial desegregation plans, represents a little-studied phenomenon in the 
legal and social history of race and sex in the postwar southern United 
States.%xamining the theory and practice of Jane Crow helps to elilcidate 
the cultural ramifications of, and interactions among, racial integration, 
shifting sexual mores, gender politics, and legal change during this period. 
Debates and litigation over Jane Crow also exemplify a series of 
transformations in antidiscrimination law and discourse between the 1950s 
and the late 1990s. In particular, the sex segregation controversy reveals 
profound shifts in the conceptualization of the constitutional harm of 
discrimination and in the construction of the relationship between race and 
sex inequality. 
Before the Supreme Court declared racial segregation unconstitutional 
in Bvo~vn 11. Board oj' Edzlcation, Jim Crow's defenders often used the 
unquestioned legitimacy of sex segregation to illustrate the absurdity of 
outlawing racial segregation-keeping black from white was as natural as 
separating male from female, the argument went. Brown permanently 
1. Daniel Sheridan. School Bo~cott  Lecider- Vo'o~.s to Contitz~le, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT,  Aug. 31, 
1977 (on file with the Library of'Congress, Records of the National Associatio~l for the Advancement 
of Colored People [hereinafter "Records of the NAACP"], V: 2570, Folder: Branches-States- 
Mississipp~: A-J Misc., 1956-8 1 ). 
2 .  Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,437 ( I  968). 
3 .  I use "Jane Crow'' as a shorthand because it neatly captures the interconnections and overlap 
between sex segregation and J I ~  Crow. It should be noted. however. that the term "Jane Crow" 
apparently originated In the writings of the pioneering clvil rights lawyer and fenlinist Pauli Murray in 
the 1940s, and referred to sex discrimination inore generally. The te1-m first achieved widespread 
dissemination in 1965, when blurray, along with Justice Department attorney Mary 0. Eastwood, 
published a pathbreaking article entitled, "Jane Crow and the Law." See Pauli Murray & Mary 
Eastwood, Jane Crow und the Ltrw: Se.x Discrin7inrrtior1 nnd Title I///, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 
(1965). For more on Murray arid "Jane Crow,'' see, for example, Susan Ware, Dialog~le: Puctli 
Murruj~'s Notable Connectiot~s, 14 J. WOMEN'S  HIST. 54 (2002). On Murray's contributions to 
feminist IegaI strategy in the 1960s and early 1970s, see Serena Mayeri, Cntl.stit~~tionul Choices: Legal 
Fe~ninisn~ and the Nisto~.i~,ill DJ'IZUIIIICS of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004). 
4. Two recent articles have iricludcd brief discussions of these cases. See Jill E. Hasday, The 
Principk und Pi.ucticr (if' kVomen's 'ilirl! Citizerzship': '4 Glse S~LIC!I' qf Sex Segregated P~lblic 
Education, 10 1 Ivlrcr-i. L. RE\'. 755 (2002); LJerna C. Williams, Rcrjb?-t?i or Hctrenchnlent?: Single-Sex 
Education and tile Con.rtr.~~ction qfRcrce and Gender, 2004 MQs. L. Rtv. 15; .see also Jack Balkin, Is 
There a Slippery Slope fion1 Single-Se-r Edzicution to Sirzgle-Race Edz~cu[ion?, 37 J .  OF BLACKS IN 
HIGHER EDUC. 126 (2002). 
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disrupted this neat syIlogism. As Pal? I of this article describes, in the 
wake of what some white Southerners called "Black Monday," sex 
segregation stnlck many observers as the perfect answer to fears that racial 
integration would lead inexorably to social intimacy and, ultimately; to 
interracial marriage and the horrors of "amalgamation," or 
"mongrelization." Many southern states passed laws authorizing the 
separation of students by sex, and some of the very few school districts 
that implemented desegregation in the first fifteen years after BTOII:M 
considered or employed sex segregation. While there certainly was 
disagreement over the desirability and efficacy of the sex segregation 
solution, few questioned its constitutionality during this period. After all, 
anti-miscegenation laws remained on the books until 1967,5 and civil 
rights proponents were reluctant to vindicate segregationist propaganda by 
even hinting that racial equality required black boys to attend school with 
white girls. And though a few commentators suggested that sex 
segregation inight impose a racial "badge of inferiority," virtually no one 
characterized Jane Crow as sex discrimination. 
Part I1 chronicles the first shift in Jane Crow law and discourse, which 
occurred in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's 1968 mandate that 
Southel-11 school districts expeditiously produce and implement 
desegregation plans designed to create racially "unitary" school s y s t e l ~ ~ s . ~  
A number of school districts in several Southern states included sex 
segregation in these plans, prompting resistance from many African 
American communities, and, in some cases, federal government 
intervention. Objectors contended that sex segregation, in this context, 
"perpetuate[d] racial segregation by subterf~ge."~ The Fifth Circuit 
responded by establishing a "racial motivation standard" to evaluate the 
legality of sex segregation schemes: courts were to inquire into whether 
the plans were motivated by "racial discrimination," or rather stemmed 
from legitimate "educational pui-po~es."~ Though everyone understood-- 
and many acknowledged outside of court-that fears about the social 
implications of racial integration were the real impetus for sex separation. 
the racial motivation standard encouraged school districts to manufacture 
race-neutral justifications for Jane Crow. Many of the "educational 
purposes" cited by school districts, sucli as the virtues of sex-specific 
curricular specialization and the need to rescue boys from the "feminized" 
classroom, reflected the failure of emerging anti-sex-discrimination nonns 
5. Lo\ing 1. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 ( 1907). 
h Gretw. 391 U.S. at 340 
7. Bncf of Appellants at 9. Smitl~ v .  C'ancoi-dia Parish Sch. Ud., No. 28342 (5th ('il-. C)ct I .  19h9i 
(on file w ~ t h  the National Arch~vcs  and Record< Adrninistratiorl [hei-einaftcr "XAKA"J. Su~rthwcst 
liegiot~al 1111 ision [l~el-einafter "S.W. Reg. I~IV."] .  RG 276, United States C o u ~ t  of Appeals fi>r- l ! ~ c  
Fifth C'il-cu~f [herelnafter "Fifth Circu~t"]. ('asc Flies. Box 3235. 28342-28340) 
8. G1iitt.d States \' Amite C'ounly. No.  280.30 (5th (_'ir. Dec. 1'9, 1069) ( ' ' j l ) \  r;lclal d~\c i -~r i~in ; l t~or?  
rhe rnotlvation for the plan or does it lia\$e 11s h a s ~ s  rn cducat~onal purpo\cs'.'"). Tlie ~CI-ni  "I-ac~a! 
morl\atlon standard" is  my o\vn shorthanci. 
Yale Journal of Law & thc 1-liimanities [Vol.  18:1X7 
to penetrate Jane Crow discourse. While rnany had come to view Jane 
Crow as racially discriminatory, neither litigants nor judges raised any 
cjui~ll~s relating to sex discrimination in the late ! 960s and early 1970s. 
The women's rights revolution changed all that, as Pal? 111 relates. The 
explosion in legal conscio~~sness of sex discrimination between 1970 and 
i 977-the result of advocacy, legislation, and litigation--transformed the 
debate over sex segregation. By 1974, a whole host of new legal tools and 
thcorics were available to opponents of Jane Crow, including Title TX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972," the Equal Educational Opportunity 
Act of 1974," and a new constitutional equal protection jurisprudence." 
Plaintiffs in some Jane Crow cases, and advocates from groups like the 
American Civil Libel-ties Union, the National Organization for Women, 
and the American Friends Service Committee, now argued that sex 
segregation was not only race discrimination, but sex discrimination. The 
school districts' defense of sex segregation, which emphasized the 
benefits of single-sex schools to boys and the virtues of sex-specific 
c u ~ ~ i c u l a  that (to feminists) disadvantaged girls, made salient a particular 
version of the sex discrimination argument. This argument emphasized the 
psychological and material harms that sex segregation imposed upon girls, 
and framed those ham~s  as analogous to the injuries visited upon black 
children by racial segregation. 
Calling sex segregation sex discrimination provided advocates with a 
new and compelling argument against Jane Crow, and offered the 
women's rights movement a powerf~~l example of invidiously motivated 
separation of the sexes at a time when such separation largely was viewed 
as benign. But this analogy-based sex discrimination model, for all of its 
rhetorical and strategic advantages, failed to capture what was at stake for 
those arguably   no st affected by Jane Crow: African American families in 
9. 20 U.S.C. 5 1681 (2005). 
10. See Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, $ 202(a)(l). codtfified at 20 U.S.C. 
170l(a!(l) ("[All1 children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity 
without regard to race, color, sex. or national origin"); id. $ 203(a)(l), codifirct crt 20 U.S.C.  $ 1702(a) 
("The Congress finds that . . . the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned 
to schools solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to thosc students the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment"); id. 5 204, codified nr 20 U.S.C. 
$ 1703 ("No State shall deny equal ecfi~cational opportnnity to an indivitlual on account of his or her 
race, color, sex, or national origln, by . . . the assignment by an educational agency of a student to a 
school, other than the one closest to his or her place of residence within the school district in which he 
or she resides, if the assign~ncnt resuits in a greater degrce of segregation of students on the basis of 
mce, co!or, sex, or national origin among the schools of such agency than wo~lld result if such students 
were assigned to the school closest to his or her place of residence within the school district of such 
agency providing the appropriate grade level and type of education for s~ich student"); id. 5 296, 
cod~fird crt 20 U.S.C. $ 1705 ("[Tlhc assignment by an educational agency of a student to the school 
nearest his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for 
such student is not a dcnial of equal educational opportunity or of equal protection of the laws unless 
SLICII assignment is for the purpose of segregating students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national 
origin, or the school to which such student is assigned was located on its site for the purpose of 
segregating students on such basis "). 
11. See, e.g., Frontier0 v. Richardson. 41 1 U.S. 677 (1973) 
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the sex-segregating school districts of Georgia, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi. As I argue in Part IV, some African American communities 
calm to evaluate the efficacy of sex segi-egation in pragmatic terms, based 
on its success in keeping white students and govei-ninent funds in the 
public schools. Where they perceived sex separation as retaining white 
enrolllnent in, and financial contribution to, public schools, many African 
Americans apparently were mjilling to put up with this "less than ideal" 
policy. In contrast, in sex-segregating school districts where whites 
abandoned the public scl~ools in large numbers and withdrew theil- 
financial support, black resentment and protest of Jane Crow increased 
during the 1970s. 
African Americans affected by Jane Crow also expressed the harm of 
sex segregation in ways not captured by the dominant legal sex 
discrimination paradigm. They did not eniphasize psychological and 
material damage inflicted on girls in particular, but rather voiced broader 
concerns about the distribution of political power and the proper 
socialization and education of children. They stressed the undemocratic 
imposition of sex segregation by white officials on blacks; the insidious 
implications of a policy intended to keep black boys away from white 
girls; the arbitrary lin~itations on both male and female cu~ricular choice; 
the obstacles to healthy, Iieterosocial interaction between boys and girls: 
and students' lack of preparation for a sex-integrated world. 
Recovering the Jane Crow cases and the debates they adjudicated helps 
us to see more concretely the staltes of school desegregation for black and 
white Southern families, for school officials, for the civil rights and 
women's rights mo\iements, and for the reiationship between legal 
advocacy and grassroots protest. But the story of Jane Crow has thus far 
been little lnore than a footnote to the history of sex-segregated education 
and of white resistance to racial descgregation. Part V explores the reasons 
for the Jane Crow cases' legal obscurity, describing their legal resolution 
under a little-noticed statutoiy provision and explaining why the sex 
discriniination argument against sex segregation nal-rowly failed in thc 
Supreine Court. Part V1 concludes by reflecting upon each phase of the 
Jane Crow debate and upon the consequences of the transformation of 
anti-discrimination discourse that this controversy embodied. 
!. " 0 ~ 1 ~  Fo ir\/l O r  SEGREG 4 1 ' 1 0 ~  TI 141 IS PI- KF EC I LY LEG 2 ~ " '  
TH t SEX SFPARAI roh SOLL-I lob. 
This Past locates the origins of sex segregation proposals in the 
aftermath of tlic B1-01,tw decision and describes the politics and l a ~ l  of sex 
segregation in the years before the Supreme Cou1-t required widespread 
I-acial desegregation. As thc first section describes. Bi-o~ix revitalized a 
longsranding discourse that linked racial integration to sexual disordel- anci 
the decline of civilized hunlanity. Cries of "al~?algali?ation" and 
L ' ~xongreli:~:aiiiori" i i i  B!-r:,r, t~'s vakc prompted politicians, journalists, and 
ordinar-y citizen:; ti, sl!gge,;t scs regregation as a soiution to thc problem of 
racial i~tegraiion. 5ic 3. scgrcgation proposals served a variety of political 
,- purposes. some expsesscd revulsion against interracial intimacy, while 
others reflected a gcri~liile desire to ease the transition to an integrated 
sosiety. Bu!t as the scconcl section sho\vs. whatever its underlying impetus, 
sex segregation erljoyed virtual!y unquestioned constitutional validity in 
the decade and a half 3Rer B).O\I:YZ. Dilring this period, almost no one 
suggested publicly that separate schools for male and female students 
might constitute illccal <.- discrimination. 
A. "To Alicr?, the War-st f i c r i - " :  Seer Sc>gr-egation Pr-oposc~is in the Brown 
Dec~ldt? 
In the century follo~ving the Civil War, courts and legal scholars often 
used the "naturalfy" separate education of the sexes to rationalize the 
legality of school scgregatior! by race. In 1878, for instance, a federal 
court in Louisiana rejected a challenge to racial segregation in the state's 
public schools, declaring, "Eq~iality of right does not necessarily imply 
identity of right.;;."" l f the Constitution's equal protection guarantee 
prohibited racial r;cparaiio:~, the court went on to suggest, the equality 
principle would also rnandate "cducating children of both sexes, or 
children without regard tr; their attainments or age in the same ~choo l . " ' ~  
Such a result was cieai-ly absurd." Eight decades later, attorney John W. 
Davis hoped the 1-Jnifcd States Si~preme Court would see things the same 
way: if the Court ouiia~$-eci racial school segregation, he argued in 1952, 
there would hc alo 1cgal basis for separating students on any number of 
perfectly legitimate g~oi l~ids ,  such as age, ability--or sex." 
The N~-ov i*r l  decision did not put such arguments to rest; quite the 
contrary."' But 111 the  post-Br.o\\:t.l era, sex-segregated schooling became 
12. Bel-tonncaii \ .  IZcl, ut~Dilcctoi-.;. 3 1:. Cas. 294. 295-96 (C.C.D. La. 1578). 
1 3 .  I t / .  
14. Feileral distr-ict .luJgc ii.illi;im 11. Woods. later an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
COLIT~, usrote in N C I . I O I I I I ~ ~ L I I I ,  
[T lhc  sole grlcvsncc . . ih tiwt co~nplainant's childreti. being of African descent, are not 
allowed to attend the sailic ji~hllc \cllools as those in which childr-en of white parents are 
eclucarcd. White childrerl ;111cl i:ulo;.ccl cliiidren a]-e co~npelled to attend different schools. That is 
all. Thc state . hat1 ~ l i ~  right to nlana,ze its schools in the manner which, in its judgment, will 
best j~ro~iiotc lic intci-cst.; of a!!. The statc !i?ay bc of the op~nion that it is better to educate the 
sexes apart. Hy such :I policy can it he said that the equal rights of either sex are invaded? 
Id .  For more on thc !IJL'I.IOIIIII.(III C;LSC. see LIL':\ B.-\KER, TIE SECOND BATTLE 01- NEW ORLEANS: Tljt 
HUNDRED-Y E A I ~  S-llI<l;(>( 11.1: ? 0 IN  I L ( , R . \ ~ I  I: T I  I E  SCkl0C)LS 29-3 I ( 1996). 
I S .  Philip Dodtl. C'!ilit i T[~:r!<t;\ ; '11 Sq~.c+~triion i f 1  P~thlic Schools. CFII D ~ \ I ~ . Y  TRIB., Dec. 10; 
1952, at 6. The context hl- i h \  ix's :I[-gutncrir \\,as the Supreme Court's first consideration of the scliool 
segregatiox cases that would later hc known as Bt.o~vri 1.. B o a t d  yfEdrtcatiotr. For more on Davis, see 
WILLIAM k1. H..\RUAI!(,II. I..\\\ Yi.i:'!; i . , \ \$rYtK:  Tl l t  LIFE O F  JOHN W .  DAVIS (2d ed. 1990). 
16. For instance. critics rnoclicd flr-ott,:~'s holding that racial school segregation was 
unconstitutional by s~iggcstir~g tll::t the ruling, by extension, would invalidate all-tnale colleges and 
salient in a different way: as a palliative for white Southern fears that 
racially mixed schools would lead down a slippery slope toward 
interracial marriage and social equality. "The ultimate aim and goal of 
NAACP leaders in the present segregaiim fight," warned Georgia 
Governor Herman E. "Eugene" Tal~nadge in 1955, "is the complete 
intermingling of the races in housing, schools, churches, public parks, 
public swimming pools and even in marriage."" 'l'he unavoidable result of 
such social integration would be a "mongrcl race in which the strongest 
and best features of both races have been destroyed," wrote ~almadge. ' "  
Such proclamations, along with well-known sociological a~~alyses  that 
linked segregation with fears of "rnlscegcnat~on," convinced many 
Americans that visceral discomfort with interracial intllnacy lay at the 
heart of Southern resistance to integration." 
Tndeed, it is almost impossible to overstate the pervasiveness of this 
discourse of "mongrelization" and "amalgarnat~oi~" in the wake of 
~vo~)rz.'O Virtually every Issue of the segl-egatronist Citizens' Council's 
publication warned, in lurid tenns, that desegregation would lead 
inevitably to interracial mairiagc, and ro the degeneiation of the white 
race." Popular segregationist scrceds like Judce - Tonr P. Brady's B/uc.ll 
Monday: Segregutio~z or- A n ~ a l g u ~ ~ ~ a t l o n ,  .Atner-/cir Hcrc /ts Cl7oice and 
Senator Theodore Bilbo's Tl~ke  Yozrr. Choicv: Seuuration or* 
Mongrelzzatior~ minced no words in forccasring I-ac~al integration's 
military academres. which seemed a patently ridiculous result. L.cna l i .  Reynolds of Berkeley, 
California. wrote to  two major newspapers rn 1956. 
Since the Suprclne Court has decreed that segt-egation In rlic public schools must end. arid, since 
the Military Academy at  West Point and the Na\a l  Aiademy at Ar~napolis 111ost certainly are 
public educational institutions. what will happen rf mrlitant fcniales. re ly~ng on the polrticians' 
pledges of 'equal rights for wonier~,' apply for bur at-e relilscd admissior; to these public 
schools'? Will the Supreme Court d e c ~ d e  that segregation of  the scscs mus: end because o f  the 
inferiority cornplex which this unequal treatment has been engender-ing in the wori~en of  tllc 
United States'? Who can tell what Joan o f  ,4rc rs k i n g  detiirc! I~el- 'equal oppor-tunity' fol- a 
mil itar-y careel-? 
Lena 13. Reynolds. Letter to the Editor, D i . s c ~ r - i i i ~ i i r r i i i o i ~ : ~ .  t . A . T l i { ~ k . s .  Scpt. 9 .  1956, at B4: Lena H. 
Reynolds, Letter to the Editor, Lfiiei/tri~l T~.~r i / l l ier~/ ,  W ~ L I  S T .  J . .  Scpt. i 3 .  1% 6 ,  at I!). .Sw cilso i~?fi.tr 
note 77. 
17. Hertlian E. Talmadge, fn/er-11li;7y/i11g utid f ~ i r ~ , ~ - ~ r i ~ r i - i - i ~ i ~ r : ~ , ,  " 7  \'OO - \XI)  SI (~~<EC;..\TION 42 
(1955). For- more on Talmadge. see \.\:rl.L1,4X1 A N D I ; R S ~ I \ .  7111- \1:11.1) hl .\N i  RO?I SO~; . \R  C I ~ T E K :  TI IE  
POLITICAL C A K F I : I <  O F  EIJGEI\'E T~I.hlAJl(j1: ( 1075). 
18. Talmadge, .sr~p~.n note 17. at 41 SYC, trlco Editorral, 7 ; )  ..1110~- r l i ~  Il'or:\/ 1:ciir.. C'I~I:ISTI.\N Sc I. 
M O N I T ~ K .  July 7. 1954. at E-2 ("When the w ~ d e l y  1,especteii C;o\ci-nor of South Car-olina. Jarncs F. 
I3ymcs. told a cor-respondent of this ne\itspaper he o p p o s x  ending I-;icf;ii zcgr-i-g;~tion iri the public 
schools chiefly because i t  'will Icad to mon~r~cl i ra t ion '  he \\,:!s \.oiciny tltc grca: t~n~!c!-Iy~l~g k;rr that 
besets many of  the white people of  the Soutl,.") 
19. See, ex.. (;UNNAR MYRL1.4L. A N  AMI :RI ( ' , \L  D l 1  ~ h l \ l  \ (IV44). 
20. On the prolninence of  "arnalg;iniat1011~~ f?;?15 in tlic tl?c.ola;;i[;il tich;ite o \ r r  scgrcgat1oi1. see 
Jane Uarlcy. Sru. Segrc,gir!io~i. ur?if rile So~.i-c~ii r fii~i- I ~ I - I , \ ~  n . 9 I .i. Axt. i 1 1 q 1  1 10 (100-7 ). One sl;ltc 
legislator succinctly summed up the stance of  numsroirs \vhiti. Sot~tlier-n !~oiiticia~i:, ill 195X: "All law:, 
for the separation of races ;ire lar-gel! a deli-nhc . . p r ~ t ~ ~ t i i ~ g  thc la\< ;is;iinb! iilt~1-!11;11-t.i;lyc 7 h c  real 
leader-s o f  tlic ranti-scgr-e~atiori] movement know u.ll;?l t h q  \\.\;lni. t:~ti~i-rnar-i~i;lyc " ~ 1 1 1 ~ r ~ ~ ~ 1  111 Paul 
Sit~iori. A . S O U I / ~ ~ W ~  .SWI-C;~.. C I ~ I ? J S J  I A Y  Sc.1. b10\1 roi< ,\11g 2h. I O i X .  :it 0. 
2 )  For more on thc C'tuzens C-ouncilKs tirst ciccacie. sec N l  I1 i t  ? i l c  ?lIi L I - L .  T I I I  ( ' I - I I L I I N S '  
o :  R I  I I  \ ( ' i  10  I 1 1 '  SI;( OND KI:( ( I N S  I R i J c  rlo!,. I 'iSJ-6.4 ( i O7 1 I 
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particular." Still, as Renee Romano describes, BI-OM.IZ brought fears of 
i< race-mixing" to the forefront of popular discourse once more.18 The 
prospect of .school desegregation was especially tl~reatening to white 
Southerners, because it entailed a particular kind of social equality not as 
clearly implicated in other public  setting^.'^ Many saw children as 
especially susceptibIe to the corruption of interracial contact: if white 
children went to school alongside black children, how would they learn 
tlie etiquette of racial hierar~hy?'~ Orators sentimentalized white 
children's racial purity as they demonized "race mixing." Governor Ross 
Barnett told Mississippians in a 1962 televised address, "There is no cause 
which is more moral and just than the protection of the integrity of our 
races. To this end, we as parents will do whatever is necessary to defend 
those who are most dear to us."" 
27. MYRUAL, .sui~ru note 19. Jane Dailey writes that "state antimiscegenation la\w underpinned 
the edifice of racial segregation and discriminat~on in America. a fact advertised by students of 
southern social relations since the 1920s." Jane Dailey, Tile Tiienlog~. c!J"tlrr.s.si~~e Resistcrnce: Seu. 
Segt-egution, c ~ i ~ d  [he Sucr-ed ufier. Brown. ill M;\Ssrvt KESIST.ANC~~; SOlr~11EuN OPPOSI TIC?N TO I ' I ~ I :  
SECONI> RECONSTRUCTION (Clive Webb ed., 2005) 151, 158. Other eat-ly works explicating the 
connectron betmeen anti-miscegenation fervor and white supremacy ~ncluded JAMES WELDON 
JOHNSON. ALONG TIIIS W h y  (1933); JOHY DOLLARD. CASTI-. A N D  CLASS IK !\ SOUTHERN TOLIN 
(1937): and L I I - L J A ~  S I I T H ,  KILLERS OF Tlil-. DREAM ( 1  949). Dailey. .\rr/?i-~, at 158-59 & I76 n.30. 
On the origins of the tern1 "miscegenation." see Sidney Kaplan. 73e ~\lisc~c~~~ctii~/iori I.ss~re it1 the 
Eiellecrion of 1864. 24 1. NtGRO HIST. 274 (1949). For niorc on the t\tent~etli-centu~y histo~y of 
opposition to intel~acial intimacy, see, for example. ! K T ~ R R A C I A L I S ~ I :  B L A C I - W I ~ I T E  
INTERMARRIAGE IN A ~ I E R I C A N  HISTORY, LITER/\TURI-., A N D  LAM. ( W L - ~ C F  Sollors ed.. 2000): 1011N 1'. 
JOHNSOY, JK.. SCIENCE FOR SEGRi:G,4TION: RACE, LAW. .AN11 T H t  CAYE AGXINST BliOif'?i. 1'. RO:I/<I) Oi-' 
EI)IICATION (2005): ALI=.X LUBIN,  ROMANCE AND R I G ~ ~ T S :  HE POI_lTICS OF ~ N T E K R . ~ ( ' I A L  IhTIM,\CJ'. 
1945-1954 (2005); RENEE ROMAKO. RACE MIXING:  BLACK-W131 1-F M K R I A C ~ E  1Y POST~UAII AMERICA 
(2003); Julle Novkov, Ruc.iui Cot~srr-itcriotis. The Legoi Re:<~~/uiio~r of' /ritc,i-12iciuI Mu/./-itrgc. in 
.4luhut71u. 1890-IY.34. 20 L. & HIST. REV. 225 (2002); and Peggy I'ascoe, ,Wi.$cegri~trrioi~ /<~11. .  C;)~ii.f 
Ca.c.e.s. U I I ~  rile Ideolog~. qJ'"Rczce " ill T~t.eti/ii/tl7-Cetirtri:1~ ./fn?ei.ictr. 83 J .  .4hi. HIST. 44 ( 1996). 
28. ROMANO. strprtr note 27. at 146. 
29. On tlie particular threat posed by school desegregation. as opposed to othcr types of 
desegregation, see ROMANO, . s~~pro  n te 27. at 156. and CHARLES BOL~TON. T H I :  HIKIIEST D t h ~  OF
ALI-: THE BATTLE OVER SCI~OOL INTEGRATIOS ir\' M~SS~SS~PPI. 1870-1980 xvil. 108 (2005). Book- 
length defenses of  racial segregation in education included J.ihl1.S J.~C.I<SOS KII.I'ATRICK. T I I F  
S ~ U T H E K N  CASE FOR S C H ~ O L  SEGRLC~ATION ( 1  962): %ILLI:\M i). \vORKh4.4h. JR.. 1.111- CASL FOR T-ifF-: 
S O ~ J I I I  (1 960); and EI)W.ARD P. LA~VTON, THE SOUTH .4ND THE N A T I O ~  ( i 963). 
30. See ROMANO. c~ipr-ir note 27, at 159 ("[Slouthern parents wel-c ultimately mol-L- concerned that 
Lvhlte students in integrated schools \vould be taught that the races were equal. TI:is 'm~seducation,' as 
segregationists desci-ibed it. would counter- the inhercnt inst~nct of 'race prefcl-cnce' and uould 
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31. Ross Bar-nett, i ~ ~ t i s . s i s c i ~ ~ ~ ~ i  Srili Sq s '.Vel.r,-'!. THE Clil/Eh. Scpt. 1902. at h (transcript of 
television and radro address to tile people of Missihsipp~, del~vered Sept 13. 1967). Barnett continuzd. 
"Thsl-c 1s no case i l l  histoi-); \\-here the Caucasian I-ace has surv~\.ed social iiltepl-atio1-i. Lye \&,ill not 
drink fi-om tlic cup of geiiocide!" Id. Accordrii~ to Karen ,Andel-son. tlie Sear "that desegl-egation 
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This palpable tcrror of interracial social contact and its apotheosis, 
interrac~al marriage, motivated many observers, North and South, to 
suggest sex separation as a solution to the desegregation dilemma. 
Southern governors and legislators of various political stripes embraced 
the idea that schools faced with the prospect of racial integration should be 
free to establish separate schools for boys and girls. Anticipating the 
irnminent demise of Jim Crow laws, the Alabama legislature a~ithor~zed 
sex separation in public schools in 1953.j"ver the next few years, Texas, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, and Louisiana followed suit, passing 
permissive legislation of various kinds.'i 
The impulse to propose sex segregation as an antidote to the ills of racial 
integration reflected a complicated mixture of political posturing and 
pragmatism. The passage of laws authorizing sex separation in racially 
desegregated schools and classrooms often accompanied extremist 
"massive resistance" measures such as the mandatory closlng of any 
school that allowed "race mixing."" For instance, when the New Orleans 
school system faced desegregation in 1960, the Louisiana legislature inet 
in special sessions to pass a flurry of laws designed to preserve racial 
segregation.35 A bill authori7ing school segregation by sex was among the 
more moderate of these measures, and one of the few that escaped 
immediate federal judicial in~alidation. '~ 
But while sex segregation proposals often appeared alongside extremist 
rhetoric and blunter tools of legal obf~lscation, in some ways sex- 
segregated racial integration was the ~~l t imate  middle-ground position." 
Though sex segregation proposals often had an aura of panic about them, 
by definition they countenanced the inevitability of some racial 
politics" and using "the image of black boys attending schools with white girls." Elizabeth Gillespie 
McRae. 1YI1iri. I~t~'on~i/nhoori. White S~iprnnncy, and rile Rise of ~\.lhssivc Kesi~tnnce. it) M..\SSIVE 
RESISTANCE, stlpru note 27. at I8 I ,  188. 
32. See Robert Alden, Sozrrh Tt:ving Otct I V ~ W  School Plan: Srparntion qf Sr<\-e.s in High Schools 
fesird trs cln Aicl in Evrtzt~tal hitegrutiun. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1957, at 55. Othcr sex segregation 
mcasul-cs were also proposed in Alabama, including a 1957 biil that would havc required female train 
passengers to consent to any male scatinate. That measure was vetoed by Governor Jim Folsom. 
Segrecyariot7 Bills Vrioe~i by Folsot~z, W A S H .  POST, Sept. 28, 1957, at A8. 
3 3 .  Joseph Ator, Rash ofLiin.s in South Seeks to Cir-clrnlvent Nigh Couri, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 
23, 1957, at 9; Floridcl Pusse.~ Luw to Segrequte Seeyes, N.Y. TIMES. May 27, 1959, at 29. 
34. On "n~assive resistance." see, for example, MASSIVE RESIST.%NCE. .si~pr.n note 27; N U ~ I A N  V. 
BAI<TI.~:Y, THE RISE OF ~ ~ A S S I V E  K~SISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS I N  THE SOLJTH DURING THE 1950s 
( 1  969); MICHAEL KLARMI'IN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREivII: COURT ,AND THE 
S-rnuc,ci~& FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); and THE IVODERATES' DILEMMA: MASSIVE RESISTANCE 
-ro SCHOOL DESEGREGATION [ VIRGINIA (Matthew D. Lassiter & Andrew B. Lewis eds., 1998). 
-, - 
-11. FAIJCCLOUGH. s~1p1.u note 23, at 242-43. 
36. Federal district court Judge J. Skelly Wright, a steadfast opponent of Southern defiance, 
struck down most of these measures shortly after their passage. For more on Judge W~ight ,  see 
BAKER, szlpr-u note 14; and A R T H U R  SELWYN MILLER. A "CAPACITY FOR OIITRA(;E": THE JUDICIAL 
O ~ Y S S E Y  OF J .  SKELLY WRIGHT (1984). 
37. Florida's assistant attorney general Ralph Odum presented it as  such. He proposed sex 
segregation as one of three alternatives available to the state if it was to maintain viable public 
schools-the otha-s being state subsidies for private segregated schools, and voluntary integration. 
,Ator, slrpr-a note 33, at 9. 
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desegregation, without embracing its most unsettling social implications.38 
State Representative Jack Inman, who introduced Florida's sex 
segregation bill, called the proposal a "safety valvem-an emergency 
measure designed for the worst-case scenario.39 Because it acknowledged 
racial desegregation as political reality, sex segregation appealed to some 
moderates as a realistic alternative to what they viewed as debilitating 
denial and defiance. For example, longtime Georgia state legislator 
Herschel Lovett warned his colleagues in 1961, "The die has been cast 
. . . . The more we take a posture of defiance, the worse shape we will be 
in.n40 Sex segregation could help Georgians accept racial desegregation in 
public schools, Lovett suggested.41 
Sex separation proposals flourished not merely as popular symbolic 
gestures for state legislators seeking to burnish their segregationist 
credentials, or as last-ditch efforts to "soften the blow" of unavoidable 
de~egregation,~~ but also as sincere attempts to counteract Southern 
resistance to Bro%t*n and to slnootl~ the way toward peaceful integration. In 
a July 1954 editorial, the Chl-istian Science Monitor recommended sex 
separation in secondary schools in order to "allay the worst fear" of many 
white Soutl~erncrs-that "placing white and Negro young people in the 
same schools will accelerate amalgamation by making social relationships 
between them so n~atter of course that interracial marriages might become 
a~ce~table ."~ '  The sex separation solution "should be acceptable to much 
311. One Charlottesville. Virginla school board member objected to a sex segregation proposal on  
the ground that "The p u b l ~ c  I S  likely to  . . . think we are panicking and anticipating much more 
desegregation than we are.'' Cl~irriotlesville ,Ychools to Segregate the Seses, WASII.  POST, July 10, 
1959, at C2. For discussions of shifting Sourhem perceptions about the inevitability--or lack 
thereof--of racial desegregation, see Michael J. Klarrnan, lt'hy Mu.ssive Krs i~ tur~cr .~ ,  in MASSIVE 
RESISTANCE, sz4pipra note 77, at 21; 29-33; and Tony Badger, Brown und BucXlri.sh, iri MASS~VE 
RESISTANCE, .supra note 27. at 39, 5 1-52. 
39. "Mild" School Bilir GIL'PII L,egi.slufi~~e Snricfion, SOUTHI~RN SCHOOL NEWS. July 1959, at 6. 
Florida's permissive law passed with llttle debate, and had the support of Governor Leroy Collins, 
who enjoyed a reputation for moderation. 
40. Joseph H .  Baisd, (;ear-,gi~i GI-ripples 1r:i111 La~*ger- l.s.szte, CHRISTIAN SC'I. M ~ N I T O K ,  Jan. 17, 
1961; at 3. 
41. Id. A Virginia congressional candidate told the I.thshingto17 Posr in 1956 that B1.014,17 was ''tl~e 
law of  the land," but that the separation of students by sex would avoid integration "problems" like 
those he obscrvcd in the newly desegregated Washington, DC public schools. Bre1711er- Visir.~ iS'chool.s 
F1er.e. Scol-es Irlregr-uiion, W;\Sfi. POST. June 16. 1956, at 19. An anonymous Virginia resident writing 
to the Clzristian Sc.ierlc,r Mon~roi- in 1956 opined that "subconsciously . . . individual Virginians have 
accepted the idea of future integration." \4'hile the writer admitted that desegregation could not "take 
place successf~illy and at once throughout either Virginia or the South." a gsadc-by-grade. sex- 
segregated approach woultl help "to blunt thc hard e d ~ e s  of  resistance to integratiun." A Virginian. 
Letter to the Editor. ltlregrclriorl Slr.uw.s. CI~IKJSTIA~\! SCI .  MoNrTou, Apr. 27. 1956. at 20. As Col. Perr) 
It!. Thonipson: a candidate for Flor-ida secrets? of state in 1960, pilt i t ,  "We in the South must realize 
that our school segregation la\vs are In conflict w ~ t h  a Supreme Court dec~sion." "But." he added, "this 
does not prevent separation o f  the sexes." /.%ii.i~/o: l'oliricul Ac,/il,i/r.. S01!~f+i U N  S(11001 NF\\:S, Oct. 
1960. at 8. Incidentally. Col. l~hon ipso~?  was the father of President Eisenlio\s.e~-'s daughter-in-laai. Id. 
42. Judge 1 A Grayso11 of' tltc lkl~llsbor-cl~lgh (~'ounty. Florida C~-irn~n;ll C o i ~ n  suggested thc 
complete abolition of coeducation i r t  ~iublic sctrools to "soften 11le blou-' of race n ~ ~ s i n g ,  and 
"~ndefinitcly" to "postpone tile evil day" \+.hen I-ac~al Ixiii-~ers \vould fall. /.'lor-ititr I4'110r Tlie~. So?,. 
SOL11 I l l ~ R N  S C i 1 0 0 L  Nr:u's. N O \ .  1958. at 10. I I 
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of thc Negro leadership. too," the ,il,Io)zitot- argued. sincc those lcadcrs 
were "no more eager to accelerate amalgamation than are their white 
brothers. They ask simply that the individual be not shackled by an 
inferiority imposed upon a wholc race."44 
The hfonitov had many allies: prominent Northern politicians and 
journalists frequently suggested the replacement of racial segregation with 
sex segregation." In 1955, former Connecticut Senator Hiram Bingham 
wrote a much-publicized letter to South Carolina Governor James F. 
Byrnes proposing sex separation as an alternative to appease those who 
urged the abolition of public education if the state were forced to 
desegregate." Liberal social commentator Walter Lippmann observed in 
1956 that effective desegregation in the South might require "radical 
changes in school policy, say in the policy of coeducation."" Two years 
later, Lippmann opined that "in the Deep South, integration, plus 
coeducation, especially for teenagers, is impossible within the foreseeable 
f~ ture ." '~  Ordinary citizens also trumpeted sex segregation as the perfect 
solution to the desegregation impasse. The analysis offered by Albert 
Jason of Oakland, California, was typical of numerous letters to the editor 
in the several years after Bro~tln: sex separation, Jason argued, "certainly 
would eliminate the fear of parents that integration may cause problems of 
Intermarriage and/or promiscuity . . . . [Plarents throughout the South as 
well as in other parts of our country, whether white or colored, would not 
object to integration, as long as the cause of moral turpitude has been 
rern~ved."'~ 
34. Id. 
35. In the summer of 1954, Wcrslzington Post columnist Malvina Lindsay noted a widespread 
muvcment to reconsider the benefits of coeducation in the wake of Brown. Malvina Lindsay. 
C'ortl~riarion-. FOCL~S of iVew Qzce.ston.r, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1954, at 16. 
46. Pzrpil Separation By Se.c S~lggesteti: E.Y-Set~utor Birzghari7 I.Vt,ites B~rne.s This tVozlid Help 
Solve Segregnrion Woes, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Jan. 20, 1955, at 33. Immediately after- B~.olvn, Byrnes had 
~dent~fied sex as the heart of the problem with racial integration. "The pattern, Bymes contended, is 
familiar-white girl in shorts plays tennis in the yard of a segregated school; Negro boy enters 
playground; the basic wall between thc species begins to crumble, and social chaos has begun to 
envelope humanity." Edwin A. Lahey, Bvrnes on Integrcztion, WAS~I. POST, May 22. 1954, at 18. 
Byrnes may have been an ideal audience for sex segregation proposals. as he had urged his former 
colleagues on the Supreme Court to pursue desegregation implementation in a way that encouraged, 
rather than alienated, moderate leadership. See Badger, supra note 38, at 39, 44. For more on Bymes, 
see DAVID W. ROBERTSON, SLY AND ABLE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES F. BYRNES (1 994). 
47. Walter Lippmann, The Plaffbr-~n and Segr.egutiot~, W A S H .  POST, Aug. IS. 1956, at 23. 
48. Walter Lippmann, F~~i~danlen t~ i l  I.sslle.c on Integration Remain, L.A. TIMES. Aug. 29, 1958, at 
B4. 
49. Albert Jason, Letter to the Editor, Segr-egute the Sexes, WASH. POST, Oct. 2,  1957, at A10. 
One sex segregation proponent from Maryland suggested, a few weeks after Bro)vn, that 
[tlhe problem is to find an action which complies with the letter and spirit of the law and still 
minimizes [white Southerners'] fear and distress. Segregation by sex . . . should fit that bill in 
many areas. It would eliminate racial discrimination without providing a basis for the 
miscegenation which is so feared in the South. 
C.C. Van Vechten, Letter to the Editor, Seg.egclting Sexes, WASH. POST, June 2, 1954, at 18. "As 
everybody knows," wrote Mitchell Rawson to the New Yolk Tinzes a few months later, 
the historic position of the South is that the problem of the close association of the races is 
basically a biological one. Complete separation of the sexes, in separate buildings, would 
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Some sex segregation proponents euphemistically referred to "sex 
problems" or "adolescent problems" as barriers to students "applying 
themselves" in racially integrated schools.50 But few failed to observe that 
fear of "amalgamation" lay at the root of the sudden enthusiasm for sex 
separation. New York Tinles colulnnist Arthur Krock wrote in 1956, 
"Apprehension that steady expansion o f .  . . interbreeding would be the 
result of propinquity in mixed schools of adolescents is the basic cause of 
the Southern resistance."" Therefore, Krock asserted, "the suggestion of 
separation by sexes goes to the heart of the controversy" over 
i n t eg ra t i~n .~~  When Florida's governor signed that state's sex separation 
bill in 1959, the wire service headline read, "Segregation by Sex: Florida 
prevent the very worst results of the decision which are foreseen by many people of good will, 
white and black. 
Mitchell Rawson, Letter to the Editor. Seg~'egation b)) Sexes, N . Y .  T I M E S ;  Dec. 2 ,  1954, at 33. Alex T. 
Deutsch of Washington, D.C.. agreed. "[S]eparating of the sexes may take . . . the curse out of 
~ntegration," he wrote in 1957, "since intermarriage is feared more than anything else as its 
consequence." Alex T. Deutsch. Letter to the Editor, ,Segregate the Se,res. w.6~1.  POST. Oct. 2, 1957. 
at A10. Donald Traylor of Norfolk. Virginia, wrote the following year that -'the chief underlying 
objection to integration in the public schools is that it will lead to association of races in the schools, 
then on a social level, and hence. marriage between the races." Sex separation would solve the 
problem, because "there would bc no need for Negro and white students of thc opposite sex to have 
any more association than they now have." Donald H. Traylor, Letter to the Editor, Partial Solurion. 
WASH. POST,  Oct. 1 I .  1958. at AX. Sidney Rhcinstein concurred: 
Having been born and raised in the South. I think one of the main objections many Southerners 
have to integration is that they do not wish children of different sexcs to mingle. It took a long 
time to have coeducation in t h ~ s  country. I cannot remeniber any coeducation[al] schools In my 
boyhood, except perhaps a fe~v k~ndergartens. It is a fact that people in southern climates mature 
much faster sexually. Sex is a n  ever-present force in everyone's life. I think i t  goes to the very 
basis of the integration question. 
Sidney Rheinstein, Letter to the Edltoi-, liltegi.afion Wirhozrt Coeducarior7, N.Y. Tltvlts. Aug. 30, 1958. 
at 14. See also D.M. Gancher. Letter to the Ed~tor, I-'or- Dividirlg Sexes iii Scl7ool.s, N.Y. T I M E S .  Jan. 
27, 1959, at 32 (arguing that "tile educational problem in the South and else\vhere may be largely and 
more beneficially disposed of by simply resorting to segregation by sex instead of color."); D.M. 
Gancher, Letter to the Editol-. Segt-egafion (1). Sex, N.Y.  TIMES. June 13: 1954, at SM6 (similar). 
50. Alden, supr-u note 32. at 5 :  United Press International. Segregarion L J ~ '  S m ;  Hoi-ido Scl~ool 
Bill Seeks to Bat- Racial /~rier~trrciwiuye. N.Y. T I M E S ,  Apr. 22. 1959. at 18: Associated Press, 
Segr-egutron & Seat- Lroted./ot- Nor-rdu, CHI. DAILY TRIH.. May 27, 1959, at A6 ("The idea. said Rep. 
Jack Inman of Orlando, is to provldc a rueans of heading off any sex problems \vhich might arise in 
the event of race mixing in the scliools."). 
51. Arthur Krock. 111 111e :Vation: 'Gi.aduul' it? t l ~ e  F'r-atnr NJ Histor?.: 11, S . Y .  TIMES .  Mar. 27, 
1956: at 34. 
52. Id. Krock continued: 
These Southerners oppose. and fear with the deepest emotions of \r4iicli liurnan beings are 
capable. amalgamation of the Caucasian and Afncan races. Though certain of their ancestors 
were responsible for- the infusion of \vliitc blood in the race enchained by slavcrv. this has only 
intensified tlieir coinlctlon that the anthropological conhequences of t h i  interbreeding is tlie 
lowering of both racial strains. 
Id. Robert Alden also wrote in tlie !Ve~i- I'oi-k T1mc.s. 
The South 1s beginning to expel-iinen~ \vi t l i  ;I legal type of segregation. hased on gentler. in an 
effoli to make racial intesration of the schools more ;rcceptable. Much of tlic South's won? 
about Integration is based on a dtslike of the intemiingling of the sexes ot' Negro and \\.liite 
students. Thel-cforc some educators a i d  other students of the desegregal~on prohiem ha\.e 
decided that the solution iiiigli~ lic 111 fii-st scgl-cgat~ng the srseb in the scliool~ 
Alden. srrpr-(I notc 32. at 5 5 .  Sc~c, u/so Johii H. L a w ,  Lcttcr- to the Fdrlor, S[>g~-c~,prr~ion h~ . \ 'c\c, \ .  N \- 
1 I M I : ~ .  Apr. 4. 1950. at 28 (ciidors~ng KI-och's buggestion of sex scgregarlon 21s a solu~ioii). 
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School Bill Seeks to Bar Racial Intermarriage."" The sexual anxiety 
motivating sex segregation proposals was no secret-in fact, proponents 
invariably cited white Southerners' fears about race-mixing as the primary 
rationale for separating students by sex. 
Over the next several years, sex segregation continued to intrigue 
Southern legislators, and, especially, officials in the relatively few school 
districts under orders to racially desegregate. In 1959, segregationists in 
the Virginia House of Delegates proposed bills that would mandate the 
permanent discharge of any teacher who allowed coeducational 
classrooms,'%r, alternatively, would require sex segregation in a11 public 
schools.j5 They apparently were heeding Governor J. Lindsay Almond's 
earlier warning that a "livid stench of sadism, sex immorality and juvenile 
pregnancy" was "infesting the inixed ~chools." '~ These extremist 
approaches did not win legislative approval, in large measure because 
Almond eventually retreated from the massive resistance agenda. Instead, 
sex segregation became a moderate alternative to the drastic measures 
taken by school districts like Prince Edward County, which closed its 
public schools for four years rather than desegregate. For instance, the 
Charlottesville schools initiated a sex separation "experiment" for the 
1959-60 school year, and other districts in Virginia would later follow 
Ir, 1960, several prominent Atlantans and a Fulton County, Georgia 
grand jury charged with studying the racial desegregation problem 
recommended that Atlanta reestablish sex segregation in its high schools, 
a policy the city had abandoned in 1947." 
For some states and localities, sex segregation was more a desperate last 
resort than a carefully considered policy. Two years after the Little Rock 
school crisis, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus attempted, unsuccessfully, 
53. United Press International, Segregation by Ses, supra note 50; at 18. 
54. Homer Bigart, Virginia Passes Kev School Bills: Almond's Plan Jar Easing i'nfegr-ulion Is 
Approverl E\-tremi.sts .4ctive, N.Y. T I M E S ;  Feb. 1, 1959, at 48. 
55. Robert E. Baker, Virginiu 's Die-H~zr~is Agree to Vote otz Bills, WASH. POST, Jan. 3 1, 1959. at 
A l .  
56. Homer Bigart, .4lrnorzd to Fight for Segreg'yatiora: Governor Calls on Vi~ginians to S~lpport 
Him Despite COLII-t 'S Adverse Rzlling, N.Y. T I M E S .  Jan. 2 1, 1959, at 16. For fascinating explorations of 
white Southern resistance to desegregation through state-level legislative initiatives relating to 
sexuality, family, and public benefits, see Anders Walker, Note, Legi.sluting Virtlre: HOM. 
Segreg~ltionists Disg~lisecl Raciaf Discrimination us iMorczl Reform Folluwiny Brown v. Board of 
Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399 (1997); and Anders Walker, The Ghost of Jim Crow: Law, Culture, and 
the Subversion of Civil Rights, 1954-1965 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) 
(on file with Sterling Memorial Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University). 
57. Associated Press, Schools Planning Sex Segi*egatiotz: Charlottesville Will Separate Ro-vr and 
Girls cis Ruciul Integration Begins, N . Y .  T I M E S ,  Jul. 10, 1959, at 8; see also Arthur Krock, The 
Choices thcrr Reriraiiz for Virginin. N.Y. T I M E S ,  Jan. 20, 1959, at 34 (suggesting sex segregation as an 
option). 
5 8. Georgia: Pt.opose Separrrte Schools for A t!at~ta 's Girls, Boys, SOUTHERN SCHOOL N E W S ,  
Aug. 1960, at 10; 'Don't Mix Sexes '-Atlr~nta, CI-IICAGO DEFENDER,  July 13, 1960, at A23. Such 
experiments were endorsed heartily by the Christian Scrence Monitor, which had been one of the first 
publications to editorialize in favor of sex segregation in the wake of Bmwn and continued to promote 
the idea throughout the 1950s. See, e.g., Editorial, Straws in the Wind, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jul. 
22, 1959, at 16. 
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to convince that city's school board to adopt sex segregation as part of its 
racial desegregation plan.59 In New Orleans, where opposition to school 
desegregation was characterized not only by vehemence, but also by 
vulgarity and violence, embattled school officials announced in 1960 that 
any racial desegregation in public schools would be accompanied by the 
segregation of classrooms by sex.60 When a 1964 Fifth Circuit court order 
forced Mississippi to face the prospect of actual school desegregation after 
a decade of foot-dragging, a group of legislators proposed a bill 
authorizing school boards "to provide . . . for the separation of students 
according to sex, separately by classrooms or schools, when such board . . 
. determines such separation will promote or preserve the public peace, 
order, or tranquility of the school district, or the health, morals, or 
education of the  student^."^^ As it turned out, it would be several more 
years before racial desegregation became a reality in Mississippi," but the 
New Orleans sex segregation idea spread to its suburbs and to other 
Louisiana parishes forced to racially desegregate in the mid-1 9 6 0 ~ . ~ ~  For 
states and localities that succeeded in postponing desegregation, sex 
segregation remained until 1969 a hypothetical "safeguard" to be 
"throw[n] up when and if all other means to prevent integration arc 
B. "Nof Eveiz the Present Cour*t Can Call It Unconstitutiorzal": The 
Presur~ied Legitimacy of Sex Segregation 
Fueling the post-Brown sex separation renaissance was the pervasive 
perception that the constitutional encumbrances placed upon racial 
segregation were inapplicable to sex separation. Though the legality of 
racial segregation had come under escalating attack since the 1930s, and 
coeducation increasingly pervaded American schools, sex separation's 
constitutional pedigree remained unblemished. As Mitchell Rawson put it 
in 1954, there was "one form of segregation which is perfectly legal . . . . 
This is segregation of the sexes. Not even the present c o ~ ~ r t  can call it 
59. FuuDu.5 U~-gc>.s Hourd to Segr-egute Two Schools, WASH.  POST: Jul. 29, 1959; at B8; 
Seg/.egutiotl Effiwt Seen ot Little Rock, W A S H .  POST. Aug. 17. 1959, at B7. 
60. Louisiana: Governor Calls S/~rciul Session of Leglslrrtur~e, SOUTHERN SCI - I~OL N E W S ,  Nov. 
1960. at 1 ,  14. Supel-intendent James F. Redmond. under fire for attempting to cooperate with Judge 
Wright's desegregation order, hoped that the sex segregation pollcy would "tone down public 
reaction " Id. Redlnond emphasized that tlie sex sepal-ation would apply in all school act~vities. "on the 
playground as well as in tlie classrooni." and predicted that "c\~entualIy, most of [the] public school 
system would bc operating on a noncoeducational basis." Al~xeci C7/us.\e.s ' .(;epat-atio17 by Ser 
Sc~i~rtlulrd. NEW OIII.EANS TIILIILS-PICAYUNE, Oct. 13. 1060. at I :  see al.co fii 12li.rc.ri C'las.srs: A' 0. 
.%i?oo/.v / ' / t r t~  .%p~~l-alion t1y Sex. NEW PlTIK313rJRGH COUllltR. Oct. 22. 1960, at 9. 
61. L~g'h.i.slntot- Pi.ol~o.se.s Luw 10 Al~thut.ize Seg~-(',qr~fiol~ I?, S a ,  SOUTHEIIN S(.I-~OOL NIIWS. Mar. 
1964. a1 1 1 
62 For more oil thc struggle ovcr school desegregation in i\4ississrppi, see ~3OrLTclN. clrpru note 
29. 
63 ['or more. see ir!fi-ci Parts 1 1  and 111. 
4 United Press Interna\ional. De.s/~;l,i.r~c~tion M i-c;. (-141 Dl11 I<NL)kK. h4ar. I ti. 196 I .  at 2 (quot~ng 
Alabama xtate legislator Alonzo Shu~nnte). 
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unconstit~itional."~ Similarly, Senator Ringham harkened back to 
nineteenth-century traditions of sex segregation in his letter to Governor 
Byrnes, asserting confidently: -'No one could claim that was 
~nconsti tutional."~~ When federal Judge J .  Skelly Wright invalidated 
dozens of anti-desegregation measures passed by the Louisiana legislature 
in 1960, no one sctggested that the segregation of students by sex should 
fall under his constitutional ax.&' Krock perceived that Bro>vn7s "badge of 
inferiority" argument might extend to sex segregation, noting that, "The 
Supreme Court conceivably might outlaw [sex separation] on its 1954 
reasoning that (since its motive would be obvious) this arrangement also 
would 'generate a feeling of inferiority [among Negroes] . . . in many 
ways unlikely ever to be ~lndone."'~' But Krock's acknowledgement that 
sex separation might violate equal protection guarantees was highly 
unusual. 
If recognition that sex segregation might pose a constitutional race 
discrimination problem was rare, the notion that it could constitute sex 
discrimination seemed even more far-fetched. To be sure, single-sex 
institutions were not immune from constitutional challenge in the 1950s. 
Some women's rights advocates saw parallels between the exclusion of 
women and the exclusion of African Americans from institutions of higher 
education. The African American attomey Pauli Murray, who had made 
just such an argument in her unsuccessf~ll bid to attend Harvard Law 
School in 1944, saw a 1958 suit seeking to overturn the bar on admitting 
women to Texas Agricultural and Mechanical (A & M) University as an 
opportunity to renew women's legal quest for equal educational 
oppor tuni ty .6%C~~ attorney Rowland Watts viewed the Texas case as a 
chance "to build up a 'sociological' record-insofar as time and our 
research facilities permit-comparable to that done in the racial 
segregation cases."70 John Barron, who arg~led the Texas A & M 
challenge before the state's highest court, hoped that the women's lawsuit 
65. Mitchell Rawson, Letter to the Editor. Segr-egution hj. Se*re.s, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Dec. 2, 1954, at 
33. 
66. Pzlpil Separation BJ, Sex Suggesf ed: E.r-Senuror- Hirigirum W~:i-ite.~ Bvl-nes This Would Help 
Solve Segregation CVoes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1955, at 33 (emphasis added). 
67. See text accompanying supra note 36. 
68. Krock, .sLlpm note 57, at 34 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). See 
irko Brooks Hays, ,4 Sozlt17ern ilrlocietzte Predict.c. Iiicto??., N.Y. T I M E S ,  Jan. 1, 1959, at SM17 
(reporting view that a recent Alabama court ruling "opens for the most difficult age group, the high 
schoolers, the perfectly valid possibility of segregation by sex"). 
69. Presentation by Pauli Murray to the President's Commiss~on on the Status of Women ( 1  962) 
(transcript on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Pauli Murray 
Papers, Box 49, Folder 885). On Murray's attempt to gain admission to Harvard Law School, see 
REBELS IY LAW: VOICES I N  HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS ( J .  Clay Smith, Jr. ed., 1998). 
70. Letter from Rowland Watts, Staff Attorney, Amcrican Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), to 
John M. Barron (attorney for Bristol, et al), June 25, 1959 (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton 
University, American Civil Liberties Union [hereinafter "ACLU"] Records, Box 1142, Folder 22). 
National Woman's Party officials, some of whom were less than friendly to the cause of racial 
desegregation, nevertheless saw in the Texas case a golden opportunity to publicize the need for an 
Equal Rights Amendment. 
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would, on the one hand, evade the "explosive ingredients7' of the sensitive 
race issue, and on the other, facilitate challenges to sex separation as a tool 
of racial desegregation. In a letter to Watts in July 1959, Barron expressed 
optimism that "The fact that many-and increasing nun~bers-of school 
boards are using and are going to use segregation by sex to confute the 
segregation decisions, should cause the Court to see that this is a serious 
and important issue with far-reaching  result^."^' Publicly, Barron could 
not be so candid; he claimed in court to dislike the B10wr7 decision, but 
argued that ~f "separate but equal7' was illegal in the context of racial 
segregation, ~t must also be illegal for the sexes." 
But the outcome of the Texas A&M case did not bode well for those 
who would chalienge sex segregation as "inherently unequal." In Henton 
v. Bristol, Judge W. T. McDonald of the Brazos County District Court, a 
Texas A&M graduate himself, found that "as a matter of law separate but 
equal facilities are inherently unequal as applied to males and females, and 
as a matter of law any attempt at classification of males and females for 
educational purposes at the [university] is irrational and immaterial to the 
educational objectives sought, and does violence" to both the Texas and 
United States  constitution^.^^ However, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals 
overruled McDonald,74 and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the 
women's pet i t i~n.~ '  Equal Rights Amendment proponent Alma Lutz cited 
the Br-istol decision as evidence of the need for constitutional change. 
"[Slegregation by sex," she argued, "is as I I I U C ~  out of line in a democracy 
as segregation by color, race, or religion."76 The Texas A&M case. of 
course, concerned the outright exclusion of women, rather than the 
separation of the sexes, so the Supreme Coui-t's denial of the won~en's 
appeal clearly signaled that even the pre-Brown precedents requiring the 
71. Letter fi-om John M Bar-on, District Attorney. Brazos County, Bryan. Texas. to Rowland 
Watts, Staff Attorney. ACLU. July 14. 1959 (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton Un~versity,  ACLU 
Records. MC k001, Box 1142, Folder 22). Barron also hoped that, as in the racial segregation cases. 
"A case at college or university level should be strongel- Illan one at grade-school level. and the 'ice' 
should be broken more easily." Id. 
72. Bicknell Eubanks, Te.~us Aggie Rarnl~ar-fs D~rriircr'. C' I~RIS~TI IAW SC'I. MONITOR. Mar. 29. 1958. 
at 14. 
73. Qliofeiliii Heaton v. Bristol. 317 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tex. CIL .  App. 1958). 
74. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals noted that Texas A8iM was the only pub l~c  institution of 
higher education In the state that did not admit wornen: 
[Wje inust view the system as  a whole in order to  ascer~ain ~ . h e t l ~ e r  there 1s discriminat~on 
between the sexes, the entire systcrn must be viewed. and not a single institution standins alone. 
This recol-d shows that the system does not discr~minate but makcs ample and suhs~antially 
equal prov~sion for the ed~lcation of both sexes 
fc/. at 99. 
75. Hr~.cro/. 3 17 S.\b'.2d 86. U ~ , I X Y J I  di.snli.r.sc,tl, c.c2r.t. cl'riiici/. 359 1! S .  330 ( 1959). ~ Y / I I I O I I  l o r  
r.eh~ur-o~g rkrlird. 359 U . S .  909 (1959). Justlce Douglas dissented from the denlal of the petltion for 
rehearing. Id. at 999. 
7h. Alma L u t ~ .  Letter to the Edrtol. .4 M ~ J ~ I ~ L I I I  i . ~r l  /'e115017. ('11Rl>~l,\h SC'I. MOUITC)R. Apr 22. 
1'359. at 1 S 
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admission of Afi-ican Americans to all-kvh~te gaduate and professional 
schools were inapplicable to 
It would be another decade beforc any substarltlai !egal challenges to sex 
segregation in school desegregation plans arose. Most likely, this delay 
reflected the paucity of actual desegregation in the first decade after 
Brown, as well as the civll rights movement's desire to focus on 
persuading the reluctant executive and judicial branches to enforce 
Brown's mandate in the face of legislative and popular resistance. If sex 
segregation was what it took to accomplish even token integration, 
perhaps few advocates of desegregation were inclined to oppose the tactic. 
Sex segregation may have seemed relatively innocuous when the 
alternatives on the table included school closing and white brutality. 
Prominent African American leaders like Atlanta University President 
Rufus Clement, the only black member of the Atlanta school board, 
apparently concluded that sex segregation was, at best, a useful tool, and 
at worst, a necessary evil. Clernent told the Washington Post in 1959 that 
African Americans should accept segregation by sex if, as the newspaper 
put it, "such programs allay fears and do not bar entry to schools because 
of race."78 The following year, Clement declared himself "not at all . . . 
opposed to separate high schools for boys and girls if it will ease the 
situation and permit LIS to keep our [public] schools."79 
The political and constitutional climate also supported reticence on the 
subject of sex and its relations1,lip to school desegregation. Given the 
strong and oft-noted association of integrated schools with 
"amalgamation," and the almost universal public opposition to interracial 
marriage in 1950s America," the Supreme Court assiduously sidestepped 
77. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U S. 629 (1950) (holding that the state of Texas could not provide 
substantially equal legal education to African Amer~can students at a separate, segregated law school, 
and that the University of Texas law school must admit Heman Sweatt); McLa~lrin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that admitting an African American student to a University of 
Oklahoma graduate program but requ~ring him to sit apart tiorn white students in classrooms, libraries, 
and other school facilities violated equal protection). 
The Dallas Morning News edltorializrd in 1959 that the only way to rationalize the courts' refilsal 
to mandate the admission of women to I'exas A&IM on the grounds that the state provided adequate 
coeducational alternatives, was to pcrrnit states to provide racially integrated and segregated 
educational options. "If the court is consistent, which has never been proved, this decision is important 
to states that desire educational segregation at the will of the educated," the editors wrote. Editorial, If' 
the Court is Consistent, DALLAS ILIORNING N t W S ,  Apr. 8, 1959 (Mudd Library, Princeton University, 
ACLU Records, MC #00 I, Box 1 142, Polder 22). 
78.  Robert E. Baker, Birnc~nlSchoul Plun Ojfel-eci, W A S H .  POST, May 10, 1959, at D19. 
79. Georgia: Propose Sepal-ate Schoofs, slcpru note 58, at 10. Clement, the first-ever African 
American member of the Atlanta school board, had won election in 1953. African Americans in Little 
Rock apparently expressed similar views in a 1959 survey, conducted by Little Rock's Inter-Racial 
Emergency Committee, which included a question regarding sex separation as  a compro~nise means of 
achieving racial integration. The Tl-1-S~utr Lkfitzder reported that "the rank-and-file Negro in the city 
was willing to compromise on thc means to achieve integration in the city," and that "Negro teachers 
were said to have favored all of the [compromise] provisions by slight to overwhelming margins." 
Little Rock 'Mob Leader' Iss~sue.~ N q w v r ,  TRI-STATE D E F E N D E R  (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 28, 1959, at 1. 
80. A 1958 Gallup poll found that only one percent of white Southerners and five percent of non- 
Southern whites approved of marriages between blacks and whites. ROMANO. szrpl-c~ note 27, at 45 
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any ruling on the constitutionality of laws restricting interracial intimacy 
until a decade after Brown. The Justices engaged in procedural gymnastics 
to avoid reaching the inerits in Nuim v. Nuim, a challenge to Virginia's 
anti-miscegenation law that reached the Court in 1955." As Michael 
Klarman explains, "To strike dcwn antimiscegenation laws so soon after 
Brown risked appearing to validate [the] suspicions" of those who 
"charged that the real goal of the NAACP's school desegregation 
campaign was 'to open the bedroom doors of our white women to the 
Negro men' and 'to mongrelize the white race."782 It was not until 1964 
that the Court struck down a law prohibiting interracial cohabitation, in 
McLaughlin v. and only in 1967 did laws prohibiting interracial 
marriage meet their demise in Loving v. Until the mid- 1960s, it 
was far from clear that government action restricting interracial sexual 
relationships fell into the category of race discrimination prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In sum, before the late 1960s: virtually no one perceived sex segregation 
as a problem of sex discrimination, and few even raised objections on race 
discrimination grounds. Very little actual school desegregation occurred in 
the decade after Bvolvn, and advocates of integration apparently felt that 
sex segregation was a srnall price to pay for the incremental gains they 
were able to make in a smattering of Southern school districts. Objecting 
to sex segregation also could play into the hands of segregationists who 
insisted that "rnongrelization" was the object and inevitable result of 
school desegregation. Nor did a legal vocabulary exist with which to 
describe sex segregation as sex discrimination. Those who dared to 
challenge single-sex public education did so in the context of post- 
secondary institutions that did not provide any alter-native to female 
students, and they were u~~suc~cessful. As the next Part describes, however, 
when racial desegregation finally gained ~nornentum at the end of the 
1960s, litigants and judges began to characterize sex segregation as, at 
least in some cases, a form of race discrimination. 
Despite the enormous political and cultural changes that occurred 
between May 1954 and May 1968, very little effective racial 
81 Naiin v. Naim. 197 Va.  XO (1955). i,cic.ciferi (ztld I . ~ I ? I L ~ ~ I ~ c ' J .  3 5 0  U S .  801 (ICIZ.i), i-c~ilt.st~irod 
attd~?Pf'd. 197 Va. 734 (1956). u p j ~ i ~ ~ l  c/i.strlr.s.soil. 350 U . S .  985 (1956). 
82. Klamlan. S I ~ ~ I - a  note 38. at 321. See, rilso I l a~ l ry .  r~rpr-tr note 77. at 154 ("f:\t'ryo~ie coiinccteti 
\vith the school cases that became known collect~vely as Br.oien I. Uoui-~l Eductiijoll ~11idc1~sti)od hokv 
vital it \+as that they not be linhcd w ~ t h  scx -'). For a description of in1sm;il Coui? dc.ltberat~ons on 
!V~11111: see DCIIII~S J .  Hutcli~nsoi~.  l~t7u11it/i1f~ uttd lk.\egr-egotiot7. i )e~~i . \ /o~~t?~oA~tt :< 1 1 1  r i ~ [ ~  . S L I ~ J F C ~ I I I O  
('our-i, 194X-lY58,68 CEO L.J. I .  h X 7  ( 1  979). 
83. 379 C1.S. 184 (1904) 
84. 388 i~,.S 1 ( 1967) 
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descgrcgation took place between R f - o ~ ) n  and the Suprcme Court's ruling 
in (;t.ee;~ 1. Nel.1- Kent Coli?ztj. School Bo~rrcl." When confronted with :he 
reality of integration in 1969-70, a number of Southern school districts 
turned to sex segregation. Judges often embraced or tolerated these 
proposals as a means of easing the transition to racial integration. For 
many African American communities. however, sex segregation added 
insult to injury, and their protests prompted courts to scrutinize the 
motivations behind sex segregation more closely. The Fifth Circuit's 
standard, which required judges to determine whether sex separation was 
motivated by "racial discrimination" or by legitimate "educational 
pui-poscs," marked a shift in Jane Crow discourse. This inquiry prompted 
many school districts to invent race-neutral explanations for sex 
segregation, including sex differences in curricular, vocational, and 
athletic interests; the benefits of single-sex education to boys; the 
economic advantages of avoiding the "needless duplication" of facilities; 
and the prevention of "disciplinaly" and "sex problems." Still, though race 
discrimination had become a primary concern, no one attacked sex 
segregation as sex discrimination. 
A. "Ed~~cntionul Decisions Are For the School Board Alone": Revitalizing 
the Scr Separation Soltltiorz 
Only token desegregation had occurred in formerly all-white schools 
under "freedom-of-choice" plans, and hardly any white children attended 
historically black schools in 1968. The Supreme Court's decision in Green 
was the epitaph for this particular incarnation of foot-dragging. Green 
imposed upon school boards "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps 
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch,"86 In the decision's 
wake, thc Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals instituted expedited procedures 
for school desegregation cases that resulted in a flood of court orders: 
between December 1969 and October 1970, the court handed down no 
fewer than 166 opinions involving 89 different school d i ~ t r i c t s . ~ ~  
85. 39 1 U.S. 430 (1968). 
6 .  [ti at 437-38. 
87. F R ~ K  T. READ & LUCY S. MCCiOCCitI, LFT T ~ I E M  BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGK..\TION 
OF r t ~ l ;  DEEP SOUTH 469 ( I  978). Ironically, this sudden acceleration of desegregation was drivcn in 
part by the impending trend toward conservatism In the executive branch. Concerned that the Nixon 
Whitc House's commitment to school desegregation would not match thcir own, officials in the 
Departments of Justice and Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) made sure to file Gt-een-inspired 
desegregation suits throughout the South before Johnson left office. 
Altliou~h Nixon appointed a HEW secretary with a strong record on civil rights, Robert f-inch. 
Southern conservatives led by South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond besieged Finch's department 
and the Department of Justice almost immediately. As historians Frank T. Read and Lucy S.  McGough 
recount, the ultimate rcsult of their battle was an unprecedented split between the Justice Department 
and the N A A C P  Legal Defense Fund, which had for many years counted federal government lawyers 
as crucial allies. Under tremendous pressure, Finch had issucd a directive interpreted across the South 
as a reprieve for recalcitrant school districts, countenancing delays that the Supreme Court would 
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Meanwhile, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 
initiated a new policy whereby staffers from the Office of Education 
would assist school districts ill developing desegregation plans, on the 
theory that local consultation would make for more expeditious and 
mutually satisfactory results. As it turned out, many school districts 
showed little interest in seeking the advice of HEW'S education experts. 
Often, HEW'S recoinineildations were met with school board 
counterproposals characterized by varying levels of evasion, 
circumvention, and delay. Sometimes, those counte~-proposals included 
sex segregation schemes. 
Just as they had before court-ordered desegregation's expanded 
mandate, post-Green sex separation plans took a variety of fonns. Some 
school boards proposed sex segregation as a temporary measure designed 
to ease white parents into the frightening world of integration; others 
viewed sex segregation as a permanent solution to the evils of interracial 
contact. In some schemes, classrooms were segregated by sex. More 
comnlonly, at least in the cases challenged in court, entire scl~ool 
campuses would be designated all-male or all-female. In nlany of the 
school districts that desegregated by race and segregated by sex prior to 
1968, such as Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes in Louisiana, a majority 
of the student population was white. After 1968, sex segregation appealed 
particularly to school boards in districts where black students constituted a 
majorily, or close to it, or where African A~nericans were concentrated in 
a particular geographic area." In Cortcordia Parish, Louisiana. for 
instance, where the total population of school-age children was 
approximately fifty-five percent white and forty-five percent black, a 
higher concentration of African American students lived in one particular 
area of the district. Citing the "exceptional" nature of the predominantly 
black schools in that area, District Court Judge Ben Dawkins. Jr. approved 
a multi-step desegregation plan. I11 the first stage, a cohort of African 
expl~cltly PI-oliibit in the Mississippi case ..?la-triidri- I., llolnies C'oztr~tl: Rd qfEdz/ c... 396 U.S. 19. in 
October 1969. See READ & MCGOIJGH. . r~/ /?,w.  at 485-88. 
88. On the differences between niqol-itp-wli~te and majority-black school d~stricts. see UOI-TOY. 
s~rpru note 29. at 13 1 : and Charles C .  Rolton. 7Xe Lusr Srund qf !ft.fu.s.si~.e Re.rr.\t~i~c iJ: ,llf.s.si.s.ri/~/~i 
Pcrhiic S~.lrool 1;7/e,yrarioi?, lY70, 01 J OF MISS. HIST. 329. 34 1 (1999) ("Fewer whites fled tion1 public 
schools in white-l~iajority districts. not only becausc \vIiite rears of  ~ntcgrated schools \\.ere not a5 
pronounced jn placcs where they had numerical supcrior~ty. but also because \vliites in these areas 
generallj, had fewer I-esourccs to >uppol-t a private system of education."). As hliciiael Klarman 
esplaiiis. "Ardent segl-egationlsts tended to come from I-ural areas with lal-gs black populat~olis or from 
\~orkirlg-class urban neighborhoods \vitliout rigid rcside~itial se21-cgation." Klarnlan. cr~jir~i note 38. 
2 1 ,  13; .see, trlso Jolili !I. K~J-k.  41u.rri1~r lio\i\/rrilc.c~ clifti ,l.liriiiii~rr,i C'orlzyiiuilc,r: 7'11~ 01-igiifr O/ riic, 1917 
/,itl/c~ Ro(.k .Sc/?oo1 C'i-i.sr.r uizrl rlic~ l;iriiirr-c. I $  S<.I/or~l Dt..scyrrgutioii iri llir Solilh. i t1  X ~ l , \ h ~ I \ ~ l  
Rf-.SlSI!\NCF, \y,i-u note 27. at 75.  77 ("llif'fei-ent palls of  tlic South offered dlffcr-cnt Ic\-cl of' 
I-eslstance to scliool ~ L ' C ~ I - ~ ~ ~ I I O I I .  and that re\lstancc ofic~i developed more quickly and cieti.rmiiic'ill~ 
111 places that had large]- black populations. \\ hci-o \A h ~ t e s  felt niore thrcatcr1cd b!: racial change " I  
Adan? Fail-clough al-gucs. ho\\.ever. t l~at  in I ouiblaiia. "Cuppolt for massive rcsrstzincc did not al \ \a>-\  
i i~c i - ca~e  in ~)i-oporrisn to the black popiilation " ,\dam I'ail-clougli, il l'oliricul Coup d'l't;it" l /r)~\.  thc 
I?t~~ii~rc,\ o/ Lai-1 Lo/lg O ~ ~ o i ~ ~ i ~ / i ~ I i i i e ~ t  /<o(.Iu/ !tfo~lcr-(~r~oii iii l J ( ~ 7 / ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ z ~ t .  111 h 4 ~ S ? I \ ' k  R l - > i ~  I A\ ( . )  . S I ~ ~ I I - ( I  
11oti' 27. at 56. 17 
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American students would be transferred to formerly all-white schools, or 
schoois in which some token desegregation had already occurred; then, in 
the secol~d stage, white students would begin to integrate formerly all- 
black schools. It was in this second pivotal phase that sex separation 
would occur, in grades seven and above.89 In Taylor and Baker Counties, 
Georgia, African Americans constituted just under and just over fifty 
percent, respectively, of the population. These small, rural communities 
had just one secondary school for each race; in those districts boys would 
attend the formerly black school, and girls would use the formerly white 
campus." Similarly, in Amite County, Mississippi, where African 
Americans constituted approximately sixty percent of the district's seven 
thousand students and where schools were few in number, white students 
would have to attend all-black schools immediately if desegregation was 
to be practicable. Coincident with racial desegregation, two of the 
district's secondary schools would become all-male, and two all-female.91 
District co~lrt judges responded to sex segregation proposals in a variety 
of ways in the early and sometimes chaotic months of large-scale 
desegregation. Some, like Judge Dawkins, approved the separation of 
boys and girls with little commentary, either deferring wordlessly to the 
school district's assessment of necessity or mentioning sex segregation 
matter-of-factly as an unexceptional element of the desegregation plan.9' 
Others dismissed plaintiffs' objections to the sex separation, deferring to 
the local school boards' judgment that such an arrangement was desirable. 
9 .  Opinion anci Order, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd. No. 11577 (W.D. La. Aug. I, 1969) 
(NARA,  S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349). One year later, 
however. Judge Dawkins rejected Concordia Parish's scx separation scheme. See 2 RACE REL. L. 
Suliv. 174 (Jan. 1971). Other Louisiana districts maintained sex segregated schools well into the 
1970s. St. James Parish, Louisiana, for example, reta~ned the sex segregation scheme instituted in 
I959 until thc 1974-75 school year. See Order, Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., No. 16173-C (E.D. 
La. June 10. 1969) (describing sex segregation plan), and Order, Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., 
No. 16173 (E.D. La. June 25, 1974) (describing plan for reinstating coeducation) (NARA, S.W. Reg. 
Div., RG 21. U.S. Dist. Ct. Eastern Dist. La.-New Orleans Civil Cases, Deseg. Cases). For an in- 
depth discussion of one long-telm Louisiana sex segregation plan, see infrn Part 1II.B. 
90. Stanford Maxwell Brown, Equalization, Freedom of Choice, and Sex Segregation: School 
Desegregation in Taylor and Baker Counties (1994) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Georgia) 
(on file with the I-largrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia). 
91. Logistics sometimes overcame school boards' desires to institute sex segregation; for 
instance, Little Rock rejected a sex separation proposal in part because the district contained an odd 
number of high schools. 
92. Judge Dawkins did not discuss the merits of sex segregation specifically in his initial 
Concordia Parish order. Tacitly approving the delay and the sex segregation aspects of the school 
district's plan. the judge rejected HEW'S proposal for Concordia Parish as "unworkable and 
impractical. I f  adopted," Dawkins declared, "there is grave danger that it would create an all Negro, or 
substantially all Negro, public school system and thwart the objectives enumerated in the 
desegregation cases." Opinion and Order at 3, S~nith, No. 11 577 (W.D. La. Aug. 1, 1969). 
Judge Dawkins had never been a hlI-throated supporter of desegregation. According to Liva Baker, 
he admitted in one court hearing that his preferred legal regime was "P1ess.v v. Ferguson, separate but 
equal." BAKER. s~rpua note 14, at 263. Adam Fairclough notes, however, that while he applauded 
desegregation delays because he worried about white flight, Judge Dawkins was not an extreme 
segregationist. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 23, at 311, 442. Indeed, Dawkins eventually rejected 
Concordia Parish's sex segregation scheme. See infra note 136 
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For instance, in a pair of 1969 Louisiana cases, Judge Alvin Rubin upheld 
several sex-segregated school assignments over plaintiffs' complaints that 
the plans were motivated by racial hostility.93 Noting that many school 
districts throughout the country had long maintained separate schools for 
boys and girls despite the pervasiveness of coeducation, Judge Rubin 
emphasized that "edzlcational decisions are for the school board alone."94 
Since the school board was "convinced that in this transitional period 
separate education based on sex would provide the atmosphere most 
conducive for learning in these schools," separation was "not a denial of 
equal protection of the law."95 District Court Judge William Keady, 
considering a sex separation plan in Carroll County, Mississippi, remarked 
that "the philosophy of teaching young people on a basis of separation by 
sex is respectable and has behind it a certain wisdom of the ages," noting 
also that no federal court had found the practice ~b jec t ionable .~~  To jurists 
with varying levels of enthusiasm for racial desegregation, then, sex 
separation seemed a useful desegregation technique and offended no 
constitutional principle. 
R. "Sorne Feeling of Infeviority and a Vivid /~?~agirzation": The 
Racial Motivution Standard 
Under increasing pressure from African American comlnunities and, 
son~ctimes, the federal government, courts soon began to shift the burden 
of proof in sex segregation cases to school districts. At least in theory, the 
93. "Plaintiffs contend that this proposal is racially motivated, and point out that separate 
educatton on the basis of  sex was not considered until the schools were ordered to desegregate.'' 
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244. 249 (E.D. La. 1969). 
94. td. (emphasis added). 
95. Id.; see also 1 RACE REL. L. S U R V .  163-64 (Nov. 1969) (describing Judge Rubin's order that 
St. Tarnmany Parish implement a "plan for total desegl-egation" and noting that "[a]ppro\;al \vas glven 
to segregating six of the schools by sex, this being a 'transitory measure designed to ease the 
conversion to a unitary school system'); 1 RACE REL. L. SURV. 205-06 (Jan. 1970) (describing Judge 
Rubin's finding that the Tang~pahoa Parish schools were "still largely segregated," and his conviction 
that "the law no longer allows deliberate speed in  dcsegr-egation," but noting that "assign~l~ent of 
students to different schools on the basis of sex, during a tr-ansitional period, was regarded [by Judge 
Rubin] as a legitimate educational experiment not denying equal proteet~on of the la\{. to any 
student."). 
Judge Rubin. a Johnson appointee whom President Carter- n.ould later- elevate to the F~fth ('ire~~it. 
carned a reputation as an eminently fair- and compassionate judge sytnpathetic to the rights of .4li-ic:iti 
Americans and women. In 1973. he ruled in H e u / ~  v. Edr4:crrzls that Loutsiana's systern of exempt~ng 
womcn from jul-y service violated the equal protectron clause by depriving women of equal citi~ensliip 
status. The Supreme Court later agreed. Ruth Hader Ginsbur-g. who argued the tIeo/i: case. later paid 
ti-ibute to .ludge Rubin as a paragon of good judgtng. Sce Rut11 Badet- Ginsbut-g. Lllddgr lioi~c~i-1 4 
Air7s~t~or.th. ./I.. 1t4ec.nlor-inl Lecture Fo~n- Lour.siunu Giuir/.s iii /he Lait., 48 LO).. I.. Kr:v. 253 (5002) 
9 .  United States v.  Carroll County. No. 6541 K (N.D.  Miss. 1969). yi~oreci in Ordcr. Un~tcd 
States v. L-incotn Coutlty. Bd. of Educ.. Nos. 1400 and 1420 (S.D. Ga. Apr-. 27. 1970) (1.ihr;ri-y of' 
( ' o i i p e ~ .  Records of the N.AACP. V:28 19. Folder: Schools. Georgia. Legal Cases, 1970- 1978) .SCY 
cibo I RACF R I - I  . 1- S~.R\  112 (Sept. 1969) ("On May 19 .ludgc Keady ordered thc Canull County 
school hoard to implement a t~o-year-  desegregation progl-arm. wh~cli will . . . separate the students on 
the basts orsex in all grades..'): United Statcs \.. Ricl~mond County Sch. Md. (1i.11. l'a. .June 10. 1970). 
t/i.\c.iis.\c,d in 7 I < A ( ' ~ -  RI .~ .  I . .  S(~I<\ ' .  90 (Sept. 1970) (noting tlrat scx st-pal-ation \vas a practicc long 
iblloveci in otlier at-caa). 
Fifth Ctrcuit reclu~red school boards to show that sex scgrogat~on was not 
merely a new Instrument of racial discrimination and hurntl~ation, but 
rather a product of legitilnate educational purposes." Inittally, many 
school districts responded by argulng that hex separation had :ts roots not 
in discriminatory anin~us but in well-intentioned pt-agmatism designed to 
ease the transition to racially integrated education and prevent white 
abandonment of the public schools. Ultimately, though, the racial 
motivation standal-d encouraged local school officials to emphasize the 
purported educational benefits of sex separation rather than focusing on its 
racial context. 
By the end of 1969, the Fifth Circuit had established a vague but 
uniform standard for addressing sex segregation schemes proposed and 
implemented by school districts in their racial desegregation plans. In 
December, a panel of that court declared racially discriminatory intent to 
be the determining factor, calling on trial courts to distinguish between 
plans motivated by "racial discrimination" and those based on 
"educational purposes,"98 a standard the circuit reaffirmed in 1972.99 
Defending sex separation plans against charges of racial motivation could 
be a tricky business for school districts where white attitudes toward 
desegregation ran the garnut from profound reluctance to violent 
intransigence. But the tremendous attitudinal and logistical difficulties 
associated with desegregation put a premium on proposals that promised a 
racially unitary system, regardless of the plans' other characteristics. For 
many courts, achieving this objective outweighed any countervailing 
concerns a b o ~ ~ t  sex separation: judges frequently "pretemitted the 
question of sex separation pending the establishment of a racially unitary 
system,loO and sometirnes the federal government supported such 
97. The Fifth C ~ r c ~ t i t  was the only circuit to establish, in a published opinion, a unifoni; stanctard 
for addressing sex separation schcmes; however, such plans did appear in other circuits. where judges 
sometimes ~ n q u ~ r e d  into their purpose and effect. On the Fourth Circuit's treatmcnt of sex separation 
plans, see, for example. 2 RACE REL. L. SUI~VEY 50 (July 1970) (noting rejection by federal district 
Judge James K. Martin, Jr. of a Barn\i~ell, South Carolilia school district plan to separate students by 
sex on the ground that "defendants had not met their burden of proving that the plan was free from 
racial purpose or effect"): and United States v. Richmond County Sch. Bd. (E.D. Va. June 10; 1970). 
disczwsed in 2 RACE REL. L. SUKV. 90 (Sept. 1970) (ruling that evidence did not show illegitimate 
racial motive in sex separation case). 
98. United States v. A~nite  County, No. 28030 (5th Cir. Dec. 19. 1969) ("[I]s racial 
discrimination the motivation for the plan or does it have its basis in educational purposes?"). 
99. United States v .  Georgia. 466 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that school boards had 
"a duty where sex separation is maintained in the school system to provide proof that the plan was 
devised and is to be promulgated for educational purposes only; therefore, the Board must show that 
the plan was implemented for ed~lcational rather than racially discrimmatory purposes."). The court 
was overruling a three-judge district court, which had previously ruled that '-the doctrine of equal 
protection applies to racial content or effect, and not to the motives or purposes behind the acts of the 
state." United States v. Georgia: No. 71-2563 (N.D. Ga. July 16, 1971), yiloteil in 2 RYCE REL. L. 
SURV. 133 (Nov. 197 1 ). 
100. See, e.g., Motion for Kcw Plan of Pupil Assignment, United States v.  H ~ n d s  County Sch. Bd. 
and Amite County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 1973) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., 
RG 276. Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4167, 28030 & 28042, Sept. 1972-1 973): Williams v .  lbelville 
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postponements.'0' Some courts implicitly placed the burden of proving 
racial hostility on those who objected to a school district's sex separation 
scheme. For instance, in approving six Georgia plans that involved some 
sex segregation, a federal judicial panel focused on the lack of evidence 
that separate schools for boys and girls produced "any educatioilally 
unsound consequences or inequities resulting in racial di~crimination."'~' 
Especially in the early months of court-ordered desegregation, school 
districts often relied on judges' sympathy for expedient measures designed 
to effectuate a sinooth transition and avoid a white exodus from the public 
schools. Attorneys for Jane Crow school districts frequently insisted that 
the alternative was not coeducational biracial scl~ools. but rather an all- 
black public school system, which, they alleged, the HEW proposals were 
certain to produce. Representing the Concordia Parish, Louisiana School 
Board, W.C. Falkenheiner urged a Fifth Circuit panel to 
ask itself whether it is realistic to adopt a plan which would 
adversely affect the education of all children, both black and white, 
and whether it is realistic to adopt a plan which, in the opinion of 
those best in a position to know, has real prospects of co~lverting tlie 
public school system to a substantially all black system.i0i 
Other sex segregation proponents had more apocalyptic visions, 
foreseeing the widespread abolition of public education if boys and girls 
of different races attended school together. Wilkinson County, 
Mississippi's school superintendent, Bernard Waitcs. signed an affidavit 
asserting that he had "absolutely no doubt that if the plans as forinulated 
by HEW are put into effect, such plans will result in the abolishtnent of 
the Public Educational System in the County and create a state of chaos 
inasmuch as the County pupil ratio is approximately 22% White and 78% 
Negro studei~ts."'" Siinilarly, the school board in neighboring Hmite 
Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28571 (5th Cir. Dec. 13. 1969) (per cui-iam) (N4RA.  S.U' .  Reg. Div.. RG 176. 
Fifth Circuit, Case Files. Box 4290, 28569-28571). 
101. See, e .g . .  Brief for the United States. Singleton v. Jackson M u n .  Sepal-ate Sch. Uist.. No. 
2842 (5th Cir. [1969]) (NARA. S.W. Reg. Div., RC 276, Fifth Circuit. Case Files. Box 3775. 
26285(pr.)-26290). ("We believe that, in the present state of tlie ~rrcorti this C'ou~t may wish to defel- 
colisideration of the ISSLIC until racial segregation has been elimiliatcd in C ' o ~ ~ c o r d ~ a  Pal-ish."). 
102. Order. C;c,<~/;qii/, Xo 71 -2563 (N.D. Ga. Apl-. 2 1 .  1970). y ~ i o i c ~ i  ii  I3ron.n. \y?t.ci notc 90. at 
106 n.l  I .  
103. Brief of Appellees at 4-5. Sinit11 v. Concorciia Pal-is11 Sell 13ti . No. 111332 (5th Cir N o \ .  13. 
1969) (NARA. S.W. Rcg. Div.. RG 276. Flfih Circu~t.  Case Flles, Box 1235. 28341-28349). 
104. Exhibit "A" (Affidavit of Bemal-d Waites) (Aug. 13. 1069'). appcndsd t o  Ol?ject~ons to 
H.E.W. Plans, United States 1. Wilk~nson County 13d of Educ . N o  1 160 iS.L>. Miss.) ( N A R A .  S.LV 
Rcg. Di\.., RG 276. Fitill Cil-cuit. Caze Files. Box 31 63. N o \ .  1 i)hO(pi.)-r\2ar-ch 1970).  La\\yi.1~5 for rile 
Wilkinson County, M i ~ ~ i s s i p l ~ ~  \chon1 district also lvarned of'a "l?iass i.xodi~s" of'u hiic teacliei-s fi-011; 
county scl~ools if irnrncdi;ltc. dcse~l-czarion wel-e p u r s ~ ~ e d .  Obleciions to H . F  W Plans. . s r t / ~ l - t r .  at 2: 
ril.\o 2 RAC-E K F L  L. S I ; I < \  137 ( N o \ .  1070) (noting that "aliei- the Idesi .gre~;l t~on] plan \ \as put ilittr 
c1Tcct all of  the \z.li~tc sti~cien(s arlcl ,ill hut 0 ot'ilic \bl~ile tcachei-2 \\.~tl~c!ri.\\ firom the public .scl~ool 
systcnr." and that the school hoard pititloned tile ~ii.;t~-ict crur~ f o ~  pe r rn i~ \~~>i :  t~ clc~se tlic l i ~ f h  ~chi>ol  
anti scni! I-emaining student.; to tile >ci~(>ol s c ~ - \ - ~ n g  grade> ! -9) .  
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County declared in a motion before the Fifth Circuit. "[Sleparation of the 
sexes is absolutely necessary if Defendants-Appellees are to maintain a 
public education system within their school district.""'" 
These dire predictions reflected the continired vehemence of white 
resistance to integrated schools, even though the abolition of public 
education remained highly unlikely.106 Across the Deep Soutl~, "seg 
academiesn-private schools serving white students-had appeared in the 
1950s and proliferated in the wake of court-ordered desegregation at the 
close of the 1960s.lo7 In Mississippi, state superintendent of schools 
Garvis Johnson appealed to white citizens to "help us preserve our public 
education," but his pleas placed hardly a dent in the "mass matriculation" 
of white children at private schools in 1969-70.'08 In early 1970, a 
Mississippi state legislator could credibly, if crudely, declare, "What 
we're going to wind up with eventually is private schools for the white 
kids and a state-subsidized system for the niggers."lo9 white business and 
community leaders fretted that without affordable, segregated private 
schools, poorer white parents would keep their children at home or worse, 
resort to violence. ""ome wondered aloud whether public education had 
any future in Mississippi, given the recent repeal of the compulsory school 
105. Motion of Defendants-Appellees to Amend Desegregation Ortler, United States v. Amite 
County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Clr. Nov. 10, 1960) (NAKA. S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, 
Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4 163. Nov. 1969 (@.)-March 1970). 
106. While most white SoutI1erne1-s supported segregation, a majority prefen-ed token integration 
to school closings, even in the late 1950s. See Klannan, supra nore 38, at 29. Of  course. school 
closings were not unheard o f  Prince Edward County, Virginia had closed its public schools when 
faced with court-ordered desegregat~on in 1959, leaving most African American children in the county 
without formal education for more than four years. J. H i \ n v l ~  WILKINSON 111, FROM BROWN TO 
BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL ~NTPGRATION: 1954-1978, at 98-99 (1979). Most white 
students were able to attend private schools founded to maintain educational segregation. Id, But 
lnassivc resistance met its demise in large pan because Southerners were not willing to sacrifice public 
education at the altar of de jul-e segregation. See Klarman, szcpi-a note 38, at 29. However, historian 
Charles Bolton has called Mississippi whites' reaction to desegregation in the 1970s '-the last stand of 
rnasslve resistance." See Bolton, s~rpru note 88, at 329. 
107. Between 1966 and 1970, the number of private schools in Mississippi climbed from 121 to 
236. and the number of students attending private schools increased threefold. Much of the exodus 
occurred in black-majority districts. Bolton, srtpm note 88, at 341. 
108. James T. Wooten, US. rot-n1.s Prrnel./br 1\4i.s.si.~sippi: A g e i ~ t ~  o Help Transition to Integr-uted 
Scl~ools, N . Y .  T ~ h l ~ s ,  Jan. 1 ,  1970, at 2 1. Rallies attended by thousands of white parents featured die- 
hard segregationists like former- gubernatorial candidate and country-music singer Jimmy Swann, who 
campaigned for "private" segregated schools financed with state monies. Ic f .  While Govemor John 
Bell Willianls counseled white Mississippians against violent resistance to desegregation, he suppolted 
the state legislature's attempts to provide parents with private school vouchers, or, alternatively, to 
allow tax deductions for private school expenses. He also supported continued compensation for 
teachers who refused to comply with desegregation. l ~ f .  Charles Bolton argues that while Govemor 
Williams supported the use of public funds for private schools, he "clearly saw private schools as a 
temporary solution. Along with most state political and business leaders. he recognized that 
abandoning the public schools permanently would damage the state's continuing effort to attract 
industry to the state." Bolton, s~rpr-il note 88, at 340. 
109. James T. Wooten, E.x\-oc/~cs Seen u.r Thr-ent to the S,;.stenl on Eve oj"lt7tegi.ation Move, N .Y .  
TIMES, Jan. 5 ,  1970, at 1 
110. Id. "These are the folks I'm worried about," one white teachcr from Canton told the New 
York Times. "They have no alternative except no school or integrated school-Land they're just the 
ones who might start trouble." Id. 
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attendance law"' and the massive withdrawal of funding from public 
schools in some districts. ' " 
As in Brown's immediate wake, the true purpose of sex separation in the 
post-Green era was hardly in doubt. School officials, parents, and students 
in Jane Crow districts more or less freely admitted to reporters that the 
specter of "amalgamation" and its effect on white support for public 
education drove the demand for sex segregation. The VVall Street Jourrzal 
reported in 1970 that "when pressed," school officials "explain[ed] their 
real motive [for sex separation]: To keep black boys from white girls: the 
fear of interracial dating has long haunted even moderate S~utherners.""~ 
In Taylor County, Georgia, "just about everyone concede[d] that the plan 
was really a palliative for white parents worried about [the] interracial 
dating and marriage that they saw coming from integration," the Christian 
Science Monitor noted in 1972. ' I 4  
What was different about these new sex segregation scl~en~es was that 
they were now susceptible to legal chaIlenge. School boards had to deny 
in court that their sex segregation schemes were racially motivated, even 
as they acknowledged privately the plans' true impetus. The State of 
Georgia accomplished this feat of verbal gymnastics simply by insisting 
that there was no evidence of racial motivation behind the separation 
plans."' Refuting the plaintiffs' contention that, in the School Board's 
words, its plan was "suspect simply because of the times and 
111. Id. 
1 12. Roy Keed, fill1 111fegrufio11 J+'ol.i.ie.x (/;id il~iger~s hf js~iss fppi ,  N.Y. T I M E S ,  NOV. 24, 1969, at 
1 .  In Louisiana, Governor John J .  McKeithen fomented such speculation by suggesting publicly that 
the state legislature would henceforth refuse to appropriate funds to the school system. Id. McKeithen 
also predicted that integration would "bring civil disobedience by tens of thousands of our citizens." 
Roy Reed, Pzp f i  li~tegriztron .Yp!irfi17g ill Solrrh, N Y .  TIMES, Sept. 2, 1969, at 1 .  
During litigation, school districts regularly argued that their own plans constituted the only means 
of preventrng complete ~vhite w~tl~drawal from the public schools. See e.g.; 1 RACE REL. L. SUKV. 65 
(July 1969) ("Once again, tlie threat of wholesale withdrawal from the public schools in which 
Negroes heavily predo~niriate was declal-ed [by the 17ifth Circuit] not to be a justification for sustarning 
constitutionally unacceptable desegregation plans. . . ."): id. at 70 (notlng an Arkansas school board's 
contention that "no feasible alternative to freedom of cho~cc exists . . . because if any kind of 
compulsory integration plan were to be implemented. niost of the white students would be withdrawn 
from the public schools to avoid attending schools in whrcli Negroes arc in the ll~ajority"); 1 RACE 
REL. 1,. SIIRV. I 1  3 (Sept. 1969) (describing similar a]-guments in a Tennessee case); 1 RACI: REL. L. 
Sunv. 156 (Nov. 1969) (describ~ng similar argllment in a Virginia case). 
1 1 3. Tom Herman, Evasive i c.tioir: S<.l~ool.s 117 Deep Souih Slott: Ii~tcgrutioi~ 7Fde \zli/h Suhtln- 
lirc1ic.s. WALL S'I-. J. .  Oct. 15, 1970. ai I .  
1 14. John Dlllin. To Ir~teg~x~te ,  S'rl Hol,.s, C;i~.l.s Api11-1:'. CHKISTI~ZN SCI. ~ ~ O N I T O K ,  Apr. 8, i 972: at 
1 .  Indeed, segregationist publications like Tlrc. C'iti~c.11 kept up the drumbcat against "I-ace niis~ng" well 
into the 1970s. Private school teacher Bob Mfccnis opined In 1972 that li~storically, the "etnot~onal 
Would you want your daughter to niarr); a Negro? . . has hccn the most effective single 
a~.gu~nent against the social interlninglilig of tilt races. . . . [I]n spite of attempted satil-c by 
intcgl-ationists it is still the best wcapoll in our arsenal. for- it gocs straight to the heart of the race 
lwoblem. 
I3oh \Yeems. Irric~i-~-uc~rtrl h l a r ~ ~ i u , ~ r ,  lire..  1 ' 1 1 1 .  CI I 1%)-k. Feb 1 T72. at 4. 
115 B~nef of the State of Georgia. et al.. Unired Statcs v. Georgia, Nos. 71-2563 and 12972 (5th 
C'lr- Sept. 16. 1971) (N.4RA. S.M1. Reg. Iliv.. RCr 276. I:ifili Clrcu~t. Case Flles. Box 6148. 71:2563- 
7 1 2569) (asselting a lack ofraclal moil\.atlon except per-haps tbr Tavlor County plan). 
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circurnst:inccs under which it was adoptecf." school officials in Concordia 
Parish, Louisiana contended that their ability to implement sex segregation 
prior to racial desegregation mandates had been constrained by court- 
ordered freedom-of-choice plans and by the lack of adequate hcilities.' I 6  
Sex segregation proponents also questioned the racial motivation 
standard itself. At first they did so indirectly? arguing that regardless of 
intent, sex separation could not be discriminatory since it applied equally 
to both races. "If any parent or student, white or Negro, has some feeling 
of inferiority and such a vivid imagination." attorneys for the Concordia 
Parish officials wrote, "the School Board should not be held accountable 
for it.""' School boards mustered additional ammunition against the 
requirement that they prove the absence of racial motivation from the 
Supreme Court's 197 1 decision in Pulnzer- v. T / ~ ~ v l z ~ s o n . ~ ' ~  A closely 
divided Court had nlled in Palrner that the decision of Jackson, 
blississippi to close its municipal pool rather than allow racially integrated 
swimming did not violate the equal protection clause. According to the 
attorney general of Georgia, Palmer thereby "laid to rest the err-oneous 
notion that 'motivation' is a proper subject of judicial inq~i ry .""~  
Georgia's attorneys went one step fui-ther and attacked the racial 
motivation standard head on: "Even . . . assuming further that the 
separation by sex was 'racially motivated,' the proper response is so what! 
Most everything in public education is racially motivated today. This is 
what the federal courts require" by pushing districts to desegregate, the 
state's brief de~lared.'~"'ls it not reasonable to assume that local school 
officials, faced with massive racial integration, desiring that it work, and 
i 16. Brief of Appellees at 6, Smith v. Concordia Parish School Board. No. 28342 (5th Cir. Nov. 
13, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28149). 
Furtllermorc, the board's brief argued. if racial mot~vation were at the root of the sex separation 
scheme, the district \vould have separated all boys and girls in the parish, not just those in two 
particular geographic areas. Id .  at 7. The brief neglected to mention what District Court Jutigc 
Dawkins had emphasized in his decision approving the plan-namely, that these areas were the only 
ones in the parish whcre black students oi~tnuinbered ~vhites by a substantial margin. Plaintiffs' 
attorney Norman Chachkin wrote to Judge Charles Clark in December 1969 that the appeal In another 
pair of Louisiana cases "presents the serious issue of the constitutionality of imposing sex separation 
only upon that part of a Parish wherein Negro students orltn~~mber white students." Letter from 
Norman C;hachkin, Attorney for Apprllants, to Hon. Charles Clark, U.S. Circuit Judge, Dec. 9, 1969, 
Re: No. 28573-Charles v. Ascension Parish School Bd., No. 28571-Williams v. Ibervillc Parish 
School Bd. (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., Fifth Circuit, Case Piles, Box 4291, 28572-28576). 
117. Briefof Appellees at 8, S~nirh, No. 28342 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 1969). 
118. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
119. Brief of the State of Georgia, et al., at 16, Ceorgicz, Nos. 71-2563 and 12972 (5th Cir. Sept. 
13, 1971) (NARA, S.W. Keg. DIV., RG 276, Fifth C~rcuit, C'ase Files. Box 6148, 71:2563-71:2569). 
Justice Black's opin~on for the Court in Palir~er included a fairly lengthy disquisition on the "pitfalls" 
of judicial inquiry into legislative motivation. beginning with the declaration that "no case in this 
Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of 
the men who voted for it." f'ultrzel-, 403 U.S. at 224. 
120. Brief of the State of Georgia, et al. at 17, Georgio. Nos. 71-2563 and 12972 (5th Cir. Sept. 
14, 1971). 
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that meaningful public education be maintained, seize upon the device of 
separation by sex as a means of reducing disciplinary problems?"'" 
Opponents of sex separation scoffed at the school districts' attempts to 
deny invidious racial motivations. Plaintiffs in Concordia Parish, 
Louisiana pointed out that the school superintendent himself had testified 
before the trial court that "'the coeducational system in effect in 
Concordia was educationally sound as long as schools are racially 
segregated.' When, however, racial integration becomes inevitable, then 
sexual segregation suddenly is 'most educationally ~ound."'"~ Such 
testimony made "plain what must become obvious to black parents and 
their children" if the sex separation plan went into effect: "[Tlo the school 
officials of Concordia, black boys are simply not good enough to be in 
schools with white girls, and black girls are simply not good enough to be 
in schools with white boys."'" Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs' 
attorney, George Strickler, argued, the practice imposed a "badge of 
inferiority" similar to that endured under Jim Crow. Plaintiffs also 
contended that segregation denied members of the disadvantaged group 
the opportunity to "develop relationships with members of the dominant 
class."'24 When implemented solely to avoid the dreaded specter of 
interracial sexual contact, plaintiffs in Concordia Parish declared. sex 
separation did nothing more than "perpetuate racial segregation by 
~ubterfuge." '~~ It was not enough, insisted lawyers for African American 
families in Georgia, "that assignments based upon sex do not produce 
unsound education or inequities resulting in racial discrimination.""" 
Under such suspicious circumstances, "sex separation may be racial 
discrimination per ~ e . " " ~  
121. Id. 
122. £31-ief of  Appellants at 9. S1nit/7, NO. 28342 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div 
RG 276, Fifth Circuit. Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349). 
123 Id at I0 It relndlns unclear to xt hat exlent concerns about relattonships b e t ~ e e n  white boys 
and black g~r ls .  as opposed to between black boys and \vhlte girls, underlay sex segrepatlon Given the 
history of  white nien's and boys' sexual exploitation of  black women and girls. African American 
parents might have supported sex segregation as  3 means o f  reducing white access to their daughters. 
but I have not found any sources indicating that this concern outweighed their indignation at rhc racial 
insult of sex segregation. For more on tlie legal status of  interracial intimacy bet\t::een lvhite men and 
black wonien. see Adi-ienne Dav~s ,  Loving Against the Law: The History and .lur-~spmdence of 
Intel-racial Sex (unpublished manuscript. on file with the author). Whites' apposition to inten-acid 
d a t ~ n g  and ~ n a r ~ i a g c  d ~ d  not always specify the composition of the couples iliat conccmcd them, 
although \vlien it did. black nialeiwh~te female dh~ads always dominated anti-m~scegenation rhetoric. 
For a historical perspective. see MARTIIA HOIIES. WII ITE WOMEN,'RLA(:K M t h :  I L I  1 c . 1 ~  SEX 13 Ti-tE 
NJXF:I-I:FKTH-CENT L K Y  SOUTI 1 ( 1997). 
124. BI-~efof 'Aplxllants at 12. S ~ ~ i l t h .  N O  28342 (5th CII-. Oct. 1. 1969). 
1 2 5 .  I(!. at 9. 
2 h c f  of Pri\,ate Appellants at 3. C;c>o,yru. No. 71-2561 (5th Cir. Sept 7. ICISI) (NAKA.  
S.\1. Rcg. Dl\, . KG 276. Fifth Clrcuii. Case Files. Box 6148. 71-2563-71-25691 
127. /d.  
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Using the Supreme Court's recent decision in Loving 1:. Virgin i~~,"~  
plaintiffs and their lawyers also attempted to debunk the school districts' 
argument that sex separation could not be racially discriminatory since it 
affected both races equally. Quoting Loving, attorney Strickler noted that 
."the fdct of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very 
heavy burden of justification"' required of race-related statutes."" 
Strickler suggested that "the sanie rule should apply to facially non-racial 
classifications which are nonetheless racially m ~ t i v a t e d . " ' ~ ~  In one of 
several interventions by the federal government in sex segregation 
controversies, the United States similarly used Loving to rebut Georgia's 
contention that "equal application" immunized sex separation from 
constitutional challenge.I3' "[Tlhe subtle implications of sex separation as 
a required factor of racial desegregation are not lost on black children," 
government lawyers c ~ n c l u d e d . ' ~ ~  
However compelling these legal arguments may have been, it was the 
testimony of African American citizens themselves that apparently 
convinced several courts to see sex separation as racially discriminatory. 
After Alexander A. Lawrence, Jr., a federal district court judge in 
Augusta, Georgia, held a hearing in early 1970 to evaluate a sex 
separation plan, he declared, "[Ilt is difficult for me to conclude other than 
that racial undertones to some degree exist. Separation by sex was never 
proposed until complete desegregation was ordered under the plan 
proposed by HEW." He had come away from the hearing, he noted, "with 
the distinct impression that the Negro population-school and general- 
regard the proposal as racially belittling."'" Tennessee federal district 
court Judge Robert M. McRae, Jr. similarly characterized African 
Americans' perceptions of another sex separation arrangement: 
128. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (invalidating Virginia's prohibition on interracial 
marriage). 
129. Brief of Appellants at 12, Smith, No. 28342 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1969) (quoting Loving, 388 
U.S. at 9). 
130. Id. 
131. Brief of thc United States at 27-28, Geovgicl, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir. Sept 3, 1971) (NAKA, 
S.W. Reg. Div., KG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 6148, 71-2563-71-2569). The U.S. brief 
refuted the state's reliance on Palmer v. Thotnpson, distinguishing that case on its facts: in Pa(tnev, 
defendants ceased to operate their swimming pools, while in seven Georgia school districts, schools 
remained open under a racially-motivated scheme of sex separation. Id. at 38 11.25. 
The U.S. also intervened in a proposed sex segregation scheme in Richmond County, Virginia, in 
1970, arguing that the plan was "devoid of any . . . educational necessity for segregation by sex," 
which raiscd an inference that "the plan sterns from . . . racially discriminatory purposes." Segregation 
of P~rpils B,v Sex Opposed, WASH.  POST, Jan. 3, 1970, at 15. Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. allowed the 
sex separation plan to go into effect despite the government's objections. See U.S. v .  Richmond 
County Sch. Bd. (E.D. Va. June 10, 1970), discussed in 2 RACE REL. L. SURV. 90 (Sept. 1970). For 
more on Judge Merhige, see RONALD J. BACIGAL, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: A BIOGRAI'HY OF 
JUDGE ROBERT R. MERHIGE, JR. ( I  992). 
132. Brief of the United States at 29, Georgiu, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir. Sept 3, 1971). 
133. Order, United States v. Lincoln County. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 1400 and 1420 (S.D. Cia. Apr. 
27, 1970) (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V:2819, Folder: Schools, Georgia, Legal 
Cases, 1970- 1978). See a1.w 2 RACE REL. L. SURV. 54 (July 1970) (describing decision). 
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"[Wlhether the defendants admit it, or whether that is the purpose of it . . . 
it is inescapable that to the Negro citizens it appears ra~ial .""~ Mississippi 
federal judge William C. Keady recalled in his memoir that he "employed 
an ingenuous plan of segregating students by sex" in the Coffeeville 
school district, but that this "remedy [was] vigorously objected to by 
blacks, who organized and maintained a school and merchant boycott of a 
thousand students for most of the first semester. Necessarily, such a 
protest induced the court to eliminate assignment by sex!"'35 And even the 
skeptical Judge Dawkins eventually became convinced that sex separation 
in Conco-rdia Parish represented "merely a sham or device to avoid mixing 
members of the opposite sex and opposite race."'36 In these cases, African 
Americans' vocal opposition to Jane Crow apparently persuaded judges to 
invalidate sex separation schemes. 
C. "Each of Us Is Aware of Tl?ese Gvecrt Differ-ences": The Educatco~al 
Purposes Defense 
Because the racial motivation standard had the potential to ensnare 
school officials who candidly announced the reasons behind their sudden 
renunciation of coeducation, school districts increasingly turned to the 
other prong of the Fifth Circuit's standard-the "educational purposes" 
defense. Despite the overwhelming predominance of coeducational 
pedagogy in American public schools, sex separation still enjoyed an aura 
of respectability and even refinement as a venerable tradition that evoked 
nostalgia for an earlier, less complicated era of gender relations. Many 
elite private and public institutions historically had separated students by 
sex, augmenting the practice's stature. Sex-segregating school districts 
drew on these positive associations, as well as sociological assessments of 
single-sex education's benefits, to defend their plans as motivated by valid 
educational purposes. Significantly, while it placed a premium on racially 
134. McFerren v Fayettc C o u ~ ~ t y  Bd. of Educ., No. C-65-136 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 1969), 
q~roted in Order, Lit7iobj Colintj.. Nos. 1400 and 1420, at 3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 27; 1970); see ul.so 1 R.ACE 
REL. L. SUKV. 256 (Feb. 1970) (noting Judge McRae's rejection of proposal to segregate high school 
students by sex). 
135. ~ J I L L I A M  C. KI'ADY. A1.L RIS~ . .  M E M O I R S  01: A MISSISSIPI ' I  FEI)EII.AL JLiDGE 106 (1988): src 
al.to 2 RACE RE[.. L. SGRV. 18 (May 1970) (describing details of the Coffeeville sex separation plan. 
approved in March 1970. which included grades 1-12); 2 RACE RFL. L. SURV. 175-76 (Jan. 1971) 
(t~oting that the Coffceville sex separation plan "was found by the same coilrt to be u~lacceptable for 
further use" in October 1970. and that the court "ordered that a bi-racial advisory committee be 
created, made up of five Negro members to be selccted by the plaintiffs in the present litigation, and 
five white nlerllbers to be selected by the defendant school board"): Bo~.r,ort 17cliis CIS Xoi-ill Cc~r.oliiiu 
Gin. Hegi~in.s Bzirilig Pi-ogi-arn. ( 'Hi. TRIR., Sept. 10. 1970. at S (descr-ibing a i~cs t  of one hundred 
Afi- can Anier-ican marchers protesting sex segregation in Coffeeville). Judge Keady. \<rho took his seat 
on the bench in 1968. reniaiked ruenty years later. "Had I known the (ireen declsion was just around 
the comer. my eagerness for the federal bench would have been considerably diminished." K t l i ~ ~ y .  
s~rpl-u, at 104. 
136. SCY~ 2 R.4('1< RLL. I-. SL'R\,. 173 (Jan. 1971) ( c i t i n ~  Judgc Dawkins' 411g~ist 1970 order- 
rqecting Concordla Parish's sex sep;~iatcori plan) 
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neutral rationales, the ed~lcational purposes defense initially remained 
untouched by any qualms about discrimination based on sex. 
Southern school districts relied on four primary justifications for their 
sex separation plans: the accommodation of sex differences in learning 
styles and curricular interests; the enhancement of male leadership and 
reduction of competition from females; the financial benefits of avoiding 
the "needless duplication" of sex-specific resoLlrces and facilities; and the 
minimization of distractions and discipline problems caused by adolescent 
cross-sex contact. Many if not most of the pedagogical theories on which 
school districts relied in the late 1960s and early 1970s unabashedly 
flouted emerging anti-sex-discrimination norms, underscoring that these 
norms had yet to penetrate the debate over Jane Crow. 
For many of Jane Crow's defenders, sex differences between males and 
females were so self-evident that they hardly required explanation. "[O]ur 
school system overlooks one of the ageless and most fbndamental 
complications of teaching-the fact that boys are different from girls. 
Each of us is aware of these great differences and there is no valid reason 
to enumerate them at this time," wrote St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana 
school official Joseph Davies in 1969.i37 Accepting the justifications of 
the Carroll County, Mississippi school district, district court Judge 
William Keady affirmed that "According to good authority, opponents of 
coeducation . . . have argued that girl's nature is so different from that of 
boy's that a different kind of education is required, especially from the age 
of 12."13"he school board of Iberville Parish, Louisiana contended, 
"There are differences in boys and girls, differences in maturation rates, in 
vulnerability to stress, in learning styles . . . . It does make a significant 
difference whether the person we are teaching is a boy pupil or a girl pupil 
and instruction provisions should be made accordingly."'39 Sex separation, 
in this view, was a natural, healthy response to real differences. 
Significantly, most of the benefits sex segregation proponents cited 
accnled to boys. Sex separation assuaged the concerns of educators who 
believed that boys suffered severe disadvantages vis-a-vis girls in primary 
and secondary schools. Boys, according to "A Case for the Separation of 
the Sexes in Schools," relied upon by several Louisiana school boards, 
"have more trouble with reading and speech and account for 90% of the 
discipline problems."'" Rather than attributing these differences to the 
"traditional" assumption that boys mature more slowly than girls, the 
experts cited by the school boards "have wondered if the real reason was 
137. Joseph J. Davies. Jr., A Case for the Separation nf the Selces in Schools, TIIE BOARDMAN, 
Jan. 1969, at 4, 5. 
138. United States v. Carroll County, No. 6541K (N.D. Miss. 1969), quoted in Order, Lincoln 
CounQ, Nos. 1400 and 1420 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 1970). 
139. A Case for the Separation of the Sexes in Schools, in Appendix, Brief of Plaintiffs- 
Appellants at 114, Williams v. Iberville Parish Sch. Bd, No. 28571 (5th Cir. [date unavailable]) 
(NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files. Box 4290, 28569-28571). 
140. Id. 
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that boys entering school are forced to conform to feminine standards of 
behavior.'"" Sure enough. experiments in single-sex education 
demonstrated that, in the absence of girls, boys "showed more excitement 
and real interest in school,'' "were found to speak more freely taught by a 
man than in a class with girls taught by a woman," and were "more 
thoughtful and considerate of each other."14' Other studies showed that 
"boys in separate classes have made better progress in language arts and 
math than boys in control [co-ed] classes. Group morale developed as the 
boys bec[a]me aware of their common interests and problems and began 
to accept themselves and one ai~other."'~' Similarly, one of the only judges 
to make concrete factual findings regarding educational outcomes in sex- 
segregated schools found that "the achievement level of the male students 
had shown substantial improvement with no lessening in the level of the 
female students' improve~nent," and identified "measurably improved 
leadership qualities on the part of the male students," but no similar 
enhancement of female leadership. 
In fact, sex segregat~on proponents cited female leadership as a 
drawback of coeducational schools. These educators were not hostile to 
female assertiveness in a single-sex context; in fact, they speculated that 
girls would benefit from "an environ~nent which permits them to view 
men and boys as colleagues, not ~ornpetitors."'~' Rather, school officials 
worried about the female "domination of positions of leadership" in 
coeducational schools and expressed concern that "[iln coeducational 
schools girls generally are more interested in excelling academically and 
boys have a tendency to withdraw when placed in competition with 
girls."'" Fortunately, according to Superintendent Davies, girls did not 
forsake the aesthetic benefits of coeducatiollal schools when they 
converted to single-sex status: in St. Bernard Parish, "[glirls continue to 
dress . . . appropriately although there are no boys to dress up for."'47 In 
Taylor County, Georgia, where sex segregation persisted until the late 
1970s; some teachers were less satisfied with their male students' sartorial 
and academic showing. reporting that high school boys in all-male 
environments "became careless about their appearance" and "apathetic 
about their schoolwork." while the girls continued to outperform their 
male counterparts a~adcmica l ly . ' ~~  Nevertheless. the consensus among 
proponents of sex separation was that single-sex schools would assuage 
the problem of female domination and academic superiority. by giving 
141. Itl. 
142. I t l a t 1 ! 4 . 1 l 7 .  
4 /L!. at 1 16. 
141. Cinited States \ .  Hind5 County Sch. Bd.. 560 F.2d 619. 621 n 3 (1977) (quoting Distl-icr 
Cour~ Judge Dan hl. Russell. JI-.). 
145. A Case for the Sr.p,~ration. .rli/?r-il note 139. at 1 17. 
146. I>a\ ies. . s i i p / - ~  iiotc 137. at 6 
147 I t /  
148 Uill111. czr/~r.u note 1 14. at i O .  
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boys an opportunity to excel and participate without feeling browbeaten 
by intersexual competition or alienated from the "Feln~nine" environment 
of the coeducational cla~sroorn. '~" 
Some school districts also touted the pedagogical and financial benefits 
of sex-specific curricular specialization. Most if not all of the Jane Crow 
districts maintained different course offerings at the boys' and girls' 
schools, especially when it came to vocat~onal studies. For instance, one 
Georgia school board explained that under its sex segregation scheme, 
"[c]ourses in Homemaking, Business Education, Family Living would be 
emphasized for the female students, whereby on the other campus, 
Vocational Agriculture, Industrial Arts, Shop programs, Brick Masonry, 
Electrical Work and Mechanics would be emphasized in the school 
serving the male  student^.""^ Further, in their zeal to prove that economic, 
and not racial, considerations underlay the decision to segregate by sex, 
school officials boasted that separate boys' and girls' campuses obviated 
the n e ~ d  for unnecessary duplication of facilities. Describing St. Bernard 
Parish's initial foray into sex separation, Superintendent Davies admitted 
that school officials "felt that certain problems which mlght arise in newly 
integrated schools would be iessened if the sexes were separated," but 
claimed that economic frugality was the predominant consideration in 
converting from coeducational to single-sex schools.'" Increasing 
enrollment, Davies explained, had created the need for two additional 
secondary schools in the parish. Of the two existing high schools, only one 
had a high-quality athletic facility; if the schools were to remain 
coeducational, two brand-new, top-flight athletic facilities would be 
necessary, and the district would have to upgrade the second high school's 
sub-par accommodations. A brilliant solution struck parish officials: 
separate the sexes! "Instead of spending money for four first rate athletic 
149. These ideas also had currency outside the courts during the 1960s. Roanoke and Fairfax 
Counties in Virginia experimented with sex segregated classrooms in  the early 1960s, for the express 
purpose of improving boys' academic performance. See Segregating Pupils & Sex Is Ter-~ned Virginia 
Success, WAsk[. POST, Mar. 14, 1963, at B4. C.Virsl~!n.yfon Post columnist Dorothy Rich wrote in 1966 - 
of a growing movement toward experimentation with single-sex learning environments in order to 
ameliorate achievement gaps between boys and girls. She cited benefits to boys including fewer 
discipline problems, greater interest in learning, "tremendous spirit," and curricular tailoring, 
including a greater emphasis on "science and transportation study that often doesn't interest girls." She 
opined that "[ilf grouping the boys together will help them combat the overwhelming 'momism' of the 
early school years (almost all elementary school teachers are women), then it is all for the good." 
Dorothy Rich, Sepurnfing the Boys unri Gir1.v. WASH. POST, May 15, 1966, at F26. In  1968, Professor 
Patricia Caye Sexton of New York University published a study concluding that the "feminine" 
environment of elementary schools had deleterious effects on boys, particularly "lower class" boys, 
who she said tended to be "more masculine" than middle-class males. Professor Sexton recommended 
that "schools become more masculine n it11 more technological and independent work-study programs 
and more male teachers-real he-men types." Dorothy Rich, Schools V ~ ~ S L I S  Bo l i~ ,  WAS! I.  POST, Feb. 
18, 1968, at Cil6. 
150. Order, United States v. Lincoln County. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 1400 and 1420 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 
27, 1970) (Library of Congress, Record> of the NAACP, V:2819, Folder: Schools, Georgia, Legal 
Cases, 1970-1978). 
151. Davies, strprcr note 137, at 6. 
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plants," Davies related triumphantly, "only two were necessary if the 
sexes were separated and on the basis of the cost of these, the Board saved 
a million and half dollars by eliminating needless duplication of athletic 
Finally, school districts argued that coeducation distracted boys and girls 
from their studies during the turbulent, sexualized adolescent years, and 
that single-sex schools would mitigate resulting discipline problems. "A 
Case for the Separation of the Sexes," for instance, cited studies showing 
that "the lack of distractions from the opposite sex" resulted in "better 
work habits" for both boys and girls and "fewer discipline problems.""' 
Wrote Davies, "It is generally agreed that the ages of twelve to fifteen are 
the worst years for boys and girls to be educated together. . . . '[Plutting 
girls and boys together in the same school is not necessarily the normal, 
healthy thing to do.""j4 When the Jefferson Parish, Louisiana school 
board proposed reinstating coeducation in the parish's high schools in 
1973 after more than a decade of sex segregation, supporters of 
maintaining single-sex campuses often cited unspecified "disciplinary 
problems" as among the "innumerable difficulties" coeducation would 
produce.'55 One newspaper account alluded to a school board meeting 
discussion where "references [were] made to young men as animals who 
would destroy" the girls' schools.'i0 
The arguments for single-sex schools that highlighted sexual distractions 
and discipline problems dovetailed nicely with underlying fears about 
interracial sexual contact and social intimacy, without referring directly to 
race. The equation of racial integration urith sexual and social disorder had 
long been a prominent theme in segregationist ideology, and as 
desegregation proceeded, its opponents seized every opportunity to 
trumpet the vindication of their worst fears. The mid-1950s saw an uproar 
over "disciplinary and sex problems" in the newly desegregated District of 
Columbia schools, as congressional hearings featured testimony 
concerning the alleged "manhandling" of girls in the hallways, a splke ir, 
pregnancies and venereal disease, a general increase in physical 
altercations, and the distribution of pornography among  student^."^ A 
congressional report blamed integration for these ills, and recolnmended 
152. Id. at 5 .  
153. A Case for the Separation, s1rpl.u note 139. at I 17. 
154. Davies. s~cyr-cl note 137. at 4-5 (quo t~ng  James S. Coleman o f johns  Hopkins Uni\,ersity). 
155. Mrs. Edward GI-oner & Mrs. E.J Lacombe. Metairie Wornen's Club: Letter to the Edito!. 
Ayulnsr JKO Coetllication. NEW O R I . ~ A N S  TJXI I .S -P ICAYUN~.  Jan. 14. 1973. $2: at 2: see c7l.c-o Einile 
LaFourcade, Jr.. Har-uhun Borrr-d Oppo.sc,s .Sex- lr~teg,-cztron in Scl~ooir. Ni;t+.' O R L . ~ A ~ S  T1h4l-5- 
PICAJ.UNE. 3 1 .  at 9 (11oti119 t11e ohser\~ition.; of ;in alder~ilan and foriiier schocll bus-dl-!\ el- thiil "i i  
school busload of g ~ r l s  01- of boys is mucli easier 10  control than  hen boys and girls at-e on the s j lne  
bus"). 
150 Fred Ban-?. Jeji'ro I'ore 017 C'oc~d ls.,lrt.,. Y I : ~  C)RI.I:.ANS Tikll:s-I>l( j % \ ' ~ ! ~ t : .  Jan. 18. 1073. 
157 lrlrrgr-trtror~ Sethock.\, N.1'.  'TI>II=s. Sept 2.3. 1956. at 186: .Sc>.\ f'~.ohlt,ni\ Hoh 1 j l  irr I~1'111i1, 01 
l~~re,qr~crrro~~. ('HI D.AIL.I, T R I H . .  Sept. 70. 1956. at (-3: Pi.uc.l7rr~.c- L.11 //rriyr-oiiotr ' \  .';c~r Pi-ohlt'lli\. ('Iil. 
LI.\li Y T1(113.. Sept 27. 1950. at A2 
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restoring racial segregation to prevent whire flight fiom the nation's 
! 5s U'hitzs' exodus to the suburbs continued, but the District began 
a "pioneer program of sex education" in several elementary schools in 
1959, citing the need to curb unwed motherhood."" 
By the late 1960s, concerns about desegregation combined with anxiety 
over the sexual revolution that many conserv;ltives believed was 
corrupting the nation's youth and undermining traditional r n ~ r - a l i t ~ . ' ~ ~  
Resistance to sex education and busing often became twin causes for 
parents suspicious of education policies that ceded control of school 
assignment and curricula to what many saw as a dangerous liberal plot to 
impose the counterculture on innocent children. Advocates sornctimes 
connected their campaign against sex education with their opposition to 
busing, identifying both as rcactions to what one Virginia mother called "a 
whole new morality . . . sensitivity training and social planners with their 
philosophy."'6' Racial fears did not necessarily underpin parents' 
reactions, and indeed some African American parents may have shared 
these concerns about sex education. White supremacists, however, made 
the link between integration and sex education explicit: in a 1969 editorial, 
The Citizen asserted that white parents' real concern was not just about 
inappropriate curricula, or even about sex education as a Communist 
conspiracy, as the John Birch Society charged.I6' Rather, the problem was 
that "sex education was taking place in integrated cla.~~ses!" "Integration 
plus sex education equals miscegenation," the editors warned.I6' Anxieties 
about integration mixed with apprehension about growing sexual 
158. Eve Edstrom, Duvls Unit Kepoi.t Hirs Fast School Integration, W A S H .  POST, Dec. 28, 1956. 
at i l l :  Willard Edwards. Re.segrrgirtiotl ll'crsl~ington Schools UI-ged, Ct-11. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 29, 
1956, at 3: Bess Furman, Fo~rr irl Ilonse Cirpirul Segreguiion, N.Y. TIMES, Dcc. 29. 1956, at 1. 
Blrt see Richard L.  Lyons bic Eve Edstrorn. Integration Called Mirucle of Social AcQ~afn~ent 1-ler-e, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1957, at B7 (describing Anti-Defamation League report that applauded thc 
transition to racially integrated schooling in Washington, D.C.). 
159. Roger Greene, Lrntt>er/ :Vlotller-.Y Cl'i2crt Can We Do.?, C H I .  DAILY TRIB., Aug. 9, 1959, at E6. 
160. See Neil Ulman, A Delicrrie Suhjecr - S~.Y  Etitlc~ltion Co~lirses Are S~rdrlen!~~ Assoiled bv Itlurz)~ 
l'nr-e!~t GI .OLI~S ,  WALL S T .  .I., Apr. 1 1 ,  1969, at 1 .  
161. In 1970, the Virginia House of Delegates considered anti-busing and sex education bills 
simultaneously. See B~rsiny, Se.r Bill5 Gaiii i i ~  I.i,giniil, WASH. POST,  Mar. 3, 1970, at C1. See also 
Bart Barnes, Prince George :Y Blrsing Foes Cliclnge T(lctics, w.4~11 .  POST, June 10, 1973. at B 1 .  
162. On the John Birch Society's involvement in the anti-sex education campaign, see Ulman, 
.sr/p.u note 160, at 1 . 
163. Editorial, f + SE = iCf, T H E  CITIZEN, June 1969, at 2. See i~lso Medford Evans. Se,x 
Gl~rccltiotl in Integrated Schools, T H ~ :  Cl - r l z~h .  June 1969, at 12. By the early 1970s, white 
suprcmacists had taken their argument one step further: if only interracial marriage were the worst 
outcome imaginable, lamented Robert Kuttner. But Kuttner's forays into Harlem convinced him that 
white Southerners' apprehension was desperately nai've. In fact, -'the average ghetto Black had [no] 
intentions as respectable as  marriage" for the young white middle-class women hc allegedly seduced 
into prost~tution to finance his drug hablt. Robert E. Kuttner, No?-thern Light on the Sotrthern Scene, 
THE CITIZEN, Nov. 1972, at 26. Indeed. Kuttner warned, the daughters of white liberal upper middle- 
class families were the most vulnerable to what he called "remote-control integration": teaching 
children that integration was good without exposing them to its horrors could be the downfall of well- 
meaning white girls. Id. at 25-26. 
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permissiveness and parents' perceived loss of control over their children's 
e d ~ c a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
Theories of adolescent sexual distraction provided a race-neutral 
language with which to express the concerns that had animated sex 
separation in the first place. Indeed, the Louisiana school districts that 
made "A Case for the Separation of the Sexes" had, just a few years 
earlier, been racial battlegrounds. The New Orleans suburb of St. Bernard 
Parish, for instance, had long been controlled by the fanatical and 
autocratic politician Leander Perez. Perez, with the help of Superintendent 
Davies and others, had conspired to create an all-white public school 
"annex" in St. Bernard for white children assigned to the two New Orleans 
schools where violent mobs accosted black six-year-olds attempting to 
integrate in 1960.'65 Notwithstanding his later enthusiasm for economy in 
the construction of school facilities, Davies apparently had been less 
concerned about thrift in 1961, when he announced that the parish, 
"already operating its schools in the red, would find a means of paying the 
certified teachers" employed to teach the white refugees from New 
Orleans in a converted automobile plant in Arabi.Ih6 Then again, he had 
had ample financial assistance in setting up the annex-from the state of 
Louisiana, which supplied free textbooks and lunches and later 
appropriated $300,000 to assist the school board; from volunteers who 
constructed classrooms using donated materials; and from a network of 
private buses leased by a parents' cooperative.'" Other Jane Crow districts 
in Louisiana had also experienced racial turbulence in the 1960s. Iberville 
Parish, just south of Baton Rouge, had been the site of racial unrest in 
1963, and the target of a lawsuit by black parents and the NAACP 
demanding immediate racial desegregation.'" Federal district court judge 
E. Gordon West had ordered the Iberville Parish schools to desegregate in 
1964, despite his professed agreement with school board attorneys that 
court-ordered descgregat~on did more hamm than good, and that white 
164. For a fascinating sociological sludy of the 1a1-ger debate over se* education in schools. 
il~espectlve of its racial i~nplications, see KK~STIN LVKI-.R; WHEN SI:X GOLS TO S C I ~ ~ O ~ . :  WARKING 
VIL:WS ON SIX-AND SEX EDUC .?TION-SINCE TI-I~: SIXTIES (2006). 
165. On the peculiar politics of St. Bernard Parish, see Fairclough. .c.liprtr notc 88. at 57. 
166. 1,oliisiaiitr: /,'olo-r Rcfitsrs Ret~o.ri io S ~ h o o i  Seg~-c>g-u(ioiz. S(II:TIIIRS SCHOOL NI-\'?S. Ian. 
196 1. at 1. 10. The converted factory housed a makeshift school for first- tllrough third-graders. wl~ilc 
foulth- thl-ough sixth-graders from Nc\\ 01-leans attended the regulas. segrcpted public schools of St .  
Bernard Parish. I n  I-ehrual-y 1961. New Orleails superintendent James F. Kedniond estili~ated that of 
the 1.019 \vl~ite students \\ho prs\iously attended the two schools at \vhicli desegregation had been 
attempted. only forty-nine remained in Pic\\, Orleans public schools. and at [cast six hundred were 
attending school in St. 13emard Pal-ish. i?,%7el-e Hri1.r If~'~lhdf.u~.i? PLIJI;/.S ( ; o t ? ( ' ) .  SOC'?liY.RN S C t 1 0 O L  
NI-\\;s. Feb. 1961. at 6. 
167. Lo~i/.%Iui~u . (,'o~ii.? Re/ii\c>5 l<cfio~f~. \it/>t.u note 166. at 10: 1.o~iisi~~tici: Co~ii.i l'o.~~/~oiie.r 
ifrur-ing oil Conl/)lere ~>e.sr,yi.egiirioi7. S(>I' I HI-RN SCHOOL ht-\VS. .)~inc 1961. at '1. 
1 S(i1ri11ri.11 Sc 11001 Ye\\.\ dsscl-ihed the ul~rest as fol1oa.s: "Negro srudenrs of Pl;~queruines's 
1hen.ille I-ligh School staged a bo~sterou\ book-thro\ving melee Oct. 3 .  sparking a series of ex ents ihat 
inclr~ded closing of tlie scliool. a systernw~de boycott of Ncgro schools and sexel-a1 brreet 
demonstrations that \r-CI-c dispel-sed h?; teal- gas." .L-eit. Oi-1euii.s 'Yegr.orc P~>t.rir~oti Roclr-ti /or. :l lo~r 
D(>.c<,gi,r~tr/in,1. SOL'THFRN S C H O ~ I -  h E i 4  5. Nov .  1963. at 9. 
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children were likely to suffer psychological damage from attending 
integrated ~choo l s . ' ~"  
Skeptics could thus be forgiven their doubts that the "educational 
purposes" cited by school boards were the genuine rationales motivating 
sex segregation. By the end of the decade, critics enjoyed some success in 
convincing judges that sex separation schemes were motivated by racial 
discrimination. At the same time, however, none of them suggested that 
separate schools for boys and girls posed any problem of sex 
discrimination. School districts could cite sex segregation's educational 
benefits to boys and trumpet the virtues of sex-specific curricular 
specialization with impunity. As Part 111 shows, the women's rights 
revolution would change all that. 
III. "SEP~IRATE CAN NEVER BE EQUAL": THE RISE OF THE SEX 
DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT AGAINST JANE CROW 
The educational justifications for sex separation enumerated by school 
districts in the late 1960s and early 1970s reveal a gaping sex 
discrimination lacuna in the Jane Crow discourse. Indeed, all parties to 
Jane Crow litigation during this period assumed that sex separation did 
not, in the absence of racially discriminatory motivation, pose a 
constitutional question. Thus the Concordia Parish School Board could 
argue unabashedly that because the "advantages and disadvantages 
attendant upon a separation by sex plan are all related to sex and not to 
race," there was no constitutional issue to be resolved.'70 Similarly, 
Georgia's brief in United States v. Geovgia declared: 
Separation by sex may well help in making racial integration work in 
some school systems. In any event, decisions on such matters 
obvio~~sly do not on their face directly and sharply implicate any 
basic constitzitional valttes and hence should be left to the affected 
169. Ihervillt. Paris11 Schools Ordered to he Desegregated, SOUTlIERN SCHOOL N E W S ,  Aug. 
1964, at 4 ("Judge West agreed with school board attorneys that more harm than good has been done 
the publ~c school system through desegregation rulings, but he said, 'Be that as it may, the court has to 
follow the law and will follow the law.' Defense counsel, in responding to the petition, had held that 
psychological damagc would be done to white children placed in desegregated schools. West said he 
personally felt there was merit in this defense but higher courts had ruled otherwise."). Judge West 
was not much more enthusiastic by 1969. See 1 RACE REL. L. SURV. 109 (Sept. 1969) ("Though 
acknowledging his duty to carry O L I ~  the mandate of the court of appeals, [Judge West] expressed his 
opinion that the mandate 'is both ill-advised and legally wrong."'); 1 RACE REL. L. SURV. 164-65 
(Nov. 1969) ("To req~iire attempts to bring about complete desegregation by September, 1969, would. 
in [Judge West's] opinion, 'cause nothing but complete disruption of the entire system."'). 
170. See Brief of Appellees at 8, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28342 (5th Cir. Nov. 
l I ,  1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349) 
(emphasis added). Notably, C.J. Duckworth, executive director of the all-black Mississippi Teachers 
Association, apparently did not believe that African American parents had legal recourse against sex 
segregation. "As long as black boys and white boys are in class together, I don't think they have a 
legitimate complaint." he remarked in reference to a 1970s boycott against sex segregation in 
Coffeeville, Mississippi. "I'm somy [the students are boycotting] because it's simply a boy versus girl 
thing." Qzloteci in Boycott See\- Bias, CHICAGO DAILY DEFENDER, Sept. 3, 1970, at 12. 
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local school boards . . . . I 7 '  
The school boards were not the only parties operating under this 
assumption. When Fifth Circuit judges Griffin Bell, Homer Thornberry, 
and Lewis Morgan held a question-and-answer session for school 
desegregation attorneys in November 1969, Judge Bell made clear that the 
court's primary concern about plans that called for sex separation was 
whether the boys' and girls' schools would each have a racial balance 
proportional to the school pop~1at ion . l~~ Federal District Judge William 
Keady of Mississippi opined that "the concept [of sex separation] 
embraces a philosophy that has not been held contrary to the United States 
Constitution and must, therefore, be approved."'73 The Concordia Parish 
board could therefore assert with confidence a "complete absence of any 
legal authority for an attack on separation of the sexes."'74 School districts 
had merely to assert a legitimate "educational purpose" for segregating 
boys and girls and hope that their fervent disavowals or tacit admissions of 
racial motivation would win over the courts-or at least not draw 
unwanted judicial attention. 
Just a few short years transformed the legal landscape. By 1974, 
feminist efforts in the legislative arena and in the courtroom had produced 
powerhl statutory and constitutional weapons against sex discri~~~ination. 
By 1977, when advocates sought to root out the last vestiges of sex 
segregation in the South, a sex discrimination paradigm based largely on 
an analogy to race had come to dominate an anti-segregation campaign 
that, before 1970, had been utterly silent on the subject of sex-based 
inequality. 
171. Brief of the State of Georgia, et al., at 18, United States v. Georgia, Nos. ?l-2563 &: 12972 
(5th Cis. Sept. 16, 1971) (NARA: S.W. Keg. Div., RG 276, Fifth C~rcuit, Case F~lcs, B o  6148, 
71 :2563-71:2569) (emphasis added). 
172. Proceedings at 79-80, United States v. Hlnds County Sch. Bd. Nos. 28030 8r 28042 (5th Cii-. 
Nov. 6, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., KG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files. Box 4163, No\;. 196') (pi.)- 
R,larch 1970). In fact, the Fifth Circuit panel ordered the Wilki~lson County, Mississippi. school district 
to implement the HEW proposal after the board fa~led to make a showing regarding the racial 
composition of the proposed girls' schools. Order, United States v. I-llnds County Sch. Bd. and Unitcd 
States v. Wilkinson County Sch. Dlst.. Nos. 28030 8r 28042 (5th Cir. Dec. 22. 1969) ( N A R A .  S.W. 
Reg. Div.. RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files. Box 4163. Nov. 1969 (pi.)-March 1970). .41~ound t h ~ s  
time, one newspaper report quoted Judge Bell as I-esponding to a c ~ v ~ l  nghts attorney's claim that sex 
L b  1 out segregation was racially insulting with the com~nenl. "You're trying to get the last ounce of' fl-.l 
of these people. al-en't you'?" I'eter L41lius. Dtst,yr.c~gu/ioir (.CJ.SO . , ~ / I / ICYII - .S  Dim [ ( I  ( ' O I ~ I ~ \ < ' / .  M I z S I ~ .  
Pos'r. Nov. 19. 1969. at A2. 
173 Unlted States v Carroll Couilt), No. 6541K (N.D. Miss. 1969), qlioieii i i i  (11-del-. Ut-iitrd 
Starcs v .  Lincoln County. Sch. Bd.. Nos. 1400 and 1420. at 3 (Apr 27. 1970) ( L ~ b r n c  of ('onyl-ess. 
Rccords of the NAACP,  V:2819. Folder- Schools- (ieorg~a. Legal Caxes. 1970-197s). 
174. Brief of Appellees at 6. Smith \ .  Concordia Par~sh Sch. Bd.. No. 18342 (5th C'lr No\ 1.3. 
1009) (NARA.  S I?;. Reg Div . fiCi 276. 1-~fth CII-cult. C'ilse Files. Box 4215, 283,42-?Xi4Y 1. 
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Advocates of women's rights had little success in n~ounting legal 
challenges to sex-segregated education in the fifteen years after Bro~~ t7 .  As
we saw in Part I.B., feminists' 1950s attempts to apply race precedents 
like Svveatt, McLazirin, and Bro~ t ' t~  o end the exclusion of women from 
public universities were unsuccessful. Feminists achieved two significant 
breakthroughs in 1969, revitalizing the race-sex analogy as a rhetorical 
and constitutional weapon."' Alice de Rivera, a thir-teen-year-old 
Brooklyn girl, sued for admission to the prestigious Stuyvesant High 
School in New York City, arguing that "[slex, as race, is a form of 
segregation that is not tolerated by the 1 4 ' ~  amendment,"'76 and that 
maintaining all-male elite public schools made girls "second-class 
citizens.""' When a ruling in DeRivera7s favor appeared likely, the Board 
of Education-headed by John Doar, former Assistant Attorney General 
for Civil Rights-voted to adrnit her to S t ~ ~ v e s a n t . ' ~ ~  Several months 
later, a federal district court gave tentative approval to a coeducation plan 
for the formerly all-male undergraduate division of the University of 
Virginia. Like the DeRivera case, Kimtein v. Board of Rectors of the 
University oJ' Virginicc relied heavily on an analogy between sex and race 
segregation. The court's initial ruling reflected this close relationship: as 
Judge Robert Merhige wrote, "If racial segregation in State supported 
institutions is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the 
Constitution, as indeed it is, then the allegations . . . [are] indeed a patent 
denial of due process and equal treatment required by law.""9 A three- 
judge district court went on to declare in 1970 that the exclusion of 
women from the college violated equal protection, though the court 
175. In thc late 1960s and early 1970s. cocclucation increasingly began to supplant single-sex 
schooling in elite colleges and secondary schools. For instance; coeducation began at Yale and 
Princeton in 1969, at Brown in 1971. and at Dartrnouth in 1972. Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges 
effectively merged in 1972. New York's Stuyvesant High School first admitted girls in 1969: Boston 
Latin in 1972, Phillips Academy (Andover) and Phillips Exeter in 1973. 
176. Associated Press, Girl, 13, l,l'ins Enti? fo All-Male School, EVENING STAR (Washington, 
D.C.), May 3. 1969, at A-2 (on file n~ith the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute. Harvard 
University, Catherine East Papers, MC 377, Box 9,  Folder 44) (quoting DeRivera's attorney Eleanor 
Jackson Piel). 
177. United Press Internat~onal, Sex iLI~1ke.~ Dlfferei7ce in Legal Drsplrte.~, FAYETTEVILLE (N.C.) 
OBSERVER,  Apr. 10, 1969 (Schles~nger L~brary. Radcliffe Institute, Harvard Un~versity, Catherine 
East Papers. MC 477, Box 9,  Folder 44). DeRivera's attorneys relied heavily on a race-sex analogy. 
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition 4-9. DeRivera v. Fliedner, No. 00938-69 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. June 5 ,  1969) (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers. 
MC 477, Box 9, Folder 34). 
178. Associated Press. Girl, I.?, CVit1.5 Eltttty. s~~pr-u note 176, at A-2. John Sandifer, the judge 
hearing DeRivera's case was African American, and according to one observer, "appreciated the 
relationship to the Bro~cvi case." Memorandum from Catherine East to Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, May 
2, 1969. Re: New Developments in the De Rivera Case (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute. 
kiarvard University, Catherine East Papers, MC 377, Box 9, Folder 44). 
179. Memorandum, Kirstein v. Univ. of V~rginia, No. 220-69-R, Sept. 8, 1969, at 2 (Schlesinger 
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, MC 477, Box 10, Folder 7). 
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"declined to go further and to hold that Virginia may not operate any 
educational institution separated according to the sexes."'" In other 
words, sex-segregated education inight not, like racial segregation, be 
"inherently unequal." Philip Hirschkop, who argued the case for the 
Virginia ACLU, wrote to fellow women's rights lawyers. "While we 
managed to desegregate the University of Virginia, which is what we set 
out to do, T had hoped for more. At any rate, we must accept our 
vict~ries." '~ '  Ruth Bader Ginsburg was more upbeat, calling the decision a 
"landmark" and a "path-breaker."'Y2 
Meanwhile, feminists expressed dismay over the renewed enthusiasm 
for sex segregation as an accoinpaniment to racial desegregation, and 
encouraged the Justice Department to intervene in the Jane Crow cases.I8' 
Catherine East, technical secretary to the Citizens' Advisory Council on 
the Status of Women, offered a typical analysis: "Separate education 
based on either sex or race has never been equal and is undoubtedly 
inherently unequal."'" But although women's rights advocates tried to 
enter the debate over sex segregation in racial desegregation pIans.''' the 
plaintiffs and attorneys who challenged these plans in 1969-70 were not 
yet incorporating arguments about sex discrimination into their rhetorical 
or legal arsenal. A U~~iver-sity of Chicugo Law Revieli student note by 
Robert Bamett helped to disseminate such argu~nents on the eve of a 
revolution in constitut~onal sex equality doctrine.'"' ''The Constitutionality 
of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans," which circulated 
among desegregation laivyers before and after its publication i n  1970. 
advanced three approaches to challenging sex separation schemes. The 
180. Kirstein v. Univ. of Virgillia. 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D.C. \:a. 1-eb. 0. 1970). .judge Merliige 
did not apply a full-blown race-sex pal-allel to Jane Crow. either. \'hen lie considel-cd a scx segrega!ion 
plan in Richmond County the followi~ig year. See s~rpr-u note 131. 
181. Letter from Philip .I. Hit-schkop to Me1 Wulf, Re: Kirsteln v. Rector and Vis~tors  of the 
University of V~rginia  (Feb. 12, 1970) (on file with Schlesingel- Libra~y.  Radclifk I~lstitute, Ijai-\-al-d 
University. I-iunian Rights for Women Papers, 83-M229. Box I ,  Foldel-. K~rstcin).  
182. ILetter from Ruth Bade:- Ginsburg to  Beillice Sandler (Sept.  8. 1970) (on fils \\,it11 the LiSra~y 
of Congress. Ruth Bader Glnsburp Papers. Container 7. Folder: Rutgers College. Nev, Ur~ins\vick. Nj .  
Coeducation. 1970:. 
183. Ci t~zens  Advison~ Council on the Status of Women. U.S. Dcpart~nerit of Labot-. Separat~on 
of  the Sexes in School Desegregation Plans. May 27, 1069 (Sc1iiesinge1- Library. Kadcliffc Irist~tute. 
Elal-vard University. Cather~ne Last Papers. MC 377. Box 9, Foldei- 37) (noting deci.;~ons upliold~ng 
sex scgrcgatton in St. .lames I'arish. Louisiana and Can-oll C o ~ ~ n t y .  Viss is~ippi .  and urging wonicn's 
ad\/ocates to w r ~ t e  to the ;l\ttorncy (;e~ie~-al and Assistant Attorney Gencral tbr Ci\,il I< ~glits) .  
183. Id. East continued. ".At best. the gu-1s \\.hose t a l en~s  lay in sciencz and i-i~ntli would h a ~ e  an  
inferior educat~on and bo1.s \+:hose talc~its lay in verbal areas \\,ouid l ihcivi~e he siiglitcd. Tile hest 
teachers would go to boys and tlle best tlquil~rnent. Sociologically. boy\ and 211-Is nced tills oppo~lilnity 
to  cstabllsh relati i~nsh~ps to each othel- as human beings. Separation of rhe seuc5 in educat~on can oiily 
lead to greater polarization in adult li\.es." It/ 
1 8 .  \i;orticn's r-lghts at$\ ocatc I)orotl~y Kenyon was a\\ ar-c ot' (anti i t idi~nanl about) 
srgscgation proposals in  he 1Y50.; .Ye:(.(. L.cttcr from D~I-ot l iy  Keii\o~i r o  Rtr\vland W;~tls. Sta!'i 
Attoniey. AC'LLI (Apl-. 24. 19 i t ) )  (Mudd Libr-ary. PI-inceton lin~\,cl-sli!. A( I G I?ecor-d\. 130.; 1147. 
I-older 22). 
1 x 6  K o t e ~  7-Iiv C ~ ~ I I S ~ I I I ! / I O I ~ [ I / I ~ \  of..Se.~ . Y C ~ I ~ I I . O ~ ; O I I  111 . ~ < ' / t O O /  L ~ c , . \ ( ~ ~ I ~ c , : ~ , I ! I o I I  !>i(111\. 37 L.1. ( III 1~ 
Rl \.. 20(> ( 1970) 
Yale journal of t a w  &I the Humanities [Vol. 18: 187 
first concerned "sex separation as racial discrimination," another 
addressed "sex separation as limiting freedom of associationn-but 
Barnett took his analysis a step further and argued for "sex separation as 
sex discrimination." 
Significantly, Barnett based his sex discrimination argument on "a 
parallel to the harms found in race separation," relying on "evidence 
pointing to the conclusion that the same psychological detriments, alleged 
to harm the segregated black, may also harm the separated female."'" In 
developing his argument that "[tlhe status and problems of the woman in 
America present a curious parallel to those of the black,"'" Barnett could 
cite a growing literature developing an analogy between race and sex 
inequality, including works by sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, social 
psychologist Helen Mayer Hacker, anthropologist Ashley Montagu, and 
lawyers Blanche Crozier, Pauli Murray, and Mary E a s t w ~ o d . ' ~ ~  Like 
racial segregation, Barnett extrapolated, sex separation would also lead to 
material and educational harms, "resulting in an atmosphere which 
inadequately prepares one for the realities of social life in a world of two 
sexes."'" Bamett also saw strategic potential in the Jane Crow cases. "It 
may be," he suggested, "that sex separation in school desegregation plans . 
. . presents an ideal situation for a challenge to the validity and viability" 
of the Supreme Court's refusal to regard sex classifications as 
constitutionally ~ u s p e c t . ' ~ '  
While the Jane Crow controversy did not play the prominent test case 
role Barnett foresaw, his sex discrimination argument nevertheless 
anticipated a revolution in sex equality law between 1970 and 1974.19' 
187. Iri. at 313. 
188. Uarnett continued: 
Wonicn. l ~ k e  blacks. are characterized by a high social visibility expressed in physic?l 
appearance. dress. and patterns of behavior setting them apart as a distinct 'class.' Besides a 
h ~ g h  degree of visibility, women and blacks also share the dubious distinction of being the 
vrct~nis of very srmilar arguments used by the dominant group to justify the inferior position 
accorcled them. including inferior intelligence, scarcity of geniuses, freedom in instinctual 
gratifications. and emotionalism. Both groups were assigned a 'place' in society, whether it be 
the ficld or the horne, and were barred from education, sufkage, certain jobs, and political 
ofticc. Most significantly, the actions of the dominant groups toward both blacks and women 
wel-e thougilt to bc in the best interest of the s~~bordinate groups. 
hi, at 3 12-13. 
189. On the race-sex analogy, Bamett cited ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS 
MY-rH: T H C  FALLACY OF RACE ( I  948); MYRD.RL, s~rpvn note 19; Blanche Crozier, ConstitutionuliQ9 of 
Discr-iinrncition Bclsrci 017 Sex, 15 B.U. L. REV. 723 (1935); Helen Mayer Hacker, CVornm us iz 
Minor-it>% Groirp. 30 SOCIAL FORCES 60 (1951); and Murray & Eastwood. suprir note 3. 1 have 
discussed the development of legal race-sex analogies in Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Crmzi~zon Fate of 
Disc~iminufion": R~~ce/Gen&r ilnalogies in Legul ancl Hktoricil Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 
(200 I ) .  
190. Barnett, Note, strpru note 186, at 316. 
191. lci. 
192. Bar-nett's note circulated within the women's rights advocacy community after its 
publication. See, e.g., Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Barbara Esposito (Mar. 29, 1971) (Library 
of Congress, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 7, Folder: Rutgers College. New Brunswiek, NJ, 
Coeducation, Mar.-Apr. 1971 ) (citing Barnett note). 
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Almost a half-century after it was first proposed, Congress passed the 
Equal Rights Amendment and sent it to the states for ratification in 1972. 
The same year, the Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act 
mandated equality of educational opportunity for women and girls.19' 
Known as Title IX, the provision prohibiting sex discrimillation in 
education passed with relatively little fanfare, as heated debates over 
busing dominated coverage of the bill. Wall Street Journal reporter 
Jonathan Spivak presciently predicted, "Overshadowed by the busing fuss 
. . . [the] strict ban against sex discrimination [in education] . . . could be a 
major source of contention in the future."'94 
Title IX was not the only piece of sex discrimination legislation to slide 
through Congress without prolonged public debate. Two years later, a 
little-noticed provision of the Equal Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA) 
prohibited pupil assignments based on sex as well as race, color, religion, 
and national origin.lg5 The busing controversy again overshadowed the sex 
disci-iinination issue: press coverage of the EEOA's passage mentioned the 
inclusion of sex only in passing, and no legislative history survives to 
explain its origins. Two years earlier, though, Dr. Bernice Sandler of the 
Women's Equity Action League (WEAL) had voiced the suspicion that 
Nixon's proposed anti-busing bill had purposely omitted sex from the 
prohibited categories of pupil assignment in order to "permit the operation 
of sex segregated schools as a ineans of maintaining partial racial 
segregation-'the segregation of black boys and white girls.""" Sandler 
also expressed sex discrimination concerns. She told the Nel.r, York Times 
that she "doubt[ed] very much that the girls' schools would have equal 
science facilities, physical education programs and vocational 
programs."'97 The final bill, passcd in 1974, was responsive to Sandler's 
objection, despite a lack of legislative history confirming the EEOA's 
intended applicability to Jane Crow. 
In the meantime, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU Women's Rights 
Project convinced four Supreme Court Justices to accept a constitutional 
analogy between race and sex discrimination in the 1973 case F~onfiero v. 
~iclzardson. '"~ Frorztier-o was, as it turned out, the high-water mark for the 
193. 20 U.S.C. 5 I68 1 (2005). 
9 lotlathan Spivak, rlien. ffigllrr--Ecl'cr'llc.utioti Bill Pr-oi~itles 15fo1-e Fz/nds, hiti Se.~-5iu.~ Sectiorl 
Could .(jjci~-k C'oritr-o~.c~r-.s.v, W~1.1. ST. J. ,  Jul. 13, 1972. at 36. For morc on the stealthy passage and 
thorny tmplementat~on of Title IS. see JOHN D,z\~II )  S K I I E N T N Y ,  THE ~ . ~ I N O R I ~ ' Y  RIGHTS REVOLUTIOK 
230-62 (2002). 
195. St~esi1111-unotc 10. 
9 Eilccn Shanahan. ,Vi.ro~z Aid  SozcgJii on I:qucrl 12igl7is. N.Y. TIMES. Mar-. 18. 1972, at 15. 
197. Id 
198. 41 1 U 5. 677. 685 (1'373) (Brennan. J..  pluraltty opi~iioli) ("[Tlhl-o~ighout much of t l ie  19th 
centuty tlic poiition of  \vometi in our soctety ;?.as, in many respects, cot-uparahle to that of  blacks 
under the pt-e-Civil War s l a ~ c  odes. Netthcr slaves nor women could hold office. s e n e  on juries, or 
bring suit rn theit- own names. and mart-icd women traditionall>, \\!ere denied the legal capacity to hold 
or con\'ey property or- to serve a s  legal guardians of tlietr own children. And although blacks were 
guaranteed tlie risht to vote in 1870. wometi \vet-e dctiied even that rtglit - w h i c I i  is itself 'prescrvat~ve 
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constitutional race-sex analogy, but it confirmed the rapid ascendance of a 
theory that the Court had so~lndly rejected a dozen years earlier.'"" Sex- 
based lcgal classifications no longer were sub-ject to the lax rational basis 
standard of review;"'" instead, lower courts argued over how strictly to 
scrutinize laws that distinguished between inales and females. It was far 
from clear what the women's rights revolution woulci mean for sex- 
segregated education, but a new universe of legal theories and precedents 
unquestionably was available to sex segregation's foes by the time that 
ACLU attorney Jack Peebles filed a complaint on behalf of Kenlee Helwig 
and other plaintiffs in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, in 1974."' 
B. "lnher-ently Discriminatory Towurd Women ": Helwig v. Jefferson 
Parish School Board 
Helwig v. Jeffeel-son Parish School Bourd was the first Jane Crow 
lawsuit to place sex discrimination at the center of the case against sex 
segregation. Jefferson Parish, a rapidly growing middle-class community 
adjacent to New Orleans, had not gained the notoriety of its neighboring 
parishes, Orleans and St. Bernard, in the early 1960s struggle against 
racial desegregation. Unlike many of the school districts that later turned 
to Janc Crow, Jefferson Parish was predotninantly white-African 
Americans comprised a little over twenty percent of the student 
population. Nevertheless, Jefferson could hardly boast a racially 
harmonious past. Like St. Bernard, Jefferson Parish had segregated its 
high schools by sex in the early 1960s in anticipation of possible racial 
desegregation, though none initially o~curred.'~' In 1962, demonstrations 
grceted the arrival of black children at Our Lady of Prompt Succor in 
Westwego, and enrollment at the private Catholic school pl~~mmeted from 
a high of almost eight hundred students before desegregation, to about five 
hundred after desegregation was announced, and to a low of 118 after 
of other basic civil and political rights'-until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendnlent half a century 
later. . . .") 
199. In H0j.t v. Flor.i~lu, the Court rejected the notion that exempting n.omen from jury service 
degraded their citizenship rights. Justice Harlan wrote: "Despite the enlightened emancipation of 
woinen from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry Into many parts of 
community life formerly considered to be reserved for men, woman is still regarded as the center of 
home and family life." 368 U.S. 17, 61-62 (1961) 
200. The rational basis standard of review required only that laws classifying indi\iduals on the 
basis of sex be reasonably related to a leg~timate government objective. Until 1971. the Supreme Court 
never invalidated a sex-based legal classification under this standard. See Reed v. R?cii. 404 U.S. 71 
(I971 ) (finding an Idaho law preferring male estate admiiiistrators unconstitutional). 
201. The suit was filed on behalf of Kenlee Helwig by her parents, Carl and Jeanne Helwig, and 
William I-lelis by his parents, Kathleen and James Helis. Sex Se;r,arurion in Schooi.r Hit, N E W  
ORLEANS TIMI;S-PICAYUNE. Aug. 2, 1974. $1. at 6. Later, Peebles filed another suit on behalf of 
Nancy Birgit Anderson and Laura Ellen Tracy, challenging thc constitutionality of the Louisiana 
statute authorizing sex-segregated school assignments. S~tit  At tach JeflNon-Coed School Senrp, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jul. 20, 1976, 9 I, at 1 .  
202. See, e.g., Editorial, Boys arid Gir-lr Together, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE. Oct. 1.  
1977, $1, at 22 ("[Sex segregation] was begun 15 years ago in response to a court order to end racial 
segregation"). 
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angry protests rocked the com~nunity."~ Undeterred, in July 1964, twenty- 
five African American students appeared at West Jefferson High School, a 
public school, to request enrollment for the coining year.'04 They were 
rebuffed, and shortly thereafter, a suit was filed on behalf of Lena Vem 
Dandridge and fifteen other students. In 1965, Dandridge was one of 
twenty African American girls to desegregate the all-female and formerly 
all-white Riverdale High School under a freedom-of-choice plan.205 
Sex segregation in Jefferson Parish high schools did not go uncontested 
in the 1960s. In 1966-67, when the school district announced plans to 
build two new high schools, the Jefferson Parish Committee for Better 
Schools called for the reinstateinent of coed~cat ion. '~~ The committee 
cited education experts from Loyola, Tulane, and Louisiana State 
University, who testified to coeducation's pedagogical In 
October 1969, several months after Judge Herbert Christenberry approved 
a school board plan involving sex separation in grades 9-12,208 over one 
hundred African American students protested sex segregation in a 
demonstration at West Jefferson High 
White school officials, however, remained convinced that racial 
desegregation could not proceed without sex segregation. Interviews 
conducted by concerned members of the Jefferson Parish chapter of the 
National Organization for Women (NOW) in late 1969 reveal that the 
superintendent and school board members did not dispute coeducation's 
general pedagogical merits. but they believed sex segregation in the 
parish's public high schools to be indispensable to white parents' 
acceptance of integration. As one of the interviewers wrote, 
Superintendent Bertucci "began by stating that he, in general, approved of 
mixing the sexes, but . . . [h]e unequivocally feels that separation was 
203. Loziisiaiiu: Batari Rouge 11escg1-egured Ilfifhouf Tlozihle, SOUTI-IERN SCHOOL NEWS. Sept. 
1963, at 12. Local State Rep. John Kau took a prominent stand against the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Lolrislanu: Oppositiutl to /--eci'dei.al Rlgilrs P t ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ t i i  Ir7ci-ease.s ill Stcite, SOUTHERN SCI- I~OL NI:\~S. Sept. 
1963, at 13. 
204. ne.segl-egution Solrght it1 j<Ifir.~otl /'ill-i.r/i. SOU-TI-IERN SCI3OOL Nt\VS, Aug. 1964, at 4. 
205. Brian Thelrenot & Matthew Brown. Frotli Re.~rstutzce to Accep'plut~ce, NEW ORLI-.ANS 7'Ilill.S- 
PICAYCNL. May 19, 2004, at 1 See olso Dandrldge v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd.. 332 F. Supp. 590. 
593 (ED.  La. A u g  13, 1971) (Chr~stenbeny. J.). 
206. Report, American Friends Serv~cr  Committee, Almost as Fairly: The First Year of Title 1X 
Irnplcmentation in Six Southern States [hereinafter "AFSC Report.'] 94 (1977) (on file writ11 the 
author). 
207. . ? c ~  Education Committee Repoll. Kc: Coeducation or Sex Segregation in Jcf'fe~-so11 Parish 
Schools (Nov. 1969) (on file \VII I I  Kt.\\,conib Archi\ies, Newcon~b College Ccnler- for Rcsearch on 
\\'omen [hel-einaftel- "NCCRW"]. Tulane Uni\,ersity, Mindy Milam Papers. Box 1 -NAC 284): Lctter 
from Edward A. Fontaine; PI-es~dent. Louisiana Federation of Teachers, to G.D. Gregson. PI-cs~dent. 
Jefferson Parish Co~nrnittce fol- Better Schools (June 19, 1967) (Ne\vcomb Arch~vez. NC'CRW. Tulane 
L!nl\-ersiry. Mindy Milarn Papsrs. Ror I - N A C  784). 
708. .%,c 1 R.ACE REIL L.  SI IR\ . .  1 10 (Scpt 1969). 
209. The only rcfcrence I ha\.e round to t h ~ s  demonstration is in a 1969 iritcl-1-ien \t.ith the 
Seff21-son Parrsh super~ntendenl 01' schools. See Joyce Trotter. Interview \wth Supel-in~cndcnt l3crrucci 
(conducted by lillr!i Russell and Joyce TI-ottel-) (Oct. 13, 1969) (Ne\vcomb AI-ch~vcs. N(-'C'IILil'. Tulane 
li~ii\ ,s~-sit>. Rl~ndy Milam l'apci-s. Box I-NAC 284). 
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necessary to accomplish racial integration-that it is still necessary for 
that same purpose-and that it will continue to be necessary for a number 
of years 10nger.""~ The superintendent was convinced that "white parents 
would not accept the integration of races and the mixing of sexes at the 
high school level at the same time,""' and warned of a "massive pull-out 
of white pupils" similar to white flight from neighboring New Orleans 
should coeducation take place.2" Still, he expressed hope that "in ten 
years we will look back and wonder what the fuss was all about," and 
predicted that "Jefferson Parish will be looked upon as a model of 
successful in tegra t i~n ."~ '~  
The superintendent downplayed any detrimental effects of sex 
segregation on the quality of education. NOW interviewer Joyce Trotter 
sensed his feeling that "the general behavior and morals of the girls 
improved," though he "admitted that boys might be influenced 
behavionvise to their betterment by co-ed~ca t ion ."~ '~  Bertucci sidestepped 
questions about the comparability of curricular offerings by insisting that 
"the very numbers of students in each school provides insurance that all 
necessary courses will be taught in each scho01.""~ School board member 
Robert Murphy agreed with the superintendent that "[sleparation was 
necessary to effect peaceful integration, and is still necessary," though he 
too agreed that coeducation was "both less expensive and superior to a 
system which separates boys from  girl^.""^ 
In 1969, NOW interviewers noted Superintendent Bertucci's view that 
"[tlhe time will be ripe for co-ed[ucation] in Jefferson when sufficient new 
schools have been built to ease . . . overcrowding, and when the 
emotionalism about desegregation has gone away.""' In 1973, it seemed 
as if that day had arrived. As overcrowding necessitated the building of 
new school facilities, an organization called the "Group for Coeducation" 
pushed for the abolition of sex segregation. In response, the school board 
considered, and initially accepted, a plan to reinstate coeducation in parish 
210. I d .  
2 1 1. /ti. 
2 12. Education Committee Report, sllpr-a note 207. 
2 13. Trotter, Interview with Superintendent Bertucci, s~cpt-a note 209. 
214. Id .  An earlier draft of Trotter's notes described how Bertucci had cited Jefferson Parish's 
comparatively low divorce rate as evidence of sex segregation's possible pos~tivc impact. 
215. Id. 
216. Intewiew with Mr. Robert Murphy, School Board Member (Oct. 23, 1969) (Newcomb 
Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I--NAC 254). On the other hand, 
at least one member of the board viewed sex segregation as pedagogically beneficial, especially to 
boys: Paul Pope considered sex-separated high schools "a distinct advantage," citing "differences in 
learning ability between high school boys and girls," and observing that "children . . . cornpetc better 
against members of their own sex, this being especially true in the case of boys." Education 
Committee Report, supra notc 207. Further, Pope believed there were '-fewer disciplinary problems" 
and "greater participation in school activities" in sex-segregated schools. Id. 
217. Trotter, Interview with Superintendent Bertucci, slrpr-a note 209. 
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high schools.218 Outcly over the projected expense caused the board to 
reconsider, however. Converting to coeducation would involve, among 
other costs, "building separate restrooms and lockers, revamping 
curriculum, revising athletic programs and installing home economics 
facilities in the currently all-male schools and shop equipment in the all- 
female ones."219 Some community groups opposed coeducation on other 
grounds, citing potential "discipline problems."220 References at one board 
meeting to boys as "animals that would destroy the girls' schools" 
prompted Mrs. Mauna P. Brooke to chide the board for obscuring what 
she saw as the real impetus for maintaining sex segregation. Financial 
concerns, she declared, were "nothing more than a smoke screen . . . 
[Tlhese . . . people are not so much concerned with how much in the red 
the system may be, but how much black is in the system."221 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, then, conflicts over racial integration 
and its social implications lurked not far beneath the surface of discussions 
about reinstating coeducation in Jefferson Parish. But prior to 1974, the 
possibility that sex segregation might discriminate against girls rarely if 
ever penetrated the Jefferson Parish debate. Those who argued in favor of 
coeducation did so on the basis of its general pedagogical superiority and 
its promotion of "natural" or "healthy" relationships between boys and 
girls. Partisans of coeducation did not deny that there were significant, and 
even desirable, differences between the sexes. For instance, E.C. Hunter of 
Tulane University wrote in a 1963 article frequently cited by proponents 
of coeducation that significant sex differences existed, not in "average 
intelligence," but in "physiological and social maturation," "interests and 
attitudes involving sex consciousness," "in the interests, occupations and 
pursuits which become culturally sex differentiated," and in "activities 
where strength, energy, and emotional steadiness are involved." He 
insisted, however, that "[tlhese differences, large or small, do not justify 
218. Ira Harkey 111, Clrufrgr I'o[icfe.~, JqJJ'Bouf-d Tuld. NEW ORLEANS STATES-ITEM. Feb. 8. 1973 
(Newcomb Archives, NCCRW. Tulane University: Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1~-NAC 284): .Jc<f 
Parish Nigh Scl~ools Going Coed Otzcr ilyairr, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 15. 1973. 4 1 .  at 
18. 
2 19. S~.Y Sepcit-ation Suit Protnised. NEW O~II~EANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 5 .  1973. 3 I .  a t  20. 
220. The Metairie W2111an's Club cited the "very few disciplinary problc~ns with the present 
system." and expressed the belief that "there would be innumerable difficultlcs if the h ~ g h  schools 
revert to co-education." Mrs. Edward Groner & Mrs. E.J. 1-acombe, Letter to the Editol-. /1guin.v/ J<[f- 
Co-Edzrcutrot~. Nt:w ORLEANS TIMES-PIC'XYUNF. Jan. 14. 1973. $2, at 3. The Harahan Board of 
Aldemian agreed. calling the capital iniprovements that would be requir-ed an "urinerded expense " 
EmiIe LaFourcade, JI-.. liar-uhun tiorit.cr' Opposes 5r.x ltztegr-ation it1 Schoo1.s: NEW ORI-EANS TIMFS- 
PICAYUNE, Izeb. 2. 1973. $1. at 9. 
221. Fred Barry. .I<fer-.soti Boar-ti Tuclh1e.s Chrd  Vote. NEW OKLEANS TI~IES-~'IC'AYIJX\~L-. I-'eb. 8. 
1973. $1. at 3. Mrs. Brooke said. "I find rt ironic that the many who have been deaf and b111id Tor at 
least thc last live years to the desperate need for monies for both the operation iind construction of 
schools are suddenly and acutely aware of the lack.'' I t l .  A local women's ~nagazine r a~sed  sii~iilar 
qucstlons. noting that despite the passage of  a thirty-seven mjllion dollar bond Issue for public 
education. "the schools remain segregated by sex. I t  appears that money is not thc basic issue." M.G.. 
S~./7001 .Cc>gt-eguriot~ Ci~allenged. DISTAFF, Dcc. 1974, at 4 (Ncurconib Arclii\es. NC'C7KW. Tulane 
Un~versity. Mindy Milam Papers. Dos I - ~ - ~ N A C  2x4). 
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separate schools for boys and girls." although separate classes for subjects 
like science, home economics, shop, and physical education remained 
appropriate."' Hunter also argued that "coeducation . . . is essential to 
good heterosexual adjustment."'" Indeed, coeducation proponents during 
this period often cast sex segregation as "unnatural" and "unhealthy." 
Louisiana Federation of Teachers President Edward Fontaine, writing in 
1 967, excoriated the "unnatural and, for mid-twentieth century America, 
unprecedented, separation of boys and girls," arguing that "the school 
environment should mirror the actual environment boys and girls will 
have to adjust to in adult life.""%alph Past, chairman of the Group for 
Coeducation echoed this sentiment several years later: "Coeducation 
would be a great boost to public education and the students. Youth would 
be afforded a healthy, natural male-female environment," he told the New 
Orlecrns States-Item in 1 973 ."' 
The lawsuit filed in 1974 dramatically shifted the terrain of contestation. 
In contrast to the earlier debates and litigation over Jane Crow, Helwig v. 
Jeiferson Parish School Board cast sex segregation primarily as sex 
discrimination, and only secondarily as race discrimination. Implicitly, the 
case challenged the efficacy of the racial   no ti vat ion standard, which asked 
whether a sex segregation scheme was motivated by "racial 
discrimination" or by legitimate "educational purposes," including 
educational benefits to boys, sex-based disparities in curricular interests, 
and discipline problems allegedly inherent in coeducation. The Helwig 
plaintiffs in effect attacked the very legitimacy of these educational 
purposes, a legitimacy assumed by courts that had considered Jane Crow 
arrangements in the past. Rather than asserting that sex segregation was 
merely "racial segregation by subterfuge," as the Concordia Parish 
plaintiffs had argued a few years earlier, the plaintiffs in Helwig 
contended that sex segregation was like racial segregation, inflicting harm 
on girls comparable to that imposed on black children by Jim Crow. 
The plaintiffs in Hel~t~ig  were a girl and a boy, represented by local 
ACLU attorney Jack Peebles, who argued that sex separation harmed 
female students and ran afoul of the Supreme Court's new constitutional 
sex equality jurisprudence.226 They contended that sex segregation in 
222. E.C. Hunter, Coed~lciltion 1r.r Public (Iigh  school.^, LOUISIAN.~ SCHOOLS, May 1963, at 13, 
54. 
223. Id. at 14. Hunter continued: 
[Tlhosc who make this adjustment succeed better in the~r  elations with the opposite sex in adult 
life and in marriage . . . . It would appear that nearly cvcryone now has come to accept the idea 
that if positive heterosexual attitudes and behavior adjustments are to be promoted, boys and 
girls must be encouraged to be together in work and In play with arbitrary restrictions reduced to 
a minimum. 
Id. 
224. Lettcr from Fontaine to Gregson, slcprci note 207, at 1 .  
225. Harkey, szipru note 218. 
226. The purpose of having a male student among the plaintiffs apparently was to represent the 
freedom of association claim. Attorney Peebles had hoped to find a black child to protest the racial 
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public high schools was "inherently discriminatory toward women," 
presented sociological and psychological data to support the conclusion 
that separation inculcated feelings of inferiority, and enlisted extensive 
testimony from Melvin Gruwell. a Tulane University professor, to that 
effect.227 Gruwell also asserted that sex separation resulted in niaterial 
inequities of opportunity for young women, arguing that curricular and 
counseling disparities steered girls in single-sex schools toward certain 
fields of study and away from traditionally male careers.228 Indeed, 
testimony offered by school superintendent Larry Sisung revealed that 
advanced math, science, and Latin courses, as well as shop and other 
traditionally male vocational training, were offered to boys but not to 
girls."9 In addition to using social science evidence and Bro~luz's 
"inherently unequal" language, Peebles relied on the recently declded 
Frontier-o v. Richardson, in which a plurality of the Court had accepted a 
race-sex analogy for purposes of scrutinizi~~g laws that classified 
individuals 011 the basis of sex.'" According to the plaintiffs, sex 
segregation was wrong because it harmed girls, materially and 
psychologically, in much the same way that racial segregation injured 
African American children. 
The Helwig plaintiffs used sex discrimination arguments not only out of 
expedience; they conceived of their case as part of a larger struggle for 
women's rights. Peebles told a local reporter that the suit stemmed from 
research by the ACLU Women's Rights Project.'" Kathleen Helis. mother 
of plaintiff William Helis, served as education chairman of the local 
League of Women Voters chapter, which announced its support for 
coeducation in May 1974,"' on the ground that "sex segregation in the 
schools perpetuates discri~nination in job oppoi-t~nities."~" The Helwigs 
and the Helises also invoked Title IX's prohibition on sex discrimination 
in education. Shortly after filing suit, they wrote to the Office for Civil 
motivations behind Jane C r o ~ r .  but in the end. both plaintiffs \sere white. See Barry W.  Lander. ./<f[ 
.Sc,hool.r A4ui. He Tul-gef of- /iylit?cfio~i.s. EAST BANK GUIDE ( 1974) (Newcomb .41-chives. NCCR\br. 
Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers. Box I-NAC 284); Susan Finch, Sex Segrcgrrriori Tor~rr of 
J<fiSuit. NLW ORLEANS STATES-ITEM. Julj. 28. 1974. 
227. Col-nplainant's Memorandum. Hcl\~.ig \,. Jefferson Parish Sch. Rd.. r41~1red 211 .4FSC Ilcport. 
.szcp~~i note 206. at 100. 
228. It/. 
229. lii. at 99-100. Itemized estimate5 ol'the cost of  co~i \ ,ening to coeducation rcbeal the inaterial 
differences between the boys' and girls' facilit~es: whel-e girls' schools had food prcparatton. sewing. 
and stenography labs. boys' canlpuses instead featured ~ndustrial ai-ts buildings. chcm~strq-. bioiogy. 
and electi-ical labs. mechanical drafting stations. and athletic equipnteilt. Sce Lettcr fi-om Jack A .  Grant 
to Jack Pccbles. Re: Coeducational School System (Scpt. 13. 1974) ( N e ~ ; c o m b  Archives. NC'CRW. 
Ttilanc Unlversity. Mindy Milam Papers. Box 1 N A C  284).  
230 Frontiero v .  Richai-dson. l l  l U.S. 077 (1973).  
23 1 .  Zander. .slr/?r-ii note 226.  I t  appeal-s tltat research conducted by one of iiuth I3adcr G~~lsburg 'b  
btnden~s at ( 'olu~nbia Law School Icd the organr~ation to inl-cstigatc Jeffel-son Parish as a pohsiblc test 
case. See. it]. 
332. Bair!? W .  Zander. Bocir-ri Opt.) .for 'I'i-ior.~!\. f'i.ojc,c.l\- ' Krrrhrr- ~ . / I ~ I I  Coc,iiiri.iilrori iri -lirliiri117. 
I- 4s-r B A K ~ ;  Guin~_,  May 8. 1974. 4 1 .  at 4: Finctl. .rzrp>u Iiole 2 2 6  
23; Finch. .szcpi.tr note 216. 
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Rights (OCR) to request an investigation of .Iefferson Parish for possible 
Title IX violations in the maintenance o-f separate schools foi- m:ik and 
female students."%egional education chief Joht: A. Beil repiied ih~at Title 
1X guidelines had not yet issued, and that in the interim. his office c o ~ ~ l d  
only intervene where there was clear evidence of educational 
disparities."' Peebles immediately responded, sending Bell the Sisung 
interrogatories, whose answers revealed curricular discrepancies between 
the boys' and girls' schools.'36 
Women's rights advocates received unsatisfying responses from the 
government and from parish school officials. It was not until 1976 that a 
Title IX coordinator began to monitor Jefferson Parish  school^.'^' In that 
year, a report by Jefferson Parish NOW'S Education Task Force 
announced the organization's intention to "make the public aware of what 
is happening in the schools," through a campaign that included "a 
formalized program of slide shows and speakers to appear in schools and 
to parent-teacher groups" to "help to raise consciousness levels and help 
combat old, out-moded ideas about educational differences between the 
sexes." "Girls," the report declared, "must be offered professional training 
as well as boys. They must have viable career alternatives presented to 
them to allow for emotional and economic independence instead of being 
locked into a life of total dependence."""n an attempt at Title IX 
compliance, the school district officially made all course offerings 
available to all students, but girls had to travel to boys' schools and vice- 
versa in order to avail themselves of non-traditional curricular options.23' 
234. Letter from James & Mary Kathleen Helis to  Dr. John A. Bcll, Chief, Education Branch, 
Region 6, Office for Civil Rights (Sept. 18, 1974) (Ncwcomb Arch~ves,  NCCRW, Tulane University, 
Mlndy M ~ l a m  Papers, Box 1-NAC 254); Letter from Jeanne & Carl Helwig to  Dr. John A. Bell 
(Sept. 19, 1974) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane Univcrsity, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I- 
NAC 284). 
235. Letter tiom John A. Bell to Mr. & Mrs. James Hclis (Oct. 31, 1974) (Newcomb Archives, 
NCCRW, Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I--NAC 284); see rzlso Letter from john A. 
Bell to Alexander C. Ross, Chief, Education Section, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice 
(Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, T ~ ~ l a n e  University, Mindy M ~ l a m  Papers, Box I--NAC 284). 
236. Letter from Jack Peebles to John A. Bell (Nov. 6, 1974) (Newcomb Archives, NCCIIW, 
Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I-NAC 284). 
237. Sexism in Education Task Force 1 (1976) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane 
University. Mindy Milan1 Papers, Box 1-NAC 284). 
238. [ci. at 2-3. 
239. See id. at  3 ("Supposedly all courses are offered to all students in the system, but 
transportation is still a major factor in who takes what."); see also Memorandum from Elaine W. 
Duvic to Faculty Members (Apr. 20, 1976) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University. Mindy 
Milam Papers, Box I-NAC 284) (announcing new policy to effect that "[all1 students in the parish 
and their parents must have the same course information . . . . Electives will be taught where there is a 
demand and where the teacher quota allows . . . . No teacher is to attempt to  influence a student against 
any course."). 
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Three years after the Helwig lawsuit first was filed,23u Jeanne Helwig, 
the mother of plaintiff Kenlee Helwig and a member of NOW, wrote to 
the New Orleans Tinzes-Picayune to argue that the continued sex 
segregation of Jefferson Parish students demonstrated the dire need for an 
Equal Rights Amend~nent.~" "Girls," she charged, were "steered into 
traditional home economics and secretarial courses while the boys were 
offered mechanical drawing, drafting, architecture, advanced math I1 and 
advanced Latin. Is it any wonder that 62.7% of the girls do not go to 
Ms. Helwig also lamented the lack of "real world" 
socialization under sex segregation, and argued that since there was "little 
opportunity for students to meet persons of the opposite sex in socially 
acceptable situations," parents 
should not be surprised to find their children latching on to the first 
person they meet of the opposite sex and hanging on to them for four 
years. Nor should they be shocked at the natural consequences of this 
situation, which manifests itself in early marriages and tragic 
unplanned ~ regnanc i e s . ' ~~  
Moreover, Helwig wrote: her daughter had graduated without receiving 
relief-or any word at all-from the three-judge district court to which the 
plaintiffs had petitioned. "It is hard now to convince our daughter that 
justice is available if one asks for it . . . . [Olur healthy, n o ~ n ~ a l  daughter 
now has a four-year handicap to deal with-simply because she was born 
female."244 
C. "A Par-ullel Between Raciul and Sex Segr-egation ": The AFSC Report 
From 1974 on, legal advocates who opposed Jane Crow increasingly 
emphasized its sex discriminatory aspect, focusing on psychological and 
material harm to girls-injuries they often compared to the iniquities of 
racial segregation. As we saw in the previous section, the Helwig case 
presented just such a sex discrimination argument. The most 
comprehensive critique of sex segregation as a form of sex discrimination 
parallel to Jiin Crow came in a 1977 report by the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC) on Title IX impleinentation in Southern public 
240. New plaintiffs filed substantially the same suit in 1976. fending off niootness whet1 tlie 
o r ~ g ~ t l a l  p a~ntiffs gl-aduated. See S ~ t i /  ..ltl~cii.~ J~fj 'Non-Coetl  Scllool Setzrp. N I - W  OI?I-L~!ZNS TIMES- 
PICAYUNL, July 20, 1976. 41. at I The new plaintiffs \&/ere Mr .  and Mrs. Frederic S .  Anderson, on 
behalf of theit- daughter Nancy: and Else Peters Tracy, mother of Laura. See u1.r.o Lcttel fi-0111 Jack 
Peebles to Judge Jack M.  Gordon (Oct. 31. 1975) (Newcolnb AI-chi\:es, NC'CRW. T~tlane Unitersity, 
Mindy Milan1 Papers, Box I N A C  2x3) (express~ng thc Helwigs' and I-lelrses' concern t h a ~  thetr 
case aou ld  be become rnool if the coun did not soon render a decisior~). 
241. Jeanne Helwig, Letter- to the I<diror-. A~r/f;ciul Segr-rgution. NI:\%- O ~ i l - . . z V r  Trblr_s- 
PICAYUYE. Mar 19. 1977, 3 1 .  at I6  
23'. Id. 
243. Id. 
'44. I d  
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 school^."^ The AFSC, which had long been involved in local and regional 
civil rights struggles, had fot~nalized its anti-sex discrimination activities 
in a Title IX conlpliance program at around the same time that the 
4CLU's Peebles filed the Helwig suit.''' The report, funded by a Ford 
Foundation grant. reflected more than a year of monitoring by AFSC's 
Southeastern Public Ed~lcation Program in six states--Alabama, Arkansas, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina-and was styled as a 
formal complaint to the Office for Civil Rights. Local and national 
chapters of organizations including the League of Women Voters, the 
American Association of University Women, NOW, the Council of Jewish 
Women, the Louisiana State Bureau on the Status of Women, the ACLU, 
and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law assisted the 
AFSC with the monitoring project. Monitors distributed detailed 
questionnaires to students, teachers, parents, administrators, coaches, 
guidance counselors, athletic instructors, Title IX compliance officers, and 
community members, in twenty-one school di~tricts.'~' 
In addition to detailing violations i n  curriculum, school policies, 
athletics, and employment, the report devoted a chapter to districts that 
still maintained sex-segregated schools and made the "firm contention" 
that HEW "should not allow these schools to exist."'" The "requirement 
of comparable programs and services," like Plessy's "separate-but-equal" 
standard, "does not diminish the effects of inequalities in such schools," 
the AFSC Report concluded. Merely enforcing Title IX's requirement of 
comparable programs and services could not obviate the simple truth: 
"Separate can never be e q ~ ~ a l . " ~ ~ ~  
The AFSC report drew an extended and deliberate "parallel between 
racial and sex ~egregation,""~ comparing single-sex schools to the 
"freedom-of-choice" desegregation plans of the 1960s. "Sex 
discrimination will never be abolished so long as the burden of equality of 
opportunity must be borne by the recipients of discrimination," the authors 
argued.2" "As in racial desegregation, the test of a [compliance] plan must 
be whether or not it  work^."^" The report quoted extensively from 
Peebles' briefs in the Helwig case, which relied heavily on a race-sex 
analogy. The authors emphasized the disparities in curricular and 
extracurricular offerings at the single-sex schools in two Louisiana 
245. AFSC Report. . S I I ~ I . L Z  note 206. 
246. Backgt-o~lnd Paper for Regional/National Task Force (1976) (on file with American Friends 
Service Committee Archives [hereinafter "AFSC Archives"], CRD 1976: Education Program #2, 
Folder: Regional Offices: SERO-SEPEP Administration). 
247. Handbook for Title 1X Monitoring, 1976, Southeastern Public Education Program, AFSC, 
.Atlanta, Georgia (AFSC Archives, CRD Education Program 1976 #3, Folder: Regional Offices: 
SERO-SEPEP Projects-Sex D~scrimination Project). 
248. AFSC Report, slipra note 206, at 93. 
249. I d .  
250. I d .  
251. Id. 
252. Id .  at Recommendations. 
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parishes and in Amite County, Mississippi. Similar patterns emerged in 
each of the districts: courses in subjects like engineering, advanced 
mathematics, physics, Latin, vocational agriculture, ROTC, and industrial 
arts would only be offered at the boys' schools, while home economics 
and secretarial skills were emphasized at the girls' schools and unavailable 
to boys.253 In Tangipahoa Parish, there allegedly was "unanimous 
agreement among principals, teachers, parents and studeilts that texts were 
sex stereotyped and biased."'j4 Monitors also cited vast disparities in 
athletic programs, with girls' coaches earning just twenty percent of the 
salaries received by the coaches of boys' teams.'" In Jefferson Parish, 
they alleged, girls' schools had no gyrm.lasium and no buses to transport 
them to athletic events.Z56 The Amite County school system, monitors 
concluded, was in noncompliance with Title 1X in every way possible.257 
On the eve of the monitors' arrival, some schools instituted "last minute 
plan[s] to equalize curricula," but the monitors found that "everything 
possible mias being done to subtly and indirectly discourage students and 
teachers from following any non-traditional courses of a~tion."'~' Often 
the proposed solution was to bus students fi-om one school to another to 
partake of courses not offered on their own can~puses. The report quoted a 
female student as saying, "My teachers said ~ t ' s  silly to want to take a 
boy's course like mechanical drawing, but I still want to. Taking the bus 
(to the boys' school) is complicated, though-so maybe I won't."*'%ike 
African American children victimized by Jim Crow, girls, the AFSC 
report suggested. bore the brunt of Jane Cro\v's complications. Moreover, 
like the victi~ns of Jim Crow, "[fleinale students interviewed repeatedly 
expressed feelings of vague inferiority, unease at their segregated status. 
apprehension about their future."26" Sex separation, as the Helwig 
plaintiffs' brief contended, was "a badge of iilferiority which must be 
borne by women.""' 
Significantly, these sex discrimination arguments precipitated a shift in 
the arguments marshaled by Jane Crow's defenders. Now school officials 
253. Set, u1.w Bior 117 Schools T(11clr~et ;I? Jeff: Nf:\i' ORLEANS TIMI:S-PIC,ZYL'NI-. Jan. 10. 1974. 1, 
at 10 (reportin? that attorney Jack Peebles submitted to fcderal district court evidence that "male 
students al-e treatzd differently from the female s tuden~s  by \\lay of curl icu1~11n and activities"). 
254. F S C  Report. .szipr-cr nore 206. at 108. 
255.  lcl at 98. 
256. Irl. Tile Jefferson Parish School I3oa1-d's \,ice president denied that the gii-Is' school':, athletic 
facilities were inftrioi-. or that girls \beri .  forbidden to takc ind~st r ia l  al-ts courses and boy5 to take 
l~otne economics .S?.Y Bli~s  Repol-i Blu.sred. NEW OKLL..%XS TI?\IL.S-PIC.AYUXL. June 2. 1977. 4 1 .  at 12. 
257. AFSC Report. S L ~ I - ~ I  note 206. at 109. 
258. k i  at 9h The report detailed the difficulties nion~ror-s encountered when they attempted to 
gather rnformat~on on single-sex s c h o o l s  I-ccalcitrant school officials. intirniiiated teache~-s. elusn e 
docu~nentarron. - 'Part~cularly reticent.-' accord~ng to the nionrrors. \xel-e black teachers w h o  feared the); 
would lose pl-olnotion opponuiiltls:,. 1x2 dc~iicd ter-iure. or- w e n  lose t l ie~r  doh\. if they euprrs.;ed their- 
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began to arglie that single-sex education benefited girls, giving them 
greater opportunities to assume leadership roles in the classroom and in 
extracur-ricular activities. The AFSC report discounted this possibility, 
arguing that "expectations for women" in single-sex schools "reinforce 
attitudes of female inferiority." Even if "a female in a sex-segregated 
situation has more opportunity to become school president---the election 
to school office hardly equates with one's life chances to become a 
~cientist."'~' Still, this mode of argumentation on the part of school 
officials marked a significant shift in emphasis on the part of sex- 
segregation proponents. Boys' fragile gender identities and special 
educational nceds were no longer the focus of attention. If plaintiffs were 
speaking in terms of girls' subordination, then school districts seeking to 
maintain sex separation policies had to respond in kind with arguments 
that emphasized how single-sex education benefited girls. To feminists, 
this was merely the old wine of subordination in new bottles deceptively 
labeled "empowerment." 
Sex discrimination arguments had transformed Jane Crow discourse. A 
practice whose harm seemed to consist primarily in its racial implications 
now appeared to inflict a particular injustice on girls. Sex-specific 
curricula that dictated the placement of girls in home economics and 
clerical courses and boys in vocational and industrial education, and in 
advanced math and science courses, had once seemed a benign and even 
salutary reflection of social reality. Now such customs were recast as a 
denial of equal opportunity that injured female students. Separating pupils 
by sex, a practice pret~iously considered harmless and even healthy, now 
was deemed a "badge of inferiority" that psychologically and materially 
damaged girls just as Jim Crow had degraded African American children. 
IV. JANE CROW'S STRANGE CAREER: THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LAW 
Parts 1-111 detailed the transformation in legal discourse from pre-Buowlz 
analogies between the legitimacy of sex separation and the 
constitutionality of racial segregation, to post-Brown enthusiasm for sex 
segregation as a palliative for white Southern fears of "amalgamation," to 
late- 1960s concerns with racially discriminatory motivation, to the 1970s 
emergence of a sex discrimination paradigm that drew an analogy between 
the unconstit~ltionality of racial segregation and the illegitimacy of sex 
segregation. Part IV explores some of the limitations of this evolving body 
of legal arguments, discussing how neither the racial motivation standard 
nor the sex discrimination paradigm fully captured what was at stake for 
African American communities in sex-segregated school districts. 
Two legal paradigms were available to Jane Crow's challengers by the 
early 1970s. The racial motivation standard, in theory, asked whether 
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"racial discrimination" or '6educational purposes" underpinned sex 
segregation. As we have seen, that standard helped some African 
American communities effectively dismantle Jane Crow through vocal 
opposition in and out of court. But in many school districts, the racial 
motivation standard allowed school boards to disguise their motives in 
race-neutral language: the standard encouraged thein to speak in terms of 
benefit to boys, sex differences, and "discipline problems." As this Part 
suggests, though, the motivations underlying sex segregation may have 
been less important than the circumstances under which sex segregation 
was implemented. In Taylor County, Georgia, where whites kept their 
children and tax dollars in the public schools, and where African 
American teachers and administrators held positions of responsibility 
alongside their white colleagues, African Americans overcame their initial 
opposition to Jane Crow. In contrast, in Amite County, Mississippi, where 
many whites withdrew their students and financial resources from the 
schools, and where whites retained almost total control over school 
administration, African Americans' discontent with sex segregation only 
increased. Even so, the evolving legal discourse did not capture what 
black families saw as the primary problems with sex segregation. A sex 
discrimination argument based upon an analogy to racial segregation 
proved ill-equipped to express what Jane Crow meant to Amite County 
Afi-ican Americans. 
A.  "To Mininzize the Problenzs People Have Adjzl~tiny ": Taylor C~zlntj} '~,  
Puag~nafic Tmde-off 
Many African Americans perceived sex segregation as an affront to their 
dignity: in the words of the Concordia Parish plaintiffs' attorney, they saw 
Jane Crow as "perpetuat[ing] racial segregation by ~ubterfuge.""~~ C.J. 
Duckworth, executive secretary of the Mississipp~ Teachers Association, 
an African American group, similarly declared in 1970, "Sex segregation 
is a damned clear way of telling our people that they are inferior to 
~hi tes ." '~"~ we saw in P a ~ t  11, some judges measured racially 
discriminatory motivation according to African Americans' perceptions of 
its purpose and effect.265 As implemented by judges sympathetic to their 
indignation, the racial motivation standard was responsive to what many 
Afi-ican American cormnunities viewed as the primary harn~ of sex 
segregation. 
263. B1-ief of Appellants at 9, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28342 (5tll C'ir. Oct. 1 .  
1969) (NARA. S.W. Keg. Div.. KG 276, Fifth Circuit. Case Files. Box 4235. 28342-28340) 
263. Tom llernian. E~~a.sii.c. .4ctiorl: Scllools iri Dee/? Sorirh S1o)t. Inic,grwriorz 7iJc. 1jir11 Slrhrler- 
7iic.fic.s. WAI 1 ST. .I., Oct. 15. 1970. at 1 .  Duckwolth was anibi\alent about the legality of scx 
segresatlon. S(v r ~ r / ~ r - c l  note 170. 
265.  McFerrei~ \,. Fayette County Bd. of Educ.. No. C-65-13(1 (V\: D. Tenn.. Dee. 10. 1969). 
q ~ t o i c d  it1 Order. Unlted States \ .  Liricoln County Bd. of Educ.. Nos. 1400 and 1470. at 3 (S.D. Cia. 
Apr. 27. 1970) (Library of Cong~ess. Rccol-ds of the N/\.ACP. V:ZX 19. Foldel-: Schools. Geor-:la. 
I.cgal Cases, 1970- I978 I .  
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The racial motivation standard had limitations, howevcr, both in tcnns 
of the realities of its selective judicial application and in its ability to 
capture how some black communities came to view Jane Crow. Some 
coul-ts "pretennitted" the sex segregation question pending the 
achievement of a racially unitary school system; others allowed school 
districts to justify separating the sexes for "educational purposes," 
variations permitted by the standard's indeterminacy. Moreover, in school 
districts that implemented sex separation plans, the longer-term reactions 
of different communities varied significantly. This section examines Jane 
Crow's career in Taylor County, Georgia, where, despite their initial 
opposition to sex segregation, African American families and school 
officials eventually proved willing to accept separate schools for the sexes. 
In exchange for this concession, African Americans expected genuine 
racial desegregation, commitment by whites to remain in and financially 
maintain the public schools, and significant black leadership in the racially 
integrated single-sex schools. 
Taylor County was a small, relatively poor, rural farming community of 
less than ten thousand residents, approximately half white and half black. 
The county had a long history of anti-black violence, most infamously, the 
murder of Malcolm X's father, an itinerant minister who espoused the 
radical views of Marcus Gamey, in the 1 9 2 0 ~ . ~ ~ ~  AS in most Southern 
school districts, the "freedom of choice" policy of the mid- to late-1960s 
resulted in almost no desegregation,'" and the integration that did occur 
was prompted by federal threats to withdraw funding.'68 Federal 
ultimatums ordering massive desegregation in the summer and fall of 
1969 did not inspire action, despite the withdrawal of funding. But a 
December 1969 federal court order enjoining the Georgia Department of 
Education from financing still-segregated schools forced the local board to 
develop a plan for racial in tegra t i~n . '~~  White school officials continued to 
resist; they submitted another freedom-of-choice plan to the court and 
sought an injunction to prevent the federal government from ordering 
266. STEPHEN G.N. TUCK, BEYOND ATLANTA: THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY IN 
GEORGIA, 1940- 1980, at 21 (2001). African American efforts at enfranch~semcnt later in the century 
also met with violence. For instance, Macio Snipes, a young black veteran of World War 11, was 
murdered on h ~ s  porch in Taylor County by ten white men, three days after voting ~n the 1946 primary 
election. Id. at 71 
267. The term "frectiorn of choice" refers to desegregation policies that nominally allowed 
s t~~dcnts  and thelr parents to choose between formerly all-white and formerly all-black schools. In 
practice, these policies allowed a few intrepid African Americans to attend formerly white schools, but 
they resulted in, at most, only token desegregation. 
268. Brief for the United States at 18-19 & n.18, United States v. Georgia, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir. 
Sept. 3, 1971) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., Fifth Circuit, Casc Files, Box 6148, 71-2563--71-2569; 
Brown, supra note 90. at 86. Based on interviews with Taylor County residents, conducted In the early 
1990s, Brown suggests that many African American parents were reluctant to scnd their children to 
white schools. both because they feared unfair treatment and even violence, and because they \vorried 
that integration would sever the strong ties between black schools and the black community. Id. at 88. 
269. fd. at 99. 
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further desegregation.'70 When integration appeared inevitable, however, 
the school board voted to convert the black elementary and secondary 
schools into boys' campuses and to reopen the two white schools as girls' 
d~rnains. '~ '  In April 1970, the federal courls approved six Georgia plans 
involving sex ~egregation.'~' The courts' application of the Fifth Circuit's 
racial motivation standard focused on results rather than intent. Thcir 
review of the plans had "not indicated that the assignments based on sex 
produced educationally unsound consequences or inequities resulting in 
racial d i~cr imina t ion ."~~~ 
The reaction of Taylor County's African Americans was similar to that 
of many other black communities faced with the prospect of replacing Jim 
Crow with Jane. Students staged protests and a boycott, emphasizing their 
concern that black teachers and administrators would lose their jobs as the 
schools de~egregated.~"~ African American plaintiffs (unsuccessfully) 
sought a hearing on whether sex separation constituted racc 
discrimination, and persuaded the federal government to intervene on their 
behalf.'75 When the Christian Scierze Morzitor reported on Taylor 
County's desegregation experience in 1972, both black and white students 
complained about sex separation.276 But overall, officials and community 
leaders of both races deemed sex segregation a qualified success. Black 
high school principal Albert O'Bryant told the Monitov that while the scx- 
segregated arrangement "left something to be desired," it was a policy that 
"seemed to minimize the problems that people have adjusting" to racial 
desegregati~n.~" As such, he and other African Americans apparently 
were willing to accept Jane Crow as a condition of successful racial 
integration: sex segregation remained in place in Taylor County until 
1 978.27" 
Three related factors distinguished Taylor County from other school 
districts where African Americans' resentment toward Jane Crow 
persisted or intensified during the 1970s: continuing white presencc in the 
public schools, financial commitment to those scl~ools, and opportunities 
270. Id .a t  102. 
271. Id. at 102-03. 
272. Ordcr of the Court. Geor-giu; NO. 71-2563 (N.D. Cia Apr. 21. 1970); cjlrorrd 117 Brown. szilri-u 
11otc 90. at I06 n.1 I .  'The six plans In\ olved Pell-ran~ city. and the counties of Baker. LaGrange. Lamar. 
Mer~\veather, and Mlller. See it/.: see ulso 2 RACE I&L. I.. S l i ~ ' v ' ~ \ -  54 (July 1970). 
273. Order of the Court. Georgia.  No. 71-2563 (N.D. Ga. 1111r 21, 1970). yzrorctli11 [31-o\vn. sitpi-(1 
note 90. at 106 n.1 I :  2 RACI- REL. L.. SL:R\ EY 54 ( J u 1 ~  1970). At the time of the coiirt's  ruling. Tayior 
County \+.as l~s ted  as one of about a dozen counties in noii-compliance with descgregat~on order-s. Ser 
i t / .  
274 Bro\vn. s ~ r j ~ r u  note 90. at 106. 
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Rcg Dl\ . .  F~f th  C'ircurt. Case I'ilcs. Box (1148. 71-25(>.3 71-75hO): Brief fo r  P r i \ a ~ r  Appellant,. 
Gcjo i~ i tc .  40. 71-1563 (5111 Cir. S e ~ t .  7. 1971) INARA.  S.W.  liey. Div.. Fifth ('il-cull. Case f ~ l c s .  l3ou 
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fot- black leadership in the integrated school system. Stanford Maxwell 
Brown's comparative study of desegregation in Taylor and Baker 
Counties reveals that in Baker County, where whites fled the public 
schools after desegregation was enforced and devoted monies to 
establishing private all-white academies, sex segregation lasted only one 
year. In Taylor County, by contrast, white citizens kept their children and 
their tax dollars in the public schools. Also, Taylor County's 
desegregation plan, unlike Baker Co~lnty's, divided administrative 
positions equitably between black and white educators. Black Principal 
O'Bryant headed one of the boys' schools, joined by a white assistant 
principal, while Mrs. Jewel McDougald, an African American teacher, 
became principal of one of the girls' schools. The other boys' school, 
headed by a white principal, gained a black assistant principal.27%lmost 
all of the teachers of both races kept their jobs in Taylor County, whereas 
many black teachers in Baker County were forced out and white teachers 
defected to the private "seg academie~.""~ The balanced racial 
composition of the Taylor County public schools held steady throughout 
the sex segregation period and beyond. 
Taylor County's African Americans did not hesitate to stand their 
ground and insist upon racial equality in the newly integrated school 
system. When white school officials decreed that only white drivers could 
transport girls on schoolbuses, while black drivers could transport boys, 
black families launched a boycott in the spring of 197 1, keeping one-third 
of the district's students out of school for more than two weeks.2s' The list 
of demands black leaders presented to the county's school superintendent 
included amnesty for students who participated in the boycott, assignment 
of drivers to buses without regard to race, abolition of race-based seating 
assignments, and "humane treatment" for all student bus-riders.'82 "All we 
really want is equal opportunity for our bus drivers," boycott spokesperson 
Sara Mathis told the Atlanta Constitution. "What they are really saying is 
279. Id. at 108. 
280. Id. 
28 I .  Tom Linthic~im, Tavlor- Bluckr E- tend School B L ~ . c ~ s  Bovcott, ATLANTA CONSTTTUTION, 
Apr. 27, 1971 (Library of Congress, Records of the NA,4CP, V: 2819. Folder: Schools: Georgia, 
Correspondence, 1965-71). See also Letter from Rufus Huffman to Norman Carter, Taylor County 
School Superintendent, Butler, Georgia (Apr. 27, 197 I j (Library of Congress. Records of the NAACP, 
V: 28 10, Foldcr: Schools: Georgia, Correspondence, 1965-7 1 ) ("Please be adv~sed that [the NAACP] 
has been informed of your school bus transportation arrangement, which is that white girls are only 
transported on buses that are driven by white persons and black boys are oniy transported on buses 
that are driven by black persons . . . . The NAACP is concerned and appalled when supposedly sane 
individuals, especially school officials, demonstrate their bigotry and racism by inflicting injustices or 
allocving injustices to be inflicted upon individuals and especially students."); Letter from Norman 
Carter to Rufus Huffman, Education Field Director, Tuskcgee institute, Alabama (Apr. 29, 1971) 
(NAACP Papers, V: 2819, Folder: Schools: Georgia, Correspondence, 1965-71) ("Please be advised 
that all girls, black and white, are transported by white drivers; and that all boys, black and white, are 
transported by black drivers. The Taylor County Board of Education glves all drivers the authority to 
assign seats when in the judgment of the driver this is necessary to maintain order on the buses."). 
282. Linthicum. sLlpra note 281. 
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that black drivers aren't good enough to drive white girls to school. Our 
childreii won't go back to school until our drivers get equal 
~ ~ ~ o ~ t u n i t ~ . ~ ' ~ ~ ~  
The comn~unity's steadfastness on the bus-driver issue suggests that 
African Americans were not simply cowed into accepting sex segregation, 
but rather that they made a conscious decision to trade Jim Crow for Jane. 
The calculation implicit in this trade-off suggests the complexity of "racial 
motivations" at work in the Jane Crow cases. On the one hand, sex 
separation unquestionably reflected invidious beliefs about the dangers 
and evils of "race-inixi~ig" and "amalgamation" that perpetuated the racial 
and sexual stigmas of Jirn Crow. On the other hand, to the extent that sex 
separation fulfilled its promise of stemming white flight to private schools 
and the withdrawal of tax revenues from public education, Jane Crow 
could function as an effective transitional measure, easing a path to racial 
integration that few corninunities traversed successfully. 
B. "We Don't Live in n Sexz~aIlj/-Segj-egated Wor-ld": Anzite County 
Confronts June Crow 
Jane Crow had a much more troubled career in Amite County, 
Mississippi, despite the area's demographic similarities to Taylor County. 
Georgia. Like Taylor. Ainite was a rural, relatively poor county of less 
than fifteen thousand residents, approximately half black and half white, 
with a lengthy history of racial violence and oppression.284 But unlike 
Taylor County whites, Amite County's white citizens left the public 
schools in large numbers, withdrew financial resources from the public 
schools. and maintained a stranglehold on power within the school district 
admini~tration.'~' Amite County African Amencans7 discoiltent with sex 
separation only increased over the course of the 1970s, culminating in a 
month-long boycott of :he public schools in the fall of 1977. As this 
section describes, neither the racial motivation standard nor a sex 
discrimination argument based upon an analogy to race fully captured the 
objections of A~nite County's African American coininunity to sex 
segregation. 
Sex separation in Amite County began in much the same way as it did in 
many other Jane Crow school districts. In late 1969, after a Fifth Circuit 
panel ordered Arnite County to implernent the desegregation plan 
proposed by HEW, the schoo! district ii~oved to amend HEW'S plan in 
order to pelmi: the separation of children by sex in grades one through 
283. It1 
284. John I l~ t tmer  calls m~d-1960s  L~berty.  Misstss~ppt. the county seat. an "embaitled outpost" 
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twelve. Notably, the four African Atncrican membcrs of the court- 
mandated biracial review committee signed an affidavit memorializing 
their unanimous approval of the sex separation scheme.'" The Fifth 
Circuit panel approved this modified plan as an "interim emergency 
measure," noting that its long-term validity depended upon the school 
district's intent. The panel ordered the district court to investigate whether 
racial discrimination or educational purposes motivated the sex 
segregation plan.'87 Meanwhile, most of Amite County's white parents 
withdrew their children from the public schools in late 1969 and early 
1970, enrolling thern in hastily created private academies.288 
In June 1970, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of- 
Mississippi held a hearing at which Annie Andrews, the Amite County 
superintendent of schools, was the sole witness. In light of the evidence, 
Chief Judge Dan M. Russell, Jr. concluded that "the separation by sex plan 
stems from sound educational purposes as distinguished from racially 
discriminatory purposes."'g9 Judge Russell found that the sex separation 
had produced a racially unitary school system, that male students' 
academic performance and leadership qualities had improved 
substantially, that disciplinary problems had declined, and that the 
"stability of the entire school operation under the modified plan resulted in 
increased attendance by white students and in better cooperation of the 
community as a whole."290 
286. Motion of  Defendants-Appellees for .Approval of Amended Desegregation Order as  
Approved by Bi-Racial Committee, United States v.  Amite County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 & 18042 
(5th Cir. Nov. 28, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., KG 276. FiRh Circuit, Box 4163, Nov. 1969 (pt.)- 
Marell 1070). For a discussion of the use of  biracial co~n~n t t t ee s  in Mississippi, see BOLTON, s u p m  
note 29. at 195-98. The circumstances under which the African American committee members 
approved Amite County's sex separation plan are not entirely clear. Minutes of  the committee meeting 
subinitted by the school district to  the court indicate that a nuruber of community members appeared at 
the mecting to express their opinions, but were asked to leave. One of the five African American 
committee members tendered his resignation before the meeting began, so that white members were in 
thc majority when the vote on sex segregation was taken. The minutes do  not record any objections to 
the plan. See Exhibit "A," Recess Meeting, Nov. 26. 1969. appended to Motion o f  Defendants- 
Appellees. s~1pr.u. 
287. Qzioted in United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd.. 560 F.2d 619. 621 (5th Cir. 1977). See 
cilso 1 R ~ C E  REL. L. SURVEY 253 (Feb. 1970) ("The court expressed some reluctance to approve the 
change without hearing to determine whether the board's request was motivated by racial 
discrimination or by bona fide educational considerat~ons."). 
288. See James T. Wooten, E.x'.uod~rs Seetl ns T/7i.ent to t l ~ e  S~.steru on Eve ofl i~trgr.atior~ ;Llove, 
N.Y. TILIES, Jan.  5 ,  1970, at  1 (reporting that nine hundl-ed white students in Amite County had 
enrolled in a segregated private academy); Roy Reetl. Boll1 Sitier in So~1th hfishtist .V[SOII Actiorz.5 on 
Sc/7oo[ It~legr.trtiorl. N . Y .  T I M E S ,  July 16, 1970, at  22 (stating that eighty-eight percent of  Amite's 
white students had left the public schools). 
289. @toted in Hilinds Co~lnty, 560 F.2d at 621. Civil rights attorney Fred Banks remembers the 
Southern District of  M~ssissippi, where Judge Rushell sat, as being particularly resistant to school 
desegregation, in contrast to the Northern District, whic l~  included Judge Keady. discussed szrpr-n note 
135. Srr  Fred L. Banks, Jr., The United Srntes Co~lt-r uf ,; lppea0 .fir the Fgif'th Cir.c~ti~: /1 Pe~sonul 
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But almost from the start, some African American families had 
expressed displeasure with the Amite County sex separation plan. In 1969, 
an advisory committee of African Americans, headed by the prominent 
educator Roosevelt Steptoe, formed to protest sex segregation."' In 
August 1970, more than 300 black parents signed a petition "express[ing] 
opposition to the plan of desegregation presently in force in Amite 
County. Separation of children by sex is but another way to keep our 
children segregated and but another example of white resistance and 
opposition to integration," the petitioners declared.292 The NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund filed a successful motion to supplement the court record. 
but received no other response to the parents' petition from the court.29' 
Rufus C. Huffman, educational director for the NAACP's Special 
Contribution Fund, communicated African Americans' grievances in a 
letter to NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney Me1 Leventhal in October. 
African American parents were disturbed that sex segregation limited their 
ch~ldren's curricular choices: "[Tfhere are some boys who desire to take 
Home Economics and some girls want some vocational training, but they 
are denied this opportunity because of sex ~egregation.""~ The parents 
also complained of classroom and bus segregation by race, and of rules 
that prevented them from visiting the schools to investigate these 
abuses.'95 Huffman declared, "The aforementioned acts and conditions arc 
in direct violation of the constitutional rights of American citizens," and 
requested that "immediate corrective actions be taken."296 In addition to 
seeking legal assistance, Amite County's African American community 
participated in a 1970 boycott of white businesses that gave financial 
support to segregationist private academie~ . '~~  Nevertheless, the district 
court continued annually to approve the school board's sex-segregated 
school a~signrnents. '~~ 
As Part 111 described, in 1974 Congress passed the Equal Educational 
Opportunity Act, which contained several provisions mentioning "sex" 
alongside race, color, and national origin as a prohibited basis for school 
29 I .  AFSC Report, slipi-ci note 206, at 109. 
292. Attachment to Motion to Supplement the Record. United States v. Hlnds County Sch. Ud. 
and Amite County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 &c 28042 (5th Cir. July 8. 1970) (NARA, S.W. Rcg. Div.. 
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a~s i~nrnent . ' "~  In late December of that year, the federal government filed 
a supplemental brief with the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the EEOA 
proscribed Amite County's sex segregation policy.700 Six months later, the 
court required Amite County Yo show cause why the EEOA did not 
mandate discontinuance of their sex-segregated assignment plan."i0' The 
school district argued that, for various reasons, the EEOA was 
inapplicable, and that racial motivation remained the appropriate standard 
for evaluating sex separation. Apparently under the impression that the 
federal government had entered into settlement negotiations with the 
school bbard, the court did not act on the supplemental briefs for over two 
years.30" 
In the meantime, African Americans in Amite County were losing 
patience. After seven years of sex segregation, white flight had left Amite 
County's schools with a student body that was more than eighty percent 
black, but the school board remained firmly under white contr01."~ In 
1976, after the school board reiterated its unwillingness to act without a 
court order, local NAACP members went to their state branch director in 
Jackson to discuss the black parents' concerns. Again, the parents 
complained that their children were receiving an "inferior education" 
because "boys are not permitted to take certain courses, such as Home 
Economics, and girls are not able to take certain courses, such as shop and 
the vocational courses," and that the black students' frustration manifested 
itself in a "lack of interest" in their studies.304 Parents also worried that 
their children were being deprived of healthy heterosocial interaction, and 
they "sounded a special alarm about the tendency of boys to 
homosexuality in the system."305 After a series of mass meetings with 
African American parents in Amite County, the state NAACP chairman 
Emmett Burns wrote a letter to the Fifth Circuit panel responsible for 
overseeing school desegregation in Mississippi, emphasizing that 
pervasive dissatisfaction with sex segregation among African American 
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Board and Amite County School District, Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Oct 31, 1973) (NARA, S.W. 
Reg. Div., RG 276. Box 4167, USCA 5th Cir. Case Files, 28030 & 28042, Box 4167, Sept. 1972- 
1973). 
304. Letter from Emmett C. Burns to Judges Griffin Bell, Homer Thornbemy, & Lewis Morgan, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Aug. 4, 1976) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2570, Folder: Branches-States-Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956- 
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students and parents should override the objections of a minority of whites 
to coeducation.306 After all, Burns reasoned, the public school population 
in Amite County was now over eighty percent black. Furthermore, Bums 
told the Jaclcson Daily News, the single-sex system "doesn't properly 
prepare students to function in society because 'we don't live in a sexually 
segregated world. "'307 
By 1977, the rhetoric and stakes of the controversy had escalated. In 
August, the Alnite County and Mississippi state branches of the NAACP 
issued a joint press release in which they 
again deplore[d] the South African, Rhodesian type apartheid system 
of strict school segregation by sex in the Amite County School 
System. The elements of apartheid are principally present: Minority 
rule (only twenty (20) percent of the school system's children are 
white) yet the minority opinion absolutely determines policy; the 
races are segregated by sex in an attempt to keep Black males and 
white females separated, but in the process Black males are denied 
co-education with Black females; and, a total disregard for the 
feelings, wishes, and thoughts of the Black majority.308 
If remedial action was not forthcoming, "the only alternative left" was for 
"the NAACP to pull the Black students out of school in an act of protest 
come fall.""0 The statement acknowledged that such an action "would 
seriously hamper the educational progress of Black students specifically, 
and the school system in Amite County generally, but the continued 
apartheid system is inore serious. We cannot and will not participate in a 
system that works to our detriment," the press release declared, for "a 
school system that contributes to zombi-ism and homosexuality is both 
pedagogically and racially unsound."310 
The NAACP and the black community of Alnite County followed 
through on their pledge, successfully launching a boycott that kept the vast 
majority of students in the district at home. As the school year began, only 
391 white students and forty-four black students were in class, out of a 
projected enrollrnent of 2,400. Several hundred protesters gathered on the 
steps of the coui~ty courthouse to protest sex segregation, and black 
leaders vowed to continue the boycott for as long as was necessary to 
convince the school board to ask the Fifth Circuit for a coeducational 
306. Itl. 
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asslgnnlent plan." Robert Wilson. the only African American member of 
the school board -and the only elected black official in the county-made 
no secret of h ~ c  disdain for sex segregation, but he mitially stopped short 
of endorsing the boycott. Wilson urged parents to "put the concern of your 
children first--do not allow a few illiterate people to destroy your 
children's lives for-ever."3" Boycott leaders were steadfast, however. "We 
know some will get hurt by this," said Rosie Wilson, whose own children 
were missing school. "[Blut . . . [w]e want the boys and girls in the same 
school this year. We're going at this, step by step."3" 
At a contentious school board meeting held several days after the 
boycott commenced, a delegation of about seventy African Americans 
confronted the three white school board members in attendance. Dorothy 
Chesser read a letter asking for their resignation on the grounds that the 
members "steadfastly refuse to serve the needs of the majority of the 
people you represent."""he white board members expressed satisfaction 
with the single-sex system, asserting that sex segregation was instituted at 
the suggestion of HEW, a recollection that black parents and their 
attorneys did not share. The proposed HEW plan of 1969 had not called 
for sex segregation, and there is no evidence that HEW officials 
affirmatively suggested such an arrangement at any For his part, 
Maurice Foreman, the white superintendent of schools, insisted that he 
had no power to express an opinion on sex segregation, much less ask the 
courts to take legal action."' Board member Bernard Dunaway challenged 
African American parents to vote him and the other white members out of 
office if they were dissatisfied with their performance, and defended sex 
311. Daniel Sheridan, School Boj.cott Lecider- Von:~ to Contin~ie, NATCHEZ DEMOCUT 
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313. Id .  I t  is not clear whether Robert and Rosie Wilson were related; one newspaper report 
suggested that they may have been husband and wife. See Bo-vcott C'ontinz~e.~ at An~ite School, 
GLOSTER WEEK1 Y (GLOSTEK, IUISS.), Sept. 2, 1977 (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 
2570, Folder: Branches-States--Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956-81 (rcfe~rring to "Rosa Wilson" as the 
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segregation as "Are you insinuating there's something wrong 
with black boys-that they shouldn't go to school with white girls'?" 
Chesser asked Dunaway at one point. "I didn't say anything to insinuate 
that," Dunaway answered. "I just said we had different schools for the 
whites and for the coloreds" before coeducation ended in 1963.''' 
The school board meeting made clear that neither side was prepared to 
~ i v e  an inch. Almost two weeks later, the boycott was still in full force, 
L 
with picketers greeting the few students still attending each of the county's 
four schools. Many wore signs reading, "End Sex Discrimination." By this 
time, black board member Robert Wilson no longer expressed reluctance 
about the boycott, telling the New Yor-k Tinzes that this was "only 'a first 
step' toward gaining equality for Amite blacks, who for the most part are 
poor and lack political organization."'" For some, these concerted actions 
marked a milestone in local African American mobilization. The eighty- 
seven-year-old aunt of picketer Mrs. A.M. Tobias attended a mass 
de~nonstration in her wheelchaii-; as this lifelong Amite County resident, 
Ms. Pinkie Griffin, told the Jlzcksorz Clurion-Ledger, she "never thought 
she would see this in Amite County. Yes," she declared, "this is history 
being 
As these protests suggest, neither the racial motivation standard nor the 
analogy-based sex discrimination argument was capacious enough to 
capture what was at stake for Amite County's African American 
coinmunity in confronting Jane Crow. It was apparent to African 
American parents from the start that the white scl~ool board's motives 
were suspect, but equally important to them was autonomy and control 
over their children's education. Jane Crow had not worked: it had not kept 
white students or financial resources in the public scbools. Nor had Amite 
County's white leaders allowed African Americans to share equally in the 
administration of the school system. Those failures rendered the sex 
separation policy an apartheid-like regime imposed by a minority on the 
majority, in contrast to its function in Taylor County as a pragmatic. if 
offensive, solution for phasing out Jim Crow. 
Further, although Amite County protesters held signs proclaiming "End 
Sex Discrimination," they defined "sex discrimination" somewhat 
differently from those who advanced the legal theory that sex separation in 
school desegregation plans discriininated on the basis of sex. As Part 111 
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described, Robert Barnett, the ACCU atto~xcys in FIehvig, and the AF'SC 
constntcted an analogy-based sex discrimination argument that 
emphasized the psychological and materia! harrn imposed upon girls by 
sex segregation. In this view, Jane Crow subordinated girls just as Jim 
Crow had subordinated African Americans, offering girls an inferior 
ed~lcation and stigmatizing thein as less academically able than boys. 
African Americans in Amite County articulated the harm of sex 
segregation as a restriction on the freedom of both boys and girls to make 
curricular choices-boys to choose home economics, girls to choose 
vocational training. This lack of choice ~neant, to them, that their children 
were receiving an "inferior education" as a result of sex segregation. 
African Americans complained that single-sex education did not 
adequately prepare their children for post-schooling life: "[Wle don't live 
in a sex-segregated world," they emphasized.'" Finally, if Jane Crow 
imposed on one sex more than the other, it arguably was boys who 
suffered most. After all, no one doubted that a primary impetus behind sex 
segregation from whites' perspective was the desire to keep black boys 
away from their white daughters. And this was not merely a stigmatic 
distinction, but a material one in many Jane Crow districts: both Amite 
and Taylor Counties adopted the common policy of converting the 
formerly black campuses into boys' schools, and the formerly white 
campuses into girls' schools. As Taylor County Girls School principal 
Jerry Partain put it, "In the South, we have always been very protective of 
our women."322 
African American families also worried that sex segregation deprived 
young people of the "normal," heterosocial relationships fostered by a 
coeducational environment. Black parents and students apparently valued 
coeducational schools as an opportunity to cultivate heterosexual 
relationships among African Americans and saw single-sex schools as 
hindering healthy interactions between boys and girls. As sixteen-year-old 
Victor Powell, an African American junior at the Central Attendance 
Center for Boys, just outside the town of Liberty, Mississippi, told the 
New Yovk Times: "It's the worst kind of arrangement. You don't have a 
normal relationship. You get to see girls only after school, or maybe not at 
all if you live way out on a farm."3" And if many white parents feared that 
biracial coeducation was a slippery slope toward "amalgamation," some 
black parents worried that single-sex education encouraged 
homosexuality. 
Neither of the legal paradigms developed to address Jane Crow captured 
the stakes of sex segregation for the African American communities of 
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Taylor and Amite Counties. Notably, the legal discourse also obscured the 
assumptions about children's sociability and sexuality that were so central 
to arguments for and against sex segregation. Part VI will address this 
subject further, but first, Part V describes the legal fate of sex-segregated 
public schooling in the 1970s. 
V. NOT "THE CASE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN": 
SEX SEGREGATION'S LEGAL RESOLUTION 
The issue of sex-segregated public p r i ~ n a ~ y  and secondary education 
rnoved through the courts along two separate tracks. The Jane Crow 
lawsuits, most of which originated in the Fifth Circuit, were filed between 
1969 and 1974; some were resolved by district courts, others awaited 
resolution for anywhere from three to eight years. The sex segregation suit 
that reached the Supreme Court, Vor.chheir?zer v. Sclzool Distleict of 
PhiladeZphia, was not a Jane Crow case. That is, the sex segregation 
policy challenged in Vovchlqeimer had nothing to do with racial 
desegregation; rather, it was an artifact of elite public single-sex schooling 
that dated back to the nineteenth century. Vorcl~lzeii~zer was filed in 1974, 
significantly later than most of the Jane Crow  case^,"^ but moved much 
more expeditiously through the courts, reaching the Supreme Court for 
oral argument by early 1977. The Jane Crow cases never reached the high 
court. Instead, the Fifth Circuit sidestepped the thorny constitutional 
questions implicated in these suits and resolved them through a 
straightfonvard application of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act 
(EEOA), the anti-busing measure that incidentally prohibited school 
assignments on the basis of sex as well as race, color, and national 
origin."" 
This Part addresses the legal fate of each strand of the 1970s sex 
segregation litigation. The first section describes the anti-clirnactic but 
unalnbiguous resolution of the Jane Crow cases, a resolution that not only 
killed Jane Crow but also contributed to its constitutional and historical 
obscurity. The second section analyzes the Vorcl7heirner litigation and 
reveals how the case highlighted the strategic shortcomings of a sex 
discrimination argument based on an analogy to racial segregation. 
A. "To Conzply ~ i t h  fhe Sfatzrtovily Marlduted Schen~e ": Jane CI-(1x1 :s 
Legal Fute 
As we saw in Part IV, African Americans' perspective on sex 
segregation revealed the limitations of both of the dominant legal 
paradign~s--race discrimination and sex discrimination--used by 
advocates and judges to assess the constitutionality of sex segregation. In 
324. Most of the irgal challenpcs to Jane Crox  ;IJOS~' In 1969-70: the fl(.litY.q case. alho tiled it: 
1974. i s  an exception. 
321 Svc, .siipr-tl note 10 
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the end, though, neither of these theories governed .lane Crow's legal fate. 
Instead. after years of silence, the Fifth Circuit avoided passing judgment 
on the constitutionality of sex segregation, deciding thc Amite County 
case as a clear violation of the EEOA's statutory ban on school 
assignments based on race or sex. This statutory resoliltion in a lower 
court meant that thc Jane Crow cases not only evaded the Supreme 
Court's notice, but also escaped constitutional review altogether. 
The decision that killed Jane Crow came several weeks into the 1977 
Amite County school boycott when the Fifth Circuit finally issued a ruling 
on the district's sex separation policy, seven years after African 
Americans first petitioned the district court for relief. The legal landscape 
had changed since the Circuit had last addressed a sex segregation 
scheme, in the 1972 case United States v. Geougiu.""hen, the court had 
affirnled earlier hints that the standard for evaluating such plans was 
whether they were motivated by racial discrimination or by valid 
educational purposes."' Now, the racial motivation standard appeared 
especially congenial to the Amite County School Board, when compared 
with the EEOA, and they clung to it."8 The school district's lawyers 
apparently believed that they would have a better chance enumerating the 
educational purposes behind sex segregation than finessing the clear 
language of the EEOA. Lawyers for the school district also argued that the 
EEOA should be interpreted to allow sex segregation, as it was practiced 
in Arnite County. Any other interpretation, they asserted, would rest on 
the erroneous assumption that Congress intended to safeguard rights 
beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections.329 
By the fall of 1977, the Amite County appeal was before a reconfigured 
circuit court panel. GI-iffin Bell, who previously presided over the 
Mississippi desegregation cases, left the court in early 1976 and became 
President Jimmy Carter's attorney general in 1977. His replacement on the 
panel, Charles Clark, had been President Nixon's first nominee to the Fifth 
Circuit. Clark was no stranger to desegregation controversies, having 
represented the University of Mississippi Board of Trustees in the dispute 
over James Meredith's attempt to integrate Ole Miss in 1961-63.330 
According to historians Frank Read and Lucy McGough, Clark had been 
"a vigorous defender of his client's policies of segregation," but had 
"earned the respect of the Court's membership in the forthright manner he 
disassociated his clients from the intransigent Governor ~arnet t ." '~ '  By 
1977, Clark had become "perhaps the most articulate and powerful 
spokesman" for judicial restraint on the court, and "as the only member 
326. United States v. Georgia. 466 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1972). 
327. Id. at 200. 
328. United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1977) 
329. Id. at 624. 
330. READ & MCGOUGH; supra note 87, at 454. 
331. Id. 
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. . . with school-age children," he was "acutely aware of some of the 
troubling academic and disciplinary problems that can follow forced 
integration."'" 
In keeping with this philosophy of restraint, Clark avoided the 
constitutional question of whether sex segregation violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Writing for himself and his colleagues Lewis Morgan and 
Homer Thornberry, Clark sidestepped questions of Jane Crow's intent and 
effect, ruling that the plain language of the EEOA prohibited pupil 
assignments based on sex."' The panel concluded that the EEOA 
superseded previous Fifth Circuit doctrine on sex segregation, rendering 
the racial motivation standard obsolete. Whether or not the school board 
could manufacture "educational purposes" was irrelevant: the language of 
the Act, on its face, prohibited pupil assignments based on sex. Further, 
Clark argued that Congress had indeed intended the EEOA to supplement 
constitutional protections, not merely to vindicate existing rights."" 
Though no legislative history concerning the "sex" provisions of the 
EEOA existed. the court believed that the act "incorporate[d] a judgment 
that a sex-segregated school district is a dual rather than a unitary school 
system and results in a similar if not equivalent injury to school children 
as uiould occur if a racially segregated school system were iinposed."'" 
This was as close as the panel came to addressing the relatio~~ship between 
race and sex segregation, and it did so not as a constitutional matter, but as 
a problem of statutory interpretation. 
One week later, Louisiana federal district judge Jack M. Gordon ordered 
Jefferson Parish schools to end sex segregation and to develop a 
desegregation plan in compliance wlth federal law.""n the months to 
332.  ltl. Clark's c1iild1-en were attending the public schools o f  Jackson, h4is~issipp1, when court- 
ordered desegregation commenced. /d.  
333.  Ifirra's C ' o ~ t t ~ i j . ,  560 F.2d 619. Clark began by reviewing the procedural history of the case. 
describing without comment thc factual findings made by district court judge Dan M. Russell back in 
1970 Id. at 621 Kr n.3 ("[C]oncluding that 'the separation by sex plan stems ii-om sound educational 
purposes as  distinguished from racially discriminatory purposes' . . . [ilhe district court entered 
specific findings that: ( 1 )  the separation of  the students by sex has produced a unitai-y school system: 
(2 )  the acl~ieveineiit Ic\-el of the male students had shown substantial inipl-ovenieiit \hrith no  lessening 
in the level of the female students' improvement; ( 3 )  attendance levels of all students had improved: 
(4) norrnal disciplinnn problems in scl~ool bulldings and on busses and playgrounds had declined: ( 5 )  
i~ioti\ation of students and teachers had improved. ~v i th  measurably iinpro\.ed leadership qualities on 
the part of  the inale students; and (6) the stability of the entire scliool operation . . . resulted in 
increased attendance by \I hite students and in better cooperation of tlic community as a v,holc.") 
C'lar-k then noted rhat \slicn the court "peni~itted the teniporaly use of [ t h~s ]  modified plan. wc 
expressly 11oted that our order was -an interim emergency rneasurc to stabilize the education PI-ocess in 
thls school district . . . and is not to be conslr-ued as  a precedent." /[I. at 623. He continued. "Nothing 
t h ~ s  court has done before or since may be construed as pernianently appro\.ing this type of student 
assignment." /d. 
334. Two decades later. the Supreme Court \vould more narro\?.lj define Congress's enforcement 
po\ver under- Section 5 of the Four-teenth Amcnd~nent rn a series o f  cases beg~nrling with ('in. of 
Roc,r.iic> 1.. Plor.c~.\. 52 1 U 5 507 ( 1997) 
335 fiim/.s C'ozo~~.. 5(>O P.2d at 623 
336.  Sex Segr-egurior~ Hurirird i t1  21i Cilsc. N.Y. TIk4ES. Sept. 29. 1977. at 18: Gordon Cisell. .Se\ 
.Sc~gre,qoriori lilegul' Nlr\X ORLF-XNS T ~ \ ~ E S - P I C ~ \ ~ L . N E .  Sept 29. 1977. $ I .  at I .  The Jefferson I'al-ish 
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follow. the remaining Jane Crow districts began the process of reinstating 
coeducation. But although the Fifth Clrcuit had finally put an end to Jane 
Crow, the court declined to mediate the heated disputes over the intent and 
effects of sex segregation that the parties and their lawyers had waged for 
the better part of a decade. The court did not explore why Congress might 
have concluded that sex segregation "results in a similar if not equivalent 
injury" to racial segregation, nor did it address the constitutionality of sex 
segregation as a too1 of racial desegregation. As the next section shows, 
the sex segregation case that did reach the Supreme Court produced a 
result even less satisfying to opponents of segregation; moreover, it 
demonstrated the strategic shortco~nings of a sex discrimination argument 
based upon an analogy to Jim Crow. 
B. ".4s Orclerly n Retreat as Possible": Sex Segregation in the S~rprerrze 
Co LL vt 
In conventional legal narratives of sex separation in public elementary 
and secondary schools, the leading case of the 1970s is Vorchheimer v. 
School District, which the Supreme Court considered several months 
before protests erupted in Amite County, Mi~siss ippi .~~ '  In Vovchheimer, a 
white female student challenged her exclusion from Central High School, 
a venerable all-male Philadelphia institution, arguing that Girls' High, 
Central's female counterpart, offered a materially inferior and less 
prestigious academic experience. A federal district court judge ordered 
Susan Vorchhcimer's admission to Central, but the Third Circuit reversed, 
and the Supreme Court split 4-4, letting the lower court's ruling stand 
without passing judgment on the constitutionality of public single-sex 
education. 
We saw earlier that despite its understandable appeal to feminists, the 
sex discrimination argument failed to capture fully the substance of 
African Americans' objections to Jane Crow. This section examines the 
sex segregation case that did reach the Supreme Court, which as we can 
now see, was not representative of much of the sex segregation litigation 
of the late 1960s and 1970s. Philadelphia's sex segregation policy was 
long-standing, confined to the district's most prestigious high schools, and 
unrelated to racial desegregation. In other words, the relationship of sex 
segregation to racial segregation in Vorchheimer was more purely 
School Board set out a five-year plan for compliance with the court's decision. The plan called for 
coeducation in two of the parish's schools in 1978-79, two more in 1979-80, and the final two by the 
fall of 1981. Plaintiff Laura Tracy expressed displeasure with the plan's length, noting that she herself 
would graduate in 1981. But her mother, Dr. Else Tracy, and their attorney, Jack Peebles, agreed that 
more litigation would only prolong the process further. See AFSC southeastern Public Education 
Program, Sclzool Boa?-d Plan Stands, CREATED EQUAL, Jan. 1978, at 2. 
337. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), uff'd by an eqtlally divided court, 
430 U.S. 703 ( I  977) (per curiam). 
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analogical, rather than inter~ectional."~ Vor~chheimer illustrates how 
even-or perhaps especially-in such a case, a sex discrimination 
argument based on an analogy to Jim Crow had its pitfalls as a legal 
strategy. As Susan Vorchheimer and her lawyers discovered, positing that 
sex segregation was like racial segregation set the constitutional bar 
unreachably high for plaintiffs. 
In its language and substance, Susan Vorchheimer's class action lawsuit 
against the Philadelphia school district echoed the concerns animating 
Brown. Filed in the spring of 1974 by local attorney and Girls' High 
alumna Sharon Wallis, the complaint asserted that the "sexual segregation 
of Philadelphia's academic high schools imposes upon female students a 
badge of inferiority, teaching them expressly and by example that they are 
not qualified to compete with male students in academic pursuits.""9 
Susan's testimony before federal district court Judge Clarence C. 
Newconler similarly indicated that she feared psychological damage and 
material hann if she attended Girls' rather than Central.'" Wallis also 
cited Central High's long and distinguished history, its large private 
endowment, and its record of produci1ig alumni who assumed local and 
national leadership positions.'" Girls' High, on the other hand, was "less 
prestigious," its alumni were "less influential," and its educational 
program "traditionally suffered from sexual stereotyping attributing lower 
career aspirations to women."342 In contrast to the meticulously assembled 
social science evidence in Brown, though, Wallis presented no 
psychological or sociological data on the effects of sex segregation on 
girls. For its part, the school district called two experts to testify about the 
purported educational benefits of single-sex education. 
District Judge Newcomer was persuaded neither by Wallis's analogy to 
Bro~~rz  nor by the school district's assertion of single-sex education's 
pedagogical rewards. Oddly, the judge opined that the substantially equal 
education offered by Central and Girls' High Schools took the case "out of 
the realm of Brown v. Board of Edt~cution.""~ Moreover, he explicitly 
rejected Wallis's argument that the exclusion of girls from Central High 
created a feeling of inferiority in female students, noting that even if- the 
338. The or~gins  of  sex-segregated education in the North were hardly free of racial, ethnic. and 
class undertones; in the nineteenth and early twentieth centur~es.  single-sex schools assuaged nati\.ist 
fears about mixing with immigrants and middle-class averslon to the "I-ougli" ways of poor boys and 
girls. Spi. DAVID TYACK & ELIZABETH )$ANSOT. L E A K N I ~ C ;  TO(;ETI~ER: A IiISlORY OF COEDUC AI'ION 
I N  AMI:I~I<:AN PUBL.IC Sc1-1001.s 95 (1992). 
339 Appendix at 9a, Vorchhe~mer v. Scl?. Dist.. 430 U.S.  703 (1977) (No. 76-37) [here~naftcr 
"Vorchhein-~er Appendix"]. 
340 Id. at 9a-10a. Vorchlie~mer v.  Sch. Dist.. 400 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. P;i. 1975) ("1 d~dn ' t  
think 1 would be able to go there for three years and not be harmed in any way by ~t."). 
341. VOI-chhe~mer Appendix. .szrpi-u note 339. at 9a. 
342. It/. 
343. T h ~ s  tatement is odd because the impoll of Rro~l:ri rested on the v c i ~  Fact that the dccis~on 
did not depend upon a show~ng that scl~ool facilities pro\~idcd to black and \vllite cl~ildrcn \\-el-c. 
n?atr~-rally unequal. 13rown v Ud. ot'Educ . 347 l!.S 483. 495 (1954) ("Separate but equal eti~~c;rtional 
facilities are inIirt.et~t/~. unequal.") (e~iiphasis atided) 
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much-criticized sociological evidence cited in Bi-ol\:rz was legitimate. the 
plaintiff had not presented any evidence of psychological detriment hcre. 
Instead, Newcomer staked thc outcome of the case on the appropriate 
equal protection standard of review, and after concluding that heightened 
scrutiny applied, he found that no legitimate educational objectives 
justified Central's refusal to admit girls. If the district's tnie purpose was 
to protect girls from the disadvantages of coeducation, then all of 
Philadelphia's schools should be sex-segregated, he argued. "[Mlales, and 
not females, are the intended beneficiaries of defendants' exclusionary 
policy," he concluded.'" When the court ordered Central High to admit 
female students, the district initially moved to comply with the ruling, but 
irate alumni convinced the school board to appeal.345 
The Third Circuit, like the lower court, rejected the plaintiffs analogy to 
racial segregation. But unlike Judge Newcomer, the panel's majority 
concluded that not even the Supreme Court's new sex discrimination 
jurisprudence could redeem Susan Vorchheimer's claim. Judge Joseph 
Francis Weis, Jr. wrote for the court that the "substantial equality" of 
Central and Girls' High Schools took the case not only out of realm of 
Brown, but also out of the realm of heightened scrutiny. Even if 
heightened scrutiny were applicable, Weis contended, the school district 
had presented "sufficient evidence to establish that a legitimate 
educational policy may be served by utilizing single-sex high schools."'J6 
Significantly, Weis suggested that the intent underlying the maintenance 
of single-sex schools was of primary importance. Although sex separation 
"has limited acceptance on its merit," the judge wrote, "it does have its 
basis in a theory of equal benefit and not discriminatory denial.""' Unlike 
racial segregation, the majority asserted, sex separation was born of 
benign intentions. 
314. Vot.chlzeitrler., 400 F .  Supp. at 332 
345. Superintendent Michael Marcase declared himself a "proponent of coeducational schools," 
stating that he was "more concerned about maintaining the academic standards than the composition 
of the school." Ewart Rouse and Steve Tworney, Judge Tells Centr-nl High to Go Co-e~i, 
PHILADELPHIA I N Q U I R E R ,  Aug. 8, 1975. at I -A .  Board of Education President .4rthur Thomas opined 
that appealing to a higher court "would be an exercise in futility." /d. The editorial board of the 
Philadelphia Itzyllirer- heartily approved Judge Newcomer's ruling, declaring that '-[t]o require 
separation of students by sex, as a matter of public school policy, may have seemed normal in thc 19th 
century but is an anachronism in this day and age." Editorial, Central Mg11 kCIill S~lmive, 
PHILADELPHIA I N Q U I R E R ,  Aug. 15, 1975. Some alumni also \tiere resigned to the admission of girls to 
Central. Philadelphia's African American mayoral candidate, Charles Bowser. himself a Central 
alumnus, acknowledged that though he found the change "uncomfortable," he was " s ~ ~ r e  therc are 
talented young women that will benefit from [Central] as much as I did." Robert Fowler. Cenft-(11 
Alrm~ni Taken B-v Surprise, PHILZDELPHIA INQUIRER. Aug. 8, 1973, at 2-C. However, many Central 
alumni, and some school board members. expressed their displeasure. Tobyann Boonin, a Girls' High 
graduate whose husband and three sons were Central alumni, urged her fellow board members to 
appeal Judge Newcomer's dec~s~on ,  w h ~ l e  1959 Central graduate Barry Bannctt lamented that the 
admission of girls would "destroy[] the Integrity of the school." By the end of August, opponents of 
coeducation in Philadelphia's elite public high schools had convinced the school board to appeal the 
judge's ruling. Rousc and Twomey, S L I P I . ~  at 2-A; Fowler, supt.a at 2-C. 
346. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1976). 
347. Id. at 887. 
Dissenting Judge John J. Gibbons strongly disagreed, opening his 
opinion with an extended comparison of Weis's reasoning to Plessy v. 
F ~ I - ~ U S O I I . ' ~ ~  Noting the majority's emphasis on the voluntary nature of 
Susan Vorchheimer's choice of an "academic" high school over other 
educational alternatives, Gibbons retorted: 
It was "voluntary," but only in the same sense that Mr. Plessy 
voluntarily chose to ride the train in Louisiana. The train 
Vorchheimer wants to ride is that of a rigorous academic prograin 
among her intellectual peers. Philadelphia, like the state of Louisiana 
in 1896. offers the service but only if Vorchheimer is willing to 
submit to segregation. Her choice, like Plessy's, is to submit to that 
segregation or refrain from availing herself of the service.349 
For the first and only time in the Vouchheimel- litigation, the analogy 
between sex separation and racial segregation gained a judicial adherent. 
The content of the certiorari petition and briefs filed in Vorchlzeirner. 
have led some scholars to surmise that Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then head of 
the ACLU Women's Rights Project (WRP), pursued a strategy based on a 
full-blown parallel between race and sex segregation, using Bt-OMVZ as a 
model for arguing the Philadelphia case.j5' In fact, Ginsburg's papers 
reveal that she recognized the strategic pitfalls of such an approach, and 
worked actively to downplay the analogy that Susan Vorchheimer's 
original attorney had promoted in the lower courts and in her draft 
certiorari petition. Many judges, Ginsburg realized, saw sex separation as 
benignly intended, devoid of the invidious purposes and hostile 
motivations of racial segregation. Framing the Vorchheimer case as 
analogous to Brown, she anticipated, could be interpreted as a broad-based 
attack on single-sex education as inherently unequal in all 
circumstanccs-a position the Supreme Court was unlikely to embrace. 
As we shall see, records of the Court's internal deliberations vindicate 
Ginsburg's concern. 
Ginsburg's Women's Rights Project, enlisted to help Wallis with 
Vorchheimer's Supreme Court appeal, was anxious to avoid the bold 
parallel e~nbraced by Judge Gibbons's dissent. WRP attorneys initially 
348. Gibbons LVI-ote: 
1 was i~ndel- the distinct impression . . . that "sepal-ate but equal" analysis. especially in the field 
of public education. passed from the fourteenth an~endnlent ~UI- ispn~dent ia l  scene oker t\\;enty 
veal-s ago. The maJority opin~on in establishing a t\\?.eltictl~-century sexual equivalent to thc 
I'1r.s.s~ dec~sion. reminds us that the doctrine can and w ~ i l  be in\,okcd to suppott sexual 
d~scriniinat~on i  the sarne manner that i t  suppo~ted discr~mlnation prlor to Bi-o~r,n. 
I d  at 888-X9 ((31hhons. J.. dissenting). G~bhons .  like Ne\vcomer- and Wets. was a Nixon appoi111ee. 
349 lo'. at 889.  
- .>>0 .S<,c,. r g.. hpl icliael I le~sc .  Arc, .Siiig/ric>-.\i-~ .ScliooI.\ li~/~rr-c~il!i~. 1~'ilrqzccrl:'. 107 hll<'l I .  I-. R l - \ .  
12 19. 1128-29 (2004) ( r s \~e \v ins  l i o s t h ? ~ ~ ~ '  C. S,AI o h ~ ~ ~ r - .  S - Z ~ ~ F .  D I I  I - 1 . ~ 1 : ~ - I ,  F. ( )~AL.  R E T I I I N K ~ ~ G  
SlSCiLE-SLY S ~ ~ I ~ O ~ I . I ~ ( ;  (2003) ) .  Rsfol-e cxam~l?ing ;archi\ nl soul-ces. 1 too assumed that the M'IIP u-as 
in contl-ol of  the I ;)r-c.h/lc~irrzc,r- litig,~t~oli .See Mayet-i. .sri/~r-tr nu t s  189. at 1078 n. 162 ("ljnlikc mosr 
post-l-/-oi~lic,r-o C , I W ~ .  the M.RP ilt~llxed race-sex ana!osies in I 'or-c~llIirir~~c.r-.") 
Yale .lournal of La\\ & the Humanities 
expressed optimism that they could forge a cooperative relationship with 
i,Vallis, and Ginsburg declared herself "[gllad all of us agree that separate 
and unequal is the position we should push.""' But their collaboration 
eventually deteriorated. The problems began with Wallis's draft petition 
for certiorari, which Ginsburg thought, among other problems, 
"overplay[ed] the sex/race analogy" and got "into hot water" on the issue 
of whether schools that excluded whites or males were constitutionally 
problematic."' Deficiencies in the factual record also dismayed WRP 
lawyers as they attempted to help Wallis with her submissions to the 
C0u1-i.~'~ The high quality of the Philadelphia school district's brief 
"convincc[dj" Ginsburg that the WRP was "on the right track" in 
proceeding cautiously.354 The school district refuted the race parallel and 
emphasized the possibly fatal consequences for single-sex education if the 
plaintiffs prevailed. "Now," Ginsburg wrote to her colleagues, "we must 
go even further to make it plain that our class seeks no 'sweeping' change, 
leaves 'the system' intact, and 'freedom of choice' an open q~estion."~" 
But the WRP lost control over Vorchheimer's reply brief after a dispute 
with Wallis over its content."' 
Before the WRP and Wallis parted ways, Ginsburg drafted her own 
reply brief, which contrasted with Wallis's eventual submission to the 
Court in its treatment of the race analogy, among other issues of form and 
substance. Though Wallis's brief disclaimed any contention "that gender 
based classifications in education are totally analogous to those based on 
race," she quoted extensively from Brown, including the decision's 
"inherently unequal" language. Ginsburg's draft, instead, invited the Court 
to consider sex segregation on its own terms, and in a particular historical 
context. She wanted to assure the Justices that petitioners were not 
35 1 .  Memorand~tni from Ruth Badcr Ginsburg to J i l l  Goodman (May I I ,  1976) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Ruth Dader Ginsburg Papers, Container 9, Folder: Vorchheimer v .  School Dist, 
Correspondence, 1976). 
352. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Jill Goodman 1-2 (June 1 I, 1976) (Library of Congress, 
Ruth Bailer Ginsburg Papers, Container 9, Folder: Vorchheimer v .  School Dist.. C'orrespondence, 
1976). 
353. (ti. 
354. Memorandum from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Sharon K. Wallis, Jill L a ~ ~ r i e  Cioociman, Sc 
Lynn Hecht Schafran I (Jan. 11, 1977) (Library of Congress, Ruth Bader G~nsburg Papers. Container 
9, Folder: Vcrchheltncr v. School Dist., Col~espondence, 1977). 
355 .  J i i .  
356. Chagr~ned by what its attorneys viewed as the low quality of Wallis's draft, the ACLU 
conditioned its assumption of printing costs upon hcr acceptance of their s~tggested changes. 
According to ACLU lawyer Spencer Coxe, Wallis told him "it was better to agree to disagree," and 
that "she would go her own way." Letter from Spencer Coxe to Kathleen Peratis, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, & Lou Pollak (Feb. 23, 1977) (Library of Congress, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 
9, Folder: Vorchheimcr v. School Dist., Correspondence, 1977). The WRP offered to assist her in the 
oral argument, but Wallis "made it clear that she wanted to proceed on her own. And so," concluded 
Coxe, "the sorry tale ends." I d .  Justice Lewis Powell, for one, found Wallis's oral argument "entirely 
confusing . . . no help." Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Oral Argument Notes, 76-37 Vorchheimer v. Seh. Dist. 
(Feb. 22, 1977) (on tile with Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis 
F. Powell. Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Casc Files). 
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"request[ing] an order abolishing single-sex schools as an educational 
alternative," nor werc they "assert[ing] that single-sex schools are per se 
impermissible." Rather, the WRP's tightly written missive focused on the 
history of single-sex elite education in Philadelphia, arguing that 
"reservation of Central to young men has deep roots in 'sexist concepts 
once and still prevalent about women."' The policy "si~nply perpetuat[ed] 
the gender line drawn in 1836," and reinscribed in the 1890s when 
feminists failed in their effort to move women into "intransigent" "male 
bastions" and instead were forced to settle for separate and inferior 
schools.357 Ginsburg's reply brief never reached the Court in an official 
capacity, but she did distribute the document to a number of interested 
parties, including New, I'ork Times reporter Lesley Oelsner, Assistant 
Attorney General Drew Days, and Jerry Lynch, Ginsburg's former student 
and a law clerk to Justice William Brennar~ . '~~  
Records of the Court's deliberations suggest that Ginsburg's concerns 
about over-zealously promoting a race analogy were well-founded. With 
Justice William Rehnquist sidelined by chronic back paln, Sharon Wallis 
made her argument to only eight of the nine Justices. After the Justices' 
first conference, Lynch was optimistic about the plaintiffs prospects: four 
members of the Court-Brennan, Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, and 
Lewis Powell-"agreed that while the findings of the district court 
regarding the equality of the boys' and girls' schools were somewhat 
ambiguous, they could and should be read to mean that the scl1ools were 
not in fact of equal prestige and quality." Consequently, they agreed that 
"the court of appeals' judgment upholding the sex segregation should be 
reversed."359 Three Justices--Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, and 
Chief Justice Warren Burger-"found that the two scl~ools were 
substantially equivalent, that complete equality was unnecessary, and that 
the state should have freedom to experiment." These three would therefore 
affirm the Third Circuit's judgment.jbO Justice Byron White felt the factual 
record on inequalities between the boys' and girls' schools was 
insufficiently developed, and thus tentatively voted to reinand the case for 
further fact-finding.'6' 
By the Justices' second conference vote, however, Chief Justice Burger 
was concerned that the Court would find itself equally divided on 
357. Ruth Badcr t3inshu1-g, Reply Brie!' for- the Petitionel-s at 7-1 1, \'or-chhc~mel- v. Sch. Dist.. No. 
76-37 (Library of Congress. Manusct-ipt Division. Ruth Bader Ginshul-g Papers. Container 10, Folder: 
VOI-chheimer- \;. School Dist. Pleadrngs, 1076-1 977) (draft: never filed). 
358.  Scr letters conta~ned in Lrbrary of Congress. Manuscript Division liut11 Bader Glnsburg 
Papers. C'oniainer- 9 ,  Folder: VOI-chhe~rner u School D~s t . .  Corrcspondencc. 1977. 
359. Memorandum from J.L.. [Setn  L-ynch] to Justice Niilliam J .  Hrennan. Jr. 1. Re: The 1-ine-up 
In Vorchhein~cr. 76-37 (on filc \vitli tlie L~bl-ary of Congress. William S f3rennan. Jr. Papers. Part 
1:421. Folder: \~orcliheimel- v School [list.) 
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361. i ~ l  This was also the po.;it~on of the United States. Set Mcmor-andum lo1 the United States 
a s  Amicus C u ~ ~ a e .  \lox-c!iheimc~- 1,. Sch. Dist . 430 U S .  703 (1977) (No.  76-37) 
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~or-cl:lzeii~zc~.."" In my vie~v," he nrote, '-action by an equally divided 
Court would be open to valid criticism as an institutional fail~tre to meet 
our ~b l i~a t ions . " '~ '  Therefore, Burger told his colleagues, his preference 
would be to canvass Justice Rchnquist's view, or, alternatively, to have 
the case reargued in the presence of all nine J~lstices.'~" Obviously," 
Burger declared, "we did not take this case to evaluate findings against the 
record but only to decide whether gender separated equal schools are 
'inhercntly unequal,' and that issue should neither be evaded nor 
delayed. "'"' 
Defining the issue presented by Vorchlzeirner this broadly was exactly 
the pitfall Ginsburg and her WRP colleagues had sought to avoid.3h6 If 
Burger could frame Vorclzheimev as a question of whether separate but 
equal was "inherently unequal" in the context of single-sex education, he 
was assured victory. And Burger could safely call for reargument without 
jeopardizing his position, knowing that it was highly unlikely that 
Rehnquist would vote to reverse. Burger did not succeed, however, in 
convincing five of his colleagues to vote for reargument, so the 4-4 split 
meant that the Third Circuit's ruling against Vorchheimer would stand.'67 
362. When neither remand nor rcargument commanded a majority o f  Justices, White voted to 
affirm. .%e Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference Notes, 76-37 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. (Mar. 25, 1977) 
(Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of  Law. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 
Suprcnie Court Case Files). 
363. Mlemorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Apr. 11, 1977) 
(Library of  Congress, William J.  Brcnnan. Jr. Papers, Part 1:421. Folder: Vorchheimer v. School 
Dist.). The Chief Jrlsticc was still smarting froin criticism the Court suffered three years earlier for 
failing to resolve the questions raised by the University of Wash i~~g ton  Law School affirmative action 
case D ~ F L ~ ~ I I s  r.. O d ~ g t ~ ~ ~ v c I .  Id. ("I have an uneasy feelmg that the I l eF~mi .~  ease will be linked with 
this-erroneously. of course; but it may appear even to some thoughtful people that the Court had 
evaded the lssue at a tirnc when the addition of  one hour to  the argument session would produce a 
definitive result."). 
364. Mernorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference, Re: Vorchheimer v. 
Sch. Dist. o f  Philacieiphia (Mar. 9. 1977) (Library of Congress, William J .  Brennan. Jr. Papers, Part 
1:42 1 .  Folder. Vorchheimer v.  School Dist.). 
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366. J ~ i s t ~ c e  ['owell noted that four Justices disagr-eed with Chief Justice Burger's judgment that 
the "separate is rnhercntly unequal" question was properly presented. See Memorandun] from Warren 
E. Burger to the Conference. Re: 76-37 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia (Mar. 9, 1977) 
[Powell Archives. Washington and Lee Un~versity School of  Law. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 
Supreme Court Case Files) (Powell wrote in the margin: "But 4 Justices are convinced this question is  
not fzirly presented by this case"). Thc Justices who might vote to reverse the Third Circuit 's decision 
were not doin2 so  on the grounds that all sex separation was unconstitutional per se. Rather? they wel-e 
confining themscl\t.s to the specific facts of the Philadelphia case. where girls were excludcd from a 
school with superior tangible and intangible qualities. 
367. Blacli~nun. also on the side of the school district, agreed that "the Court will look bad, o r  at  
least awkward" if an equally divided vote were the result, and t h ~ ~ s  voted to reargue. Memorandum 
from J~rsticc Harry h Blackrn~in to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Re: Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. o f  
Philadelphia (Apr. 18, 1977) (Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part 1:421, Folder: 
Vorchheimer v. School D~st . ) .  White, too, favored reargument. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. 
White to Chief Justrce Wan-en E. Burger (Apr. 18, 1977) (Library of  Congress, William J.  Brennan, Jr. 
Papers, Part 1:421. Folder: Vorcliheimer v.  School Dist.). Stevens did riot, however, and apparently 
only one other Justice did I\/lemorandurn from Justice John Paul Stevens to Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger (Apr. 18. 1977) (Library of  Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part 1:421, Folder: 
Vorchheimer v. School D~st.) ;  Memorandum fi-om Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to  Justice Harry A. 
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The Chief Justice wrote to Blackmun that he was resigned to the 
inconclusive result. "[Ulntil the Coui-t gives me two votes as in ancient 
English law when a court is equally divided, I find it difficult to cope with 
four unregenerate, unreconstructed 'rebels'! In which case I conduct as 
orderly a retreat as possible."368 
To the Court's critics, it was jurisprudential coherence that appeared to 
be in retreat. WRP director Kathleen Willert Peratis expressed her 
frustration with the Court's capriciousness, complaining that "[elvery case 
seems to be decided on its own facts, depending on how the Court felt that 
day," and Ginsburg agreed that "the Court is not giving courts and lawyers 
the guidance" they needed.36"he following year, Ginsburg reflected that 
perhaps the sex segregation issue had reached the Court too soon, without 
the "generation of litigation" that had laid the legal and sociological 
groundwork for BI -OWI~ . '~~  In a speech several months later, she noted 
wistfully "the case that could have beenv-Helwig v. Jefferson Par-is17 
School Boar-d.371 
Though Ginsburg did not elaborate on her reference to "the case that 
could have been," it is not difficult to imagine why Helulig seemed a 
better sex segregation test case than Vorchheimer. First and foremost, 
Hel~vig supplied the invidious intent missing from Vorchheinz~r. While the 
Third Circuit had found Philadelphia's policy to be based in a "theory of 
equal benefit" rather than "discriminatory denial," there was little question 
that racial inotivations tainted the origins of sex segregation in Louisiana. 
As Tulane Law Professor and Helwig's expert witness Melvin Gruwell 
put it, "there was a very, very definite tie between the policy of 
segregation by sex and the problems of racial de~egregation."'~' Further. 
Blackmun. Re: Vorchheimer v Sch. Dist. of  Philadelphia (Apr. 18, 1977) (L~brary  of  Congress, 
\?'illiani J .  Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part 1:421. Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist.) ("We will look 'bad' 
and the four who voted to reargue need not waive the ancient right to say 'What did we tell you!'"). 
See oiso Letter from Lewis F. Powell, .I]-. to  Warren E.  Burger, Re: No. 76-37 Vorchlieimcr v .  Sch. 
Dist. (Apr. 18, 1977) (Powell Archives, Washingtoll and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. 
Powell. Jr. Papers. Supreme Court Case Files) ("As I view the case as involv~ng urtique facts, I am 
content to 'let the chips 11e wliere they fell.'.'). 
368. Id. 
309. Lesley Oelsner, K e c e ~ ~ t  .Clrpr-enir Golrr-1  Kuliliyc Huve Set Buck M'onlen '.s K~,y/its, N.Y. Tlnd~s. 
Jul. 7: 1977. Reflecting on the 1976-77 Term as a whole, Timr.r reporter Les!ey Oelsner declared that 
the Supreme C o u ~ ? ' s  year "went against vvomen-heavily." quoting an anonyn~ous  l a x  clerk who 
surnrnarized the Term similarly: " T h ~ s  was tlie year the women lost." Qliored in iti. 
370. Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Geor-ge Abel Dreyfus Lecture on Civil L~be r t~es .  Tulane Ilniversity 
School of Law, at 39 (Feb. 13; 1978) (Libral-y of Congress, Manuscript Division. Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
Papers. Container 13: Folder: Speecl~ F~le .  Feb. 13, 1978). 
371. Ruth 13ader Ginsburg, Chapel Hill Address, at  22-23 (Sept. 22. 1978) (Library of  Collgress. 
I\.lanubcript Division, Ruth Bader G~nsburg  Papers. Container 14. Folder: Speech File. Scpt 22. 1978) 
("BI-refly. befor-e turning to L'or-c/i/ieirilc~t.. 1 should notc the case that could Ilaxe bccr~ 7'hr Lou~siana 
.ACl.Li liled it in 197[4]. Jefferson Parish. Louisiana. segl-egated its high schools hy sex the v e q  tiay 
the schools were ~ntegrated by lace Separate and unequal opportul-iities \\.ere slio\vn. and race 
discrnnination in the baclcground was apparent. But tlie tr-ial court sat on the casc for year\. and 
~rcfused to decide it "). 
372 AFSC liepofl. .slcpr-u note 206. at 101. Thc ed~torial  board of the ~ Z ' n l -  0r.irciti.s 71rilr.\.- 
I'IC.UI.IOIC' cxpres'rcd the same view of sex scgrcgat~on's origins in a pair of 1977 editol-~als pr-a~sing the 
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in contrast to the sparse VOI-chheinzel- record, the plaintiffs' attotney had 
compiled more compelling evidence in the Helv~,ig case, replete with 
psychological and sociological assessments of sex segregation's harmf~ll 
effects on girls and assertions of material disparities between the boys' 
and girls' schools. As Ginsburg reflected in 1978, "Brown v. Board of 
Ed~~cation had been preceded by a generation of litigation in which 
decisions turned on the markedly inferior opportunities afforded blacks, 
on inequalities solidly demonstrated at trial . . . . Vorchheimer may have 
been a case brought to the Court too soon, and with too spare a record.""' 
Vorchheir71c.r thus failed to live up to the demands of a race analogy on 
multiple levels. The case had not showcased a well-developed factual and 
social science record comparable to that presented in Brown. That 
deficiency, as Ginsburg's comments suggest, might have been 
preventable. The strategic shortcomings of an analogy to racial 
segregation were more difficult to overcome. If sex segregation had to 
look just like racial segregation to be recognized as a constitutional h a m ,  
the battle was over before it began. If, as Ginsburg believed, the courts 
had trouble seeing the resemblance between sex separation and racial 
segregation when feminists framed their relationship as abstractly 
analogous, perhaps they would have been more willing to find 
constitutional h a m  when, as in the Jane Crow cases, the two phenomena 
were concreteIy interrelated. Instead, the Jane Crow cases remained 
doomed to constitutional obscurity. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE TRANSFORMATION F ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
DISCOURSE 
The post-Brown debate over sex-segregated education provides an 
example of an evolving legal discourse, in which historical actors 
repeatedly redefined the social benefits of, and the legal and constitutional 
h a m s  perpetuated by, a single social practice. The transformation of anti- 
discrimination discourse proceeded in overlapping stages. In the first 
phase, sex segregation remained relatively immune from legal challenge. 
In the second, disputants evaluated Jane Crow as a question of race 
discrimination. In the third stage, while race discrimination did not 
disappear from sight, sex discrimination became the primary lens through 
which participants in the debate viewed sex segregation. Each of these 
legal paradigms-non-discrimination, race discrimination, and sex 
discrimination-offered certain substantive and strategic advantages to 
those seeking to define the harm of segregation and fashion a remedy to 
imminent return of coeducation. See Editorial, Boys clrzd Girl.s Tbgether, New ORLEANS TIMES- 
PICAYUNE, Oct. 1. 1977, $ I ,  at 22 ("[Sex segregation] was begun 15 years ago in response to a court 
order to end racial segregation."); Editorial, Kudos ,for J t f  Sci~ool Board, NEW ORLEANS TIMES- 
PICAYIJNE, Oct. 10, 1977, $ 1,  at 18 (prais~ng the school board for "start[ing] to erase a mistake made 
during emotional and difficult times," and for "refusing to give in to the prejudices of the past"). 
373. Ginsburg, Dreyfus Lecture, supra note 370, at 39. 
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the injustice visited upon children, especially African American children, 
subjected to educational apartheid. Each, however, also contained 
significant flaws: each, in different ways, obscured what was at stake for 
the communities affected by Jane Crow; each provided only a partial 
characterization of sex segregation's harm; and each entailed strategic 
dilemmas for advocates seeking legal and constitutional change. 
As we saw in Part I, sex separation proposals in the period from 1954 to 
the mid-1 960s reflected a complicated mixture of political posturing and 
pragmatism, revealing how blurry were the lines between extremism and 
moderation in Southern segregation politics. The ambiguity and instability 
of Jane Crow's meaning, for better or worse, were on full display during 
this period. For some Southern lawmakers, calling for segregation by sex 
was nothing more than an attempt to bolster one's credentials as an ardent 
segregationist and opponent of "race-mixing," to endorse the hysteria 
animating the angry mobs of white parents who shouted obscenities at 
black children and the politicians who built careers inciting them. For 
many proponents of sex segregation, though, Jane Crow was a well- 
intentioned, realistic response to white Southerners' most visceral and 
intractable objections to racial integration. For moderates, sex segregation 
provided the elusive middle ground between steadfast resistance to and 
wholehearted acceptance of an educational environment that augured the 
possibility of interracial intimacy. 
In the volatile climate of Southern segregation politics, the virtually 
unchallenged constitutional and legal legitimacy of sex segregation was 
double-edged. On the one hand, that legitimacy enabled pragmatists to 
suggest a solution that they believed might save Southern public schools 
from violent upheaval and ultimate destruction. Limited evidence suggests 
that many African Americans were willing to overlook the racial insult 
irnplicit in Jane Crow in order to vanquish Jim Crow: after all, it was 
educational quality, not what some euphemistically called "social 
equality," that they most fervently hoped integration would bring. On the 
other hand, the principal obstacle to recognizing sex segregation as 
racially discriminatory was not substantive but strategic. At a time when 
the Supreme Court assiduously avoided linking desegregation of public 
facilities to interracial marriage, proponents of school desegregation likely 
were loath to imply that coeducation was a necessary ingredient of racial 
equity. To do so was to lend credence to segregationists' apocalyptic 
clailns that racial integration paved an inexorable path to "amalgamation." 
The constitutional legitimacy of sex segregation as an antidote to racial 
desegregation conveyed an unspoken understanding that if the states could 
ban interracial cohabitation and "miscegenation" outright. then surely they 
could take steps to curb the social precursors to interracial intimacy. To 
protest sex segregation as racially discri~ninatory would have disturbed the 
tacit bargain underlying Bvolzr? itself. Jane Crow's constitutional 
legitimacy thus reflected the precarious polltics of education and 
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interracial int~macy more than the unconstrained preferences of 
communities attempting to dismantle Jim Crow. 
While the inotivatlons underlying sex segregation as a feature of racial 
desegregation plans changed little between 1954 and 1968, by the time the 
second phase of the Jane Crow debate began, the legal, political. and 
cultural context had undergone significant transforn~ations."%s Part I1 
related, after McLuzlghlirz and Loving, anti-miscegenation policies no 
longer enjoyed constitutional legitimacy, and civil rights advocates could 
more comfortably frame prophylactics against interracial intimacy as 
racial discrimination designed to maintain white African 
American activism was enabled by and helped to shape a race 
discrimination paradigm for evaluating Jane Crow. A new legal standard 
quickly emerged in the Fifth Circuit: courts launched inquiries into 
whether sex segregation was motivated by "racial discrimination" or by 
legitimate "educational purposes." African Americans in many school 
districts, sometimes with the support of the federal government, argued 
that sex segregation "perpetuate[d] racial segregation by subterf~ige" and 
should be disallowed. The in-court testimony and out-of-court protests of 
African Americans persuaded a significant number of judges to reject Sane 
Crow, including some who initially had embraced sex segregation. 
The race discrimination paradigm thus proved a significant advance in 
that it enabled African American communities to voice their objections to 
sex segregation, and, in many instances, to end the practice once and for 
all. However, the racial motivation standard entailed significant 
drawbacks. First, by allowing school districts to advance "educational 
purposes" as a defense, the standard encouraged the manufacture of race- 
neutral explanations that obscured the true impetus behind sex 
segregation. School districts had a strong incentive-if not a tactical 
imperative-to turn litigation over Jane Crow into a dispute over the 
virtues of single-sex- versus co-education. Despite their continuing 
conviction that sex separation was necessary to stem white flight and the 
withdrawal of public school funding, school officials began to downplay 
sex segregation's origins in racial desegregation panic, focusing instead on 
the merits of single-sex schooling and the shortcomings of coeducation. 
Second, the racial motivation standard focused attention on the purpose 
or motivation underlying sex segregation, but the longer-term 
determinants of African Americans7 attitudes toward Jane Crow turned out 
374. G'zless @'!lo's Conling to Dinner., the Sidney Poitier film depicting the reaction of a whiic 
woman's liberal parents to her decision to wed an African American man, is perhaps the best-known 
reflection of changing views of interracial marriage in mainstream American culture. GUESS WI~IO'S 
COMING TO DKNER (Columbia Pictures, 1967). For more on the changing cultural context dt~ring this 
period. see RO~VIANO, srrpru note 27, at 175-215. 
375. On the nature of the constitutional harm identified in ~McLci~~ghlin and Loling-, as opposed to 
the hann addressed in Brown, see Reva B .  Siegel. Equality Tcilk: Antisubo~.dincitio,r ~ r n d  
Anticlas.sification Vulues in Constit~ltional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1501-05 
(2004). 
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to be more complicated, as we saw in Pqrt IV. A comparison between two 
demographically similar school districts in Georgia and Mississippi 
suggests that in communities where whites kept their children and 
financial resources in the schools and where black and white teachers and 
administrators successfully cooperated in a racially integrated 
environment, Afiican Americans tolerated sex segregation as a long-teim 
transitional measure. In contrast, where whites fled the public schools and 
withdrew their financial support, but retained adn~inistrative control over 
now-predominantly black schools, Afiican American opposition to Jane 
Crow escalated during the 1970s. Thus the animating purpose or intent of 
sex segregation-the primary object of the racial motivation standard's 
inquiry-may have been less important in the long run than its practical 
effects on white behavior and on black educational self-deterrninati~n."~ 
Finally, the racial motivatioil standard, untouched as it was by any 
recognition of emerging anti-sex discrimination norms, enabled school 
districts to utilize a set of gender-based assumptions about the proper 
education of boys and girls in their enumeration of the valid "educational 
purposes" underlying sex segregation. This second phase of the Jane Crow 
debate provides a striking example of how accepted gender nolms could 
stand in for discredited, or at least sharply contested, racial beliefs. In 
constructing "educational purposes," school districts reached for rationales 
that reflected widely-held attitudes regarding sex differences, gender roles, 
and sexuality. They suggested, in effect, that even if Americans disagreed 
about the merits of racial segregation, all could agree that girls and boys 
differed in ilnportant ways, that providing sex-specific training to students 
was sensible and economjcally efficient; and that separating the sexes 
could help to mitigate "disciplina~y" and "sex" "problen~s" in the schools. 
Jane Crow's defenders hoped that as racial barriers fell, a gender 
consensus might stem the tide of social change, or at least save public 
education from white flight and financial insolvency.'77 
The race-neutral justifications offered by school districts evinced no 
concern whatever about the possibility of a sex discrimination challenge to 
Jane Crow, although in hindsight, the "educational purposes" justifications 
appear to invite such a challenge. That challenge so011 came, for the very 
gender consensus that defendant school districts had relied upon was 
unraveling rapidly. The third phase of the sex segregation debate. 
described in Part 111, witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of legal 
tools with which to combat discrimination based on sex, including a new 
376, On the gap between the goals o fc~ \ . i l  rights lawyers and those oi ' the~r  clients ~vith ~rcspect to 
educatio~lal desegl-egation. see Derrick A .  13ell. Jr.. Sri-viiig Ttuo .klu.\rc~i.s: Ii~reg~.cir~ui~ liic trls (ilrd 
(7irili 11rtr1-c..rr.s iil Sc~liooi Ilc~.~ccg/-crgcrfior~ L,i/i:,.cziioii, 85 ?'-\I-E L.J. 470 (1976). 
377. For fascinating d~scubsions oftlie interplay bct\\ecn gendei- arid race in the clnc.l-gcncc of 
I-aiil-aad segregation. see U:ZKB!ZRA Y o I - ~ c ;  M'I-I.KJ:, R l . ( ~ \ s - r l U ( ;  .42111RI(.45 1-113FKr\. Gti\l)l it. I ? \ (  I - .  
I -\h\io I-HI.. RAIL KO..IL, REVOLCI 10s. 1 Hh- 1920 (2001 ): and Barbara Y .  \i clke. l+'/ri~ti  .-Ill i1:c. 
l l i i t ~ i ~ i ?  H'ot-t, i'I.lili~i(' ~ ~ t i d  411 f h ~  fjl(i(.li~ l+>r.e ilrri - Gc,iiciei.. C'luts. Rric.c,. ci~iil rhr Koclci ro l'le\sy. I X 5 S -  
1'114. 13  L . & H I s - r  l i t - \  261 (1995) 
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constitutions! sex equality jurisprudence and statutory weapons like Title 
IX and the EEOA. Significantiy, the f'e~ninist legai arsenal relied heavily 
on an analogy between sex and race discrimination, and the battle over 
Jane Crow was no exception. The first widely-read treatment of the 
"Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans," 
published in 1970, argued that sex segregation inflicted psychological and 
material harms on girls similar to those imposed upon African American 
children by Jim Crow. Organizations like the ACLU, NOW, and the 
League of Women Voters followed suit. Helkcig v. Jefferson Purish 
School Board, filed in 1974, made sex discrimination the centerpiece of an 
assault on sex segregation that eventually broadened to include school 
districts throughout the South. By the time the AFSC issued its report on 
Title IX implementation in Southern schools in 1977, a fully-developed 
sex discrimination argument, based upon a deliberate parallel to racial 
segregation, had become the centerpiece of the legal discourse on Jane 
Crow. 
The sex discrimination argument against Jane Crow had considerable 
appeal. First, it made legally cognizable the objections that local women's 
rights advocates in communities like Jefferson Parish raised against sex 
segregation. There, local activists had been concerned about sex 
segregation's effects on girls since at least the late 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  and saw their 
efforts as part of a wider effort to eradicate sex discrimination in education 
and other realms. Notably, the sex discrimination argument enjoyed a 
potentially large and powerful constituency-white women-whose 
grievances might move white school officials to action where African 
American protests had not. Even without this grassroots impetus, the mere 
availability of sex discrimination theories and precedents, when race 
discrimination arguments alone had failed to move courts, may well have 
brought these arguments to the forefront. Lawyers challenging sex 
segregation would have been remiss had they not exploited the emerging 
constitutional sex equality jurisprudence, Title IX, the EEOA, and the 
other legal tools newly at their disposal. 
These available sex discrimination theories drew in large part on an 
analogy to race: Ginsburg's WRP had argued that sex-based 
classifications should, like classifications based on race, be strictly 
scrutinized as suspect; Title IX, as John David Skrentny has shown, was 
the product of a race-sex analogy as well.378 Basing the sex discrimination 
argument on an analogy to racial segregation offered significant 
advantages. For one thing, comparing sex segregation to Jim Crow helped 
to recast what had been seen as benign differences in treatment as 
invidious discrimination. After all, as Robert Barnett reminded his readers 
in 1970, "the actions of the dominant groups toward both blacks and 
women were thought to be in the best interest of the subordinate 
378. SKRENTNY, . T L ~ ~ P - ( I  note 194, at 230-62. 
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groups."37%dvocates had to convince legal decisionmakers that just as 
these debilitating racial attitudes required exposure and deliberate 
eradication, so did long-accepted principles of sex-based differentiation 
and s~bordination.'~' 
Further, the particular trajectory of the legal debate over sex segregation 
militated in favor of arguments that focused on harm to girls, as the 
analogy-based sex discrimination argument did. The racial motivation 
standard encouraged school districts to emphasize the educational 
rationale for single-sex education, and the justifications they cited often 
relied on theories of sex difference that reinforced the very gender 
stereotypes that Title IX and the Court's newT sex equality jurisprudence 
repudiated. The pedagogical benefits that Jane Crow school districts 
attributed to sex segregation mostly accrued to boys, according to the 
theory that the pressures of female competition undermined male gender 
identity and academic performance. The analogy-based sex discrimination 
paradigm effectively changed the subject from whether single-sex 
education helped boys to whether it harmed girls, enabling advocates to 
answer school districts' "educational purposes" arguments when they 
were unable to prove "racial ~l~otivation" to a court's satisfaction. 
If opponents of race and sex segregation could benefit fiom including 
sex discrimination arguments in their legal arsenal, the women's 
movement, conversely, had much to gain from introducing the Jane Crow 
cases into sex equality doctrine. The race-sex analogy ran into trouble in 
cases like Vorclzheinzer- in large part because judges saw sex segregation 
as benignly intended. The Southern sex segregation cases more vividly 
presented a policy arguably based-to invert the language of the Third 
Circuit majority-not on a theory of "equal benefit," but on one of 
"discriminatory denial." The Jane Crow fact patterns thus supplied the 
invidious intent element missing from cases like Vorchl?einzer, laying bare 
the underbelly of sex segregation in a nation riven by racial and class 
divisions. Feminists knew that they might be able to prevail without 
convincing judges to see sex segregation as exactly parallel to racial 
segregation. But by the mid-1970s, they also knew that the comparison 
was unavoidable. A factual context in which race and sex segregation 
were deeply intertwined helped them to make the case that nefarious 
purposes often lurked behind the seemingly benign faqade of social 
science evidence and the "wisdom of the ages." 
Like tile racial moti\~ation standard, the sex discritnination argul~lent 
against sex segregation also exhibited both substantive and strategic flaws. 
As we saw in Part IV, the developing legal discourse of sex discrimination 
failed to capture fully what African Anlericans articulated as the harn~ of 
sex segregation. Emphasizing sex segregation's detrimental effect on girls 
379 Barnett. Note. silpr-tr noie 186. at 3 13. 
380 For more on the rlxtorical and persuasive pourer- of race-sex analog~cs. sci- Maycri. sltpiu 
note 1 X9 
Yale S o ~ ~ r n a l  o f  La\\ & the I i ~ ~ ~ n a n ~ t l e s  [Vol I X : l X 7  
minimized the extent to which the harrn of segregation afflicted boys. The 
analogy-based paradigm placed a premium on the subordination of one 
group to another, rather than recognizing that segregation might harm ail 
students by imposing rigid sex roles on both boys and girls. For the 
African American community of Amite County, Mississippi, the injury of 
sex segregation extended to both sexes: Jane Crow curtailed curricular 
choices for boys who wished to learn home economics as well as for girls 
who wanted to take shop. If anything, the psychological stigrna of sex 
segregation particularly affected black boys, whose alleged propensity to 
prey upon white girls animated the policy. Boys also bore many of the 
material disadvantages of sex segregation, since they attended formerly 
black schools while the better-equipped white facilities were reserved for 
girls.'81 Further, thinking about Jane Crow and Jim Crow as analogues, 
like talking about the plight of girls as monolithic, obscured the extent to 
which sex segregation may have affected white and black girls quite 
differently .38' 
The dominant legal sex discrimination paradigm, based as it was on an 
analogy to racc, also had profound strategic drawbacks as a constitutional 
argument. When the Jane Crow cases failed to reach the Supreme Court, 
the Vorclzheirner litigation provided the Justices' only opportunity to 
address the legality of sex-segregated public secondary schools. Despite 
Ginsburg's best efforts to frame sex discrimination on its own terms, 
through a limited, rather than a full-blown analogy to Jim Crow, the 
question of whether sex- segregated schooling was, like racial segregation, 
"inherently unequal," ha~lnted Susan Vorchheimer's supporters. 
Analogical arguments about the harm of sex segregation proved too much: 
most judges were unwilling to accept a full-fledged parallel between race 
and sex segregation, and so long as unsympathetic jurists could frame the 
question as one of analogy or dis-analogy, the sex discrimination 
argument was doomed to fail. 
The sex discrimination argument was not uniquely flawed: as we have 
seen, each phase of the legal discourse on Jane Crow obscured, in some 
way, sex segregation's harm as articulated by the affected pal-ties. 
Ironically, the race and sex discrimination paradigms that developed to 
combat sex segregation also shielded certain aspects of the Jane Crow 
debate itself from critical scrutiny. Perhaps the most striking way in which 
the legal discourse masked the underlying issues at stake in disputants' 
out-of-court discussions was the way in which the anti-discrimination 
381. For an intriguing discussion of 51-own's stigma rationale and its relationship to African 
American ambivalence toward school desegregation, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, AII tIistoricul /Vote on 
the Sign~ficance of the Stigma Rntionale.fir ir Civil Riylzis Landmark, 48 S T .  LOUIS U. L.J. 99 1 (2004). 
382. '4s I have argued elsewhere, analogical arguments about race and sex discrimination did not 
necessarily obscure the position of women of color; in fact, African American feminists originally 
invoked such analogies for precisely the opposite purpose. See Mayeri, stlprci note 189. For more on 
the differential effects of sex segregation on different groups of women and girls, see, for example, 
sources cited supra note 4. 
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model failed to challenge, or even to confront, presuppositions about 
children's sociability and sexuality that animated supporters and 
opponents of sex segregation. In the first phase of the Jane Crow debate, 
assumptions about adolescent sexuality and interracial intimacy lurked 
close to the surface. Before concerns about race and sex discrimination 
intervened, the entire justification for sex segregation rested upon the 
notion that children who attended school together would attain the 
physical and social proximity that inevitably would lead to relationships 
with students of the opposite sex. But under the racial motivation standard, 
it behooved Jane Crow's defenders to downplay the fears of interracial 
intimacy that underpinned sex segregation schemes; instead, disputants 
referred to "sex problems" and "disciplinary problems" associated with 
coeducation. The sex discrimination argument, by focusing on the 
subordination of girls under sex segregation, similarly distracted from 
elnotionally fraught issues of sexual intimacy and maturation. Anti- 
discrimination discourse avoided facing head-on the deep-seated ideas 
about "natural" social and sexual behavior that both opponents and 
proponents of sex segregation invoked. 
In contrast, disputants outside the legal arena were still engaging these 
issues. For instance, proponents of coeducation frequently referred to the 
education of boys and girls together as "natural" and "healthy." They 
warned that children would be unable to function in the real world if they 
did not learn to understand and interact with members of the opposite sex. 
Some suggested that students would not find mates, or would choose 
poorly, or would not learn appropriate masculine or feminine behavior, or 
would resort to hoinosexuality as a result of sex-segl-egated schooling. On 
this view, it was sex segregation, not racial desegregation, that disrupted 
"normal" cross-sex relationships and deprived parents and con~munities of 
control over their children's education. 
The evolving anti-discrimination discourse made no mention of the 
extent to which arguments both for and against sex segregation were 
premised on an assumption of normative heterosexuality. Boys and girls 
would be distracted by the presence of the opposite sex, argued 
proponents of sex segregation, who implicitly assumed not only that 
sexual attraction constituted a harmful distraction, but also that boys 
would not be distracted by other boys, nor girls by other girls. Opponents, 
on the other hand, warned that single-sex schools fostered homosexual 
behavior and prevented boys and girls from engaging in the interactions 
necessary to form healthy heterosocial ties. Such arguments implied that 
heterosexual bonds were a natural part of socialization, endanger-ed by 
exclusively homosocial exposure. Of course, they also presupposed that 
homosexuality was unnatural and undesirable. 
The legal discourse of Jane Crow exposed and creatively redefined tlie 
constitutional harm of sex segregation, adapting to, and in turn, sl~aping. 
anti-segregation advocacy and strategy. But anti-discrimination discourse 
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had difficulty capturing the complex interactions between racia! 
ideologies, gender politics, and sexuality embodied in the theory and 
practice of Jane Crow. Racial motivation proved impossible to separate 
from educational purposes, which were themselves inextricably linked to 
assumptions about gender roles, sociability, and sexuality. Nor could legal 
advocacy effectively balance principled opposition to Jane Crow with the 
pragmatic calculus that led some communities to accept sex segregation as 
an unfortunate but necessary alternative to racial strife and the 
impoverishment of the public school system. Jane Crow, born of both 
panic and practicality, profound cynicism and cautious optimism, virulent 
extremism and pragmatic moderation, remained complex and multivalent 
as it reflected and shaped the trajectory of anti-discrimination law and 
discourse. 
